Crane v. X-Parker

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided May 4, 2023·No. 7:23-cv-01413·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK MICHAEL CRANE, Plaintiff, 23-CV-1413 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND X-PARKER; X-NIXON; JOHN DOE LT., Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at Sing Sing Correctional Facility, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights. Named as Defendants are “X-Parker,” “X-Nixon,”1 and a John Doe lieutenant.2 By order dated March 7, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.3 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim

1 The Court assumes Plaintiff uses “X’s” because he does not know these defendants’ first names. 2 Plaintiff filed the complaint without an original signature. By order dated February 22, 2023, the Court directed Plaintiff to provide a signed copy of the signature page to the complaint. (ECF 4.) The Court received Plaintiff’s signature on March 3, 2023. (ECF 5.) 3 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants provided him with inadequate medical care and violated his rights with respect to a misbehavior report and a related disciplinary hearing. The following allegations are taken from the complaint.4 Defendant Parker, who is an “assistant physician” assigned to Plaintiff as his primary care provider at Sing Sing, told Plaintiff that he was “suppose[d] to see a Neural Bone Specialist” with respect to his “shoulder and [b]ones.” (ECF 2, at 2.) However, “for unknown reason(s),” Plaintiff has not seen the specialist even though he has “continued [to] complain[]” to Parker.

(Id.) Plaintiff complained through the facility grievance procedures, filed a complaint with the superintendent, and “finally [appealed] to Albany,” but all his complaints and grievances were denied. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that Parker filed a “false misbehavior report” stating that Plaintiff threatened and harassed him. (Id.) Lieutenant John Doe conducted Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing during which he “relied on insufficient evidence.”5 (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that, without being provided a reason, he was prohibited from questioning Parker or hearing Parker’s testimony. Plaintiff was also unable to present documents or call witnesses who worked in the medical department. Plaintiff alleges that Doe relied solely on Parker’s misbehavior report and “failed to

articulate institutional safety/or correctional goals sufficient to justify denying [P]laintiff(s) right to reply to the evidence.” (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges that Captain Nixon “ignored the evidence presented in [Plaintiff’s] appeal.” (Id. at 3.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (1) Nixon ignored evidence that the security officers working in the area did not hear Plaintiff making threats and they did not “endorse the misbehavior report,” (2) Nixon ignored the fact that Plaintiff denied the allegations

4 Because Plaintiff does not provide any dates in the complaint, the precise sequence of events is unclear. 5 Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing appears to be a result of Parker’s misbehavior report. Plaintiff does not state the outcome of the disciplinary hearing. at the hearing; and (3) Plaintiff was not allowed to present “documentation proof” that Parker filed the complaint in retaliation for Plaintiff’s having filed complaints against Parker. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights arise under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988).

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Crane v. X-Parker, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

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