IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2021-NCCOA-450
No. COA20-261
Filed 7 September 2021
Mecklenburg County, No. 18-CVS-14058
ERIC E. CRAIG and wife, GINA D. CRAIG, Plaintiffs,
v.
BETTY BLAIR NEAL, Defendant,
and
JACK HUDSON and wife, GINNER HUDSON, and JAMES F. SHUMAN, JR. and wife, ANNE MARIE P. SHUMAN, Nominal Defendants.
Appeal by Plaintiffs from order entered 28 October 2019 by Judge Louis A.
Trosch in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9
February 2021.
Law Office of Kenneth T. Davies, P.C., by Kenneth T. Davies, for the Plaintiffs- Appellants.
Johnston, Allison & Hord, P.A., by Mary Fletcher Mullikin and Martin L. White, for the Defendant-Appellee
DILLON, Judge.
I. Background CRAIG V. NEAL
Opinion of the Court
¶1 Plaintiffs own a 2.57-acre lot located within Country Colony, a 17-lot
residential subdivision in Charlotte. Defendant owns three residential lots adjacent
to Plaintiffs’ lot, but which lie outside of the Country Colony subdivision. Their
dispute concerns their respective rights, if any, to use a certain right-of-way depicted
on a plat recorded in 1952 when Plaintiffs’ lot and Defendant’s three lots were part
of a larger tract.
¶2 Prior to 1952, Plaintiffs’ lot and Defendant’s three lots were part of a larger 65-
acre tract of land owned by the Newsons, a married couple. In 1952, a plat (the “1952
Plat”) was recorded depicting a 7.585-acre tract carved out from the 65-acre tract.
The 1952 Plat is reproduced below: CRAIG V. NEAL
This 1952 Plat was filed in anticipation of the Newsons conveying part of their 65-
acre tract – specifically this 7.585-acre tract – to another couple, the Penders, and
retaining the remaining 57 acres for the development of Country Colony. The 1952
Plat depicts a new right-of-way, labeled as “Country Lane,” straddling the boundary
separating the 7.585-acre tract shares from the future Country Colony subdivision.
Based upon the 1952 Plat, Country Lane is depicted as a right-of-way sixty (60) feet
in width, with thirty (30) feet in width on either side of the boundary line. CRAIG V. NEAL
¶3 Over the course of time, this 7.585-acre tract was subdivided into lots, with
Defendant acquiring three of said lots. Country Colony was developed into 17 lots,
with Plaintiffs coming to own the lot adjacent to Defendant’s property, along the bend
of County Lane.
¶4 Also, at some point, two gravel roads were created within the Country Lane
right-of-way. One of these roads provides Defendant access to her lots from
Kuykendall Road. In 2018, Plaintiffs erected a fence on their lot that extended across
the gravel road, depriving Defendant’s ability to use the road to access Kuykendall
Road from her lots. Plaintiffs’ act led to the commencement of this action.
¶5 The matter was tried without a jury. Plaintiffs argued at trial, in part, that
any right that Defendant might have had in Country Lane was extinguished by
operation of the Marketable Title Act. The trial court, however, determined that
Country Lane is, in fact, a public right-of-way, owned by the City of Charlotte. The
trial court concluded the Marketable Title Act does not apply and ordered Plaintiffs
to remove the fencing. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
¶6 Since this matter was tried by the trial judge, and not by a jury, “the trial court
is the fact finder; and on appeal, [we] are bound by the trial court’s findings if
competent evidence in the record supports those findings.” Fortune Ins. Co. v. Owens,
351 N.C. 424, 428, 526 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2000). However, we review de novo the trial CRAIG V. NEAL
court’s conclusions of law and whether those conclusions are supported by the
findings of fact. See Kirby Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. McNeil, 327 N.C. 234, 241, 393 S.E.2d
827, 831 (1990).
III. Summary of Opinion
¶7 The parties dispute their respective rights to use the Country Lane
right-of-way. Accordingly, “Country Lane,” as used in this opinion, refers specifically
to the 60-foot wide, right-of-way area as depicted on the 1952 Plat, and not to the
gravel roads themselves or to any other area. 1
¶8 The trial court determined that Country Lane is a public right-of-way, owned
by the City of Charlotte, based on its finding that the Newsons dedicated Country
Lane to the city when they recorded the 1952 Plat. Based on this determination, the
trial court declared that all parties (and the public) have the right to use all of the
Country Lane right-of-way.
¶9 We conclude, however, that the trial court’s findings and the undisputed facts
do not support the trial court’s finding that the Newsons intended to dedicate Country
Lane to the City of Charlotte or any other governmental body back in 1952. Rather,
1 There was also evidence that a paved road extends along the southern border of the
Country Colony subdivision west of Lot 10. This paved road was formally offered to and accepted by the City of Charlotte by the impacted lot owners. This paved road is also called Country Lane and does connect with the Country Lane right-of-way as depicted on the 1952 Plat. However, this matter only concerns the non-paved portion of Country Lane, which is the right-of-way depicted in the 1952 Plat. CRAIG V. NEAL
we conclude the Newsons intended to create private easement rights for the benefit
of the owners of the land adjacent to Country Lane as a matter of law. It may be that
the City of Charlotte has come to own all or portions of Country Lane based on some
other legal theory. However, no other theory has been argued in this appeal; the
findings and the evidence in the record do not conclusively establish the City’s
ownership as a matter of law; and the City is not a party to this action.
¶ 10 Further, we conclude the parties have private appurtenant easement rights to
portions of Country Lane not on their respective lot(s) for ingress and egress to the
public roads. 2
IV. Analysis
A. No Substantial Evidence That Country Lane Is a Public Right-Of-Way
¶ 11 The trial court found that the Newsons (who owned the original 65-acre tract)
dedicated Country Lane as a public road in 1952. Specifically, the trial court found:
The process followed by the developer of Country Colony [the Newsons] was typical for plats filed in the 1950s when rights of way were offered for dedication to the public. In the case, the recordation of the [1952 Plat] was an offer to dedicate Country Lane to the public.
(Emphasis added.) This theory of “dedication” formed the sole theory by which the
2 Nominal defendants (the Hudsons and the Shumans) own other lots that Country
Lane crosses. The Hudsons own Lot 11 within Country Colony to the north of Plaintiffs’ lot on the west side of Country Lane. The Shumans own a lot outside of Country Colony to the north of Defendant’s lots on the east side of Country Lane. CRAIG V. NEAL
trial court determined Country Lane to be a public road owned by the City of
Charlotte.
¶ 12 The term “dedication” refers to the process by which an owner/developer of real
estate offers, either formally or informally, some portion of his development to the
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
2021-NCCOA-450
No. COA20-261
Filed 7 September 2021
Mecklenburg County, No. 18-CVS-14058
ERIC E. CRAIG and wife, GINA D. CRAIG, Plaintiffs,
v.
BETTY BLAIR NEAL, Defendant,
and
JACK HUDSON and wife, GINNER HUDSON, and JAMES F. SHUMAN, JR. and wife, ANNE MARIE P. SHUMAN, Nominal Defendants.
Appeal by Plaintiffs from order entered 28 October 2019 by Judge Louis A.
Trosch in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9
February 2021.
Law Office of Kenneth T. Davies, P.C., by Kenneth T. Davies, for the Plaintiffs- Appellants.
Johnston, Allison & Hord, P.A., by Mary Fletcher Mullikin and Martin L. White, for the Defendant-Appellee
DILLON, Judge.
I. Background CRAIG V. NEAL
Opinion of the Court
¶1 Plaintiffs own a 2.57-acre lot located within Country Colony, a 17-lot
residential subdivision in Charlotte. Defendant owns three residential lots adjacent
to Plaintiffs’ lot, but which lie outside of the Country Colony subdivision. Their
dispute concerns their respective rights, if any, to use a certain right-of-way depicted
on a plat recorded in 1952 when Plaintiffs’ lot and Defendant’s three lots were part
of a larger tract.
¶2 Prior to 1952, Plaintiffs’ lot and Defendant’s three lots were part of a larger 65-
acre tract of land owned by the Newsons, a married couple. In 1952, a plat (the “1952
Plat”) was recorded depicting a 7.585-acre tract carved out from the 65-acre tract.
The 1952 Plat is reproduced below: CRAIG V. NEAL
This 1952 Plat was filed in anticipation of the Newsons conveying part of their 65-
acre tract – specifically this 7.585-acre tract – to another couple, the Penders, and
retaining the remaining 57 acres for the development of Country Colony. The 1952
Plat depicts a new right-of-way, labeled as “Country Lane,” straddling the boundary
separating the 7.585-acre tract shares from the future Country Colony subdivision.
Based upon the 1952 Plat, Country Lane is depicted as a right-of-way sixty (60) feet
in width, with thirty (30) feet in width on either side of the boundary line. CRAIG V. NEAL
¶3 Over the course of time, this 7.585-acre tract was subdivided into lots, with
Defendant acquiring three of said lots. Country Colony was developed into 17 lots,
with Plaintiffs coming to own the lot adjacent to Defendant’s property, along the bend
of County Lane.
¶4 Also, at some point, two gravel roads were created within the Country Lane
right-of-way. One of these roads provides Defendant access to her lots from
Kuykendall Road. In 2018, Plaintiffs erected a fence on their lot that extended across
the gravel road, depriving Defendant’s ability to use the road to access Kuykendall
Road from her lots. Plaintiffs’ act led to the commencement of this action.
¶5 The matter was tried without a jury. Plaintiffs argued at trial, in part, that
any right that Defendant might have had in Country Lane was extinguished by
operation of the Marketable Title Act. The trial court, however, determined that
Country Lane is, in fact, a public right-of-way, owned by the City of Charlotte. The
trial court concluded the Marketable Title Act does not apply and ordered Plaintiffs
to remove the fencing. Plaintiffs timely appealed.
II. Standard of Review
¶6 Since this matter was tried by the trial judge, and not by a jury, “the trial court
is the fact finder; and on appeal, [we] are bound by the trial court’s findings if
competent evidence in the record supports those findings.” Fortune Ins. Co. v. Owens,
351 N.C. 424, 428, 526 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2000). However, we review de novo the trial CRAIG V. NEAL
court’s conclusions of law and whether those conclusions are supported by the
findings of fact. See Kirby Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. McNeil, 327 N.C. 234, 241, 393 S.E.2d
827, 831 (1990).
III. Summary of Opinion
¶7 The parties dispute their respective rights to use the Country Lane
right-of-way. Accordingly, “Country Lane,” as used in this opinion, refers specifically
to the 60-foot wide, right-of-way area as depicted on the 1952 Plat, and not to the
gravel roads themselves or to any other area. 1
¶8 The trial court determined that Country Lane is a public right-of-way, owned
by the City of Charlotte, based on its finding that the Newsons dedicated Country
Lane to the city when they recorded the 1952 Plat. Based on this determination, the
trial court declared that all parties (and the public) have the right to use all of the
Country Lane right-of-way.
¶9 We conclude, however, that the trial court’s findings and the undisputed facts
do not support the trial court’s finding that the Newsons intended to dedicate Country
Lane to the City of Charlotte or any other governmental body back in 1952. Rather,
1 There was also evidence that a paved road extends along the southern border of the
Country Colony subdivision west of Lot 10. This paved road was formally offered to and accepted by the City of Charlotte by the impacted lot owners. This paved road is also called Country Lane and does connect with the Country Lane right-of-way as depicted on the 1952 Plat. However, this matter only concerns the non-paved portion of Country Lane, which is the right-of-way depicted in the 1952 Plat. CRAIG V. NEAL
we conclude the Newsons intended to create private easement rights for the benefit
of the owners of the land adjacent to Country Lane as a matter of law. It may be that
the City of Charlotte has come to own all or portions of Country Lane based on some
other legal theory. However, no other theory has been argued in this appeal; the
findings and the evidence in the record do not conclusively establish the City’s
ownership as a matter of law; and the City is not a party to this action.
¶ 10 Further, we conclude the parties have private appurtenant easement rights to
portions of Country Lane not on their respective lot(s) for ingress and egress to the
public roads. 2
IV. Analysis
A. No Substantial Evidence That Country Lane Is a Public Right-Of-Way
¶ 11 The trial court found that the Newsons (who owned the original 65-acre tract)
dedicated Country Lane as a public road in 1952. Specifically, the trial court found:
The process followed by the developer of Country Colony [the Newsons] was typical for plats filed in the 1950s when rights of way were offered for dedication to the public. In the case, the recordation of the [1952 Plat] was an offer to dedicate Country Lane to the public.
(Emphasis added.) This theory of “dedication” formed the sole theory by which the
2 Nominal defendants (the Hudsons and the Shumans) own other lots that Country
Lane crosses. The Hudsons own Lot 11 within Country Colony to the north of Plaintiffs’ lot on the west side of Country Lane. The Shumans own a lot outside of Country Colony to the north of Defendant’s lots on the east side of Country Lane. CRAIG V. NEAL
trial court determined Country Lane to be a public road owned by the City of
Charlotte.
¶ 12 The term “dedication” refers to the process by which an owner/developer of real
estate offers, either formally or informally, some portion of his development to the
general public, typically for a road, and said offer is accepted by the governing
authority. See Spaugh v. Charlotte, 239 N.C. 149, 159-60, 79 S.E.2d 748, 756 (1954).3
¶ 13 A dedication offer can be made either expressly or through implication. Id. at
159, 79 S.E.2d at 756 (stating that “[d]edication may be either in express terms or
may be implied from conduct on the part of the owner”). But a dedication is only
completed when the developer’s offer is accepted by the responsible public authority.
Wofford v. Highway Commission, 263 N.C. 677, 683, 140 S.E.2d 376, 381 (1965).
¶ 14 We conclude that no substantial evidence exists in the record to support
the trial court’s finding that the Newsons intended to offer, expressly or by
implication, Country Lane to the public. Rather, the 1952 Plat and other documents
filed contemporaneously demonstrate that the Newsons intended to create Country
Lane as a private appurtenant easement for the benefit of the subdivided 7.585-acre
tract and the to-be-developed Country Colony tract.
3 If an easement is created for the benefit of the property owners within the development only, such grant is not technically a “dedication.” That is, the term “dedication” technically refers to a grant of rights to the public at large. It is not the appropriate term when referring to the creation of private easement rights. CRAIG V. NEAL
¶ 15 Specifically, no evidence tends to show the Newsons expressly offered to
dedicate Country Lane for public use. The 1952 Plat merely identifies Country Lane
as a “R/W,” meaning right-of-way, without any express indication that the right-of-
way was dedicated for public use. The trial court did determine, though, that the
Newsons impliedly offered for dedication Country Lane when they recorded the 1952
Plat.
¶ 16 Our Supreme Court has recognized that where an owner of land files a plat
showing land subdivided “into lots and streets, and sells and conveys the lots or any
of them with reference to the plat, nothing else appearing, he thereby dedicates the
streets . . . [to] the public.” Blowing Rock v. Gregorie, 243 N.C. 364, 367, 90 S.E.2d
898, 901 (1956). However, our Supreme Court has also recognized that an owner
filing a plat may be deemed to have granted a private easement solely to the adjacent
landowners and not a grant to the public:
Where lots are sold and conveyed by reference to a map or plat which represents a division of a tract of land into streets, lots, parks and playgrounds, a purchaser of a lot or lots acquires the right to have the streets, parks and playgrounds kept open for his reasonable use, and this right is not subject to revocation except by agreement. It is said that such streets, parks and playgrounds are dedicated to the use of lot owners in the development. In a strict sense it is not a dedication, for a dedication must be made to the public and not to a part of the public. It is a right in the nature of an easement appurtenant. CRAIG V. NEAL
Realty Co. v. Hobbs, 261 N.C. 414, 421, 135 S.E.2d 30, 35-36 (1964) (citations
omitted).
¶ 17 In reaching its determination that the Newsons intended an offer to the public
when they recorded the 1952 Plat, the trial court relied on “expert” testimony. The
opinion was essentially that the manner in which the 1952 Plat and another plat filed
the same year laying out the 17 lots of Country Colony was the manner in which real
estate developers during that time would go about dedicating a street to the public.
We conclude, however, while expert opinion is admissible on the proper legal
interpretation of recorded real estate documents, the “expert” opinion offered at the
trial below was clearly not reliable. Specifically, the plats upon which the expert
opinion was based are materially different from the 1952 Plat. The plats relied upon
depicted subdivisions where the property lines for the lots did not extend to the center
line of the streets. Rather, the streets depicted were not part of any lot to be sold.
And no lots were sold in those subdivisions which included ownership of any part of
the streets depicted on the plats. Below is one of the plats relied upon by the expert;
specifically, a plat from 1952 depicting the Eastway Park subdivision in Charlotte,
recorded in Map Book 1487, Page 465 in the Mecklenburg County Registry: CRAIG V. NEAL
It could certainly be “implied” from the above plat that the developer of Eastway Park
intended the streets depicted to be open to the public, in large part because these
streets are not part of anyone’s private lot. The other plats the expert relied upon
also depict streets that are not part of any lot that was sold.4
4 These other plats include (1) a plat recorded in 1952 in Map Book 1487, Page 457,
showing Shamrock Gardens subdivision; (2) a plat recorded in 1952 in Map Book 1487, Page 461, showing land being subdivided into two lots; and (3) a plat recorded in 1952 in Map Book 1487, Page 463, showing Lakeview Park subdivision. CRAIG V. NEAL
¶ 18 The 1952 Plat that created Country Lane, though, depicts the boundary line
subdividing the 7.585-acre tract from the 57 acres which would become Country
Colony running down the middle of the Country Lane right-of-way. Again, this 1952
Plat was recorded in January 1952. A month later, in February 1952, when the
Newsons actually conveyed the 7.585-acre tract to the Penders, the deed description
included half of the Country Lane right-of-way, describing a boundary as running
along “the center of Country Lane.”
¶ 19 Also in February 1952, the Newsons filed another plat depicting the to-be-
developed Country Colony subdivision. This map of Country Colony provides further
proof that the Newsons did not intend to dedicate Country Lane to the public. This
map shows Country Colony’s 17 lots (including Lot 10 now owned by Plaintiffs). It
depicts the 7.585-acre tract adjacent to Country Colony as land owned by “John R.
Pender.” But this plat does not show the Country Lane right-of-way. The Country
Colony subdivision plat is shown below. CRAIG V. NEAL
¶ 20 We further note that the Newsons could not have intended to dedicate
Country Lane to the City of Charlotte, as this area of Mecklenburg County was not
annexed into the City of Charlotte until the 1980s, decades after the 1952 Plat was
recorded. All of the trial court’s findings regarding the City’s involvement with
Country Lane concern events that occurred after 1980.
B. The 1952 Plat Did Create Private Easement Rights
¶ 21 We conclude that the recording of the 1952 Plat in January 1952, and the
conveyance of the 7.585-acre tract to the Penders referencing the 1952 Plat the CRAIG V. NEAL
following month, created private easement rights in Country Lane. See Hobbs, 261
N.C. at 421, 135 S.E.2d at 36.
¶ 22 It is true that when the Newsons later sold lots in Country Colony, none of the
deeds conveying these lots ever referred to the 1952 Plat. Rather, those deeds
referred to the Country Colony map, which does not depict Country Lane. However,
before the Newsons ever conveyed any lot in Country Colony, they conveyed the
7.585-acre tract to the Penders by deed which did reference the 1952 Plat.
¶ 23 Based on Hobbs and other Supreme Court jurisprudence, we hold that the
conveyance of the 7.585-acre tract by the Newsons to the Penders included, by
implication, private easement rights in Country Lane for the benefit of the 7.585-acre
tract and reserved private easement rights in Country Lane for the tract which would
later become Country Colony for the lots fronting on Country Lane. Accordingly,
when the Newsons later conveyed lots in Country Colony (including Lot 10 now
owned by Plaintiffs), the grantees of those lots along Country Lane took subject to the
appurtenant easement rights of the owner(s) of the 7.585-acre tract. Likewise, these
grantees received appurtenant easement rights to the portion of Country Lane on the
other side of the boundary line of the 7.585-Acre tract.
C. Current Rights in Country Lane CRAIG V. NEAL
¶ 24 Having concluded that the predecessors-in-title to Plaintiffs’ lot and
Defendant’s three lots had appurtenant easement rights in Country Lane, we next
consider whether those rights still exist.
¶ 25 Private easement rights may be extinguished in a number of ways. For
instance, such rights may be extinguished by abandonment, see Miller v. Teer, 220
N.C. 605, 612, 18 S.E.2d 173, 178 (1942), by the servient owner’s adverse use for
twenty years, see Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC v. Gray, 369 N.C. 1, 7, 789 S.E.2d 445,
449 (2016), or by the Marketable Title Act, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47B-2 (2018) (stating
if a property owner has an unbroken chain of title dating back thirty years, earlier
rights and interests in the land are extinguished, barring a few exceptions).
¶ 26 Here, the trial court, as factfinder, found that “[t]here was no evidence
that any portion of Country Lane has been abandoned by [any of the parties].” No
party challenges this finding as erroneous. Therefore, it is binding on appeal.
¶ 27 Plaintiffs, though, argue that Defendant lost any right to use the portion of
Country Lane located on their Lot 10 based upon operation of the Marketable Title
Act. We disagree.
¶ 28 This Act provides that an owner of land takes free of nonpossessory interests
that others may have but which do not appear in the owner’s chain of title going back
thirty (30) years. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47B-2. Here, the trial court found that Defendant
(and her family) have been continuously using the gravel road since 1966 which CRAIG V. NEAL
Plaintiffs blocked in 2018. Based on this finding, we conclude that Defendant’s
private easement rights in the portion of Country Lane on Plaintiffs’ Lot 10 have not
been extinguished by operation of the Marketable Title Act. We so conclude based on
an exception under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 47B-3(3), which provides that the Act shall not
affect or extinguish “interests [or] claims . . . of any person who is in present, actual
and open possession of the real property so long as such person is in such possession.”
¶ 29 Plaintiffs argue that they own one of the gravel roads based on the theory of
adverse possession. We presume that Plaintiffs are contending that they now have
fee simple rights to all portions of this road, including the portions on Defendant’s lot.
We reject this argument as there is no evidence that this use was hostile, as in,
exclusive. See State v. Brooks, 275 N.C. 175, 180, 166 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1969)
(recognizing that an element of adverse possession is that the possession must be
“hostile”). Rather, Plaintiffs’ use of this road was not hostile, as they have always
had private easement rights to this road, as it lies within Country Lane, and the
evidence showed that Defendant used the road.
¶ 30 We do not address whether the parties, or some of them, may have lost
easement rights in the undeveloped portions of Country Lane (areas where there is
no gravel road established) where it could be shown that the fee simple owner of said
portions denied access to the easement owner(s). The trial court made no findings in CRAIG V. NEAL
this regard, and no party has made any argument on appeal that rights in
undeveloped portions of Country Lane have been lost through adverse possession.
V. Conclusion
¶ 31 The trial court correctly concluded that the parties have the right to use
Country Lane but that the court erred in its reasoning. Specifically, the trial court
erred in concluding that Country Lane is a public road based upon the 1952 Plat.
Notwithstanding, we conclude that the parties have private, appurtenant easement
rights in Country Lane. No party may interfere with the easement rights in Country
Lane of the other parties.
¶ 32 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order declaring Country Lane
to be a public street or road. We, otherwise, affirm the trial court’s order declaring
the parties’ rights in Country Lane, but for the reason that each adjoining property
owner was granted and possesses private, appurtenant easement rights to the other
parties’ lots within the Country Lane right-of-way.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED
Judges TYSON and ARROWWOOD concur.