Crane v. City of Dunsmuir

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. California
DecidedNovember 16, 2020
Docket3:20-cv-07010
StatusUnknown

This text of Crane v. City of Dunsmuir (Crane v. City of Dunsmuir) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Crane v. City of Dunsmuir, (N.D. Cal. 2020).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 7 8 JODI L. CRANE, Case No. 20-cv-07010-JSC

9 Plaintiff, SECTION 1915 SCREENING OF 10 v. COMPLAINT

11 CITY OF DUNSMUIR, et al., Defendants. 12

13 14 Plaintiff Jodi Crane brings this civil rights action against the City of Dunsmuir and various 15 city officials. (Dkt. No. 1.) Having granted Ms. Crane’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, 16 (see Dkt. No. 4), the Court now screens the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and concludes 17 that the complaint is deficient for the reasons stated below. 18 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 19 The facts and allegations of the complaint are difficult to discern. It was prepared using 20 the form “Complaint for Violations of Civil Rights,” but it does not specify what rights Ms. Crane 21 alleges were violated by the City of Dunsmuir, City Manager Todd Juhasz, Fire Chief Daniel 22 Padilla, and Mayor Jiliana Lucchessi. Instead, under the section regarding which right(s) were 23 violated Ms. Crane alleges: “THE RIGHT TO RUN A BUISSNESS [sic] WITHOUT 24 CURRUPTION [sic], DEFLAMATION[sic] OR ABUSE FROM OFFICAILS

13 The Court has a continuing duty to dismiss any case in which a party is proceeding in

v 14 || forma pauperis upon a determination that the case is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a O 15 claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is A 16 immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The standard of review under 28 U.S.C. §

17 1915(e)(2) mirrors that of Rule 12(b)(6). Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000).

18 Thus, the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 19 face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facial plausibility standard is not 20 || a “probability requirement” but mandates “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 21 unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations 22 omitted). To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain more than “naked assertion[s],” “labels 23 and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 24 || U.S. at 555-57. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 25 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 26 alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 27 When a plaintiff files a complaint without being represented by a lawyer, the court must 28 || “construe the pleadings liberally .. . to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v.

1 Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Upon 2 dismissal, self-represented plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis must be given leave “to amend 3 their complaint unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 4 cured by amendment.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984) (internal 5 quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 DISCUSSION 7 There are three primary issues with Ms. Crane’s Complaint. First, the Court cannot 8 discern the nature of Ms. Crane’s claims from her complaint. Second, to the extent that she also 9 seeks to state claims on behalf of her business, JUSTINTIME, she cannot do so without counsel. 10 Finally, venue does not appear proper in this district. 11 A. Failure to State A Claim 12 Ms. Crane appears to allege that the City of Dunsmuir and various city officials interfered 13 with her business. However, it is not clear what civil rights she alleges were violated and what 14 actions were taken which allegedly violated her civil rights. 15 To state a claim under § 1983, a complaint “must both (1) allege the deprivation of a right 16 secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the deprivation was 17 committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 18 (9th Cir. 2006). To adequately plead these elements, the complaint must identify what 19 constitutional or other federal right each defendant violated, providing sufficient facts to plausibly 20 support each purported violation. See, e.g., Drawsand v. F.F. Props., L.L.P., 866 F. Supp. 2d 21 1110, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Aside from passing references to due process and equal protection, 22 the Complaint fails to allege how [plaintiffs’] constitutional rights were violated and fails to 23 identify each Defendant's role therein.”); Walsh v. Am. Med. Response, No. 2:13-cv-2077 MCE 24 KJN (PS), 2014 WL 2109946, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 20, 2014) (“Before any claims may be found 25 to be cognizable, plaintiffs must separate each specific claim they wish to pursue, identify which 26 defendants relate to each particular claim, and identify the Constitutional right implicated by each 27 claim.”). 1 for causing a constitutional deprivation, a municipality may not be sued under Section 1983 solely 2 because an injury was inflicted by its employees or agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the 3 City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91, 694 (1978). The entity is instead responsible only when 4 execution of a government’s policy or custom inflicts the injury. Id. To impose municipal 5 liability under Section 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that 6 [s]he possessed a constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a 7 policy; (3) that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff’s constitutional 8 right; and (4) that the policy is the ‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt v. 9 Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v.

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Related

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
City of Canton v. Harris
489 U.S. 378 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Hebbe v. Pliler
627 F.3d 338 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Harry Franklin v. Ms. Murphy and Hoyt Cupp
745 F.2d 1221 (Ninth Circuit, 1984)
Lopez v. Smith
203 F.3d 1122 (Ninth Circuit, 2000)
Sibley v. Obama
866 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.C. Circuit, 2012)

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Bluebook (online)
Crane v. City of Dunsmuir, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/crane-v-city-of-dunsmuir-cand-2020.