Craig Shults v. Brian Birkholz

District Court, C.D. California·Decided February 27, 2023·No. 2:22-cv-07273·Unknown

Opinion

Case 2:22-cv-07273-JAK-MAR Document 23 Filed 02/27/23 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:406

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4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8

9 CRAIG SHULTS, Case No. 2:22-cv-07273-JAK (MAR) Petitioner, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED v. STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE Respondent. This Final1 Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable John A. Kronstadt, United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California. I. Petitioner, Craig Shults (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1 at 1.2 Respondent filed an answer 1 This Final Report and Recommendation is identical to the original, except for the fact that the Certificate of Appealability section is omitted, as it was included in error. See Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting “[a]lthough state prisoners proceeding under § 2241 must obtain a [certificate of appealability], see § 2253(c)(1)(A), there is no parallel requirement for federal prisoners” who file “legitimate § 2241 petitions”). The recommendation is otherwise unchanged. 2 All citations to electronically filed documents refer to the CM/ECF pagination. Case 2:22-cv-07273-JAK-MAR Document 23 Filed 02/27/23 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #:407

1 (“Answer”), arguing that Petitioner is not entitled to relief. Dkt. 13. Petitioner filed a 2 Motion for Bail, Dkt. 16, and a Traverse (“Traverse”), Dkt. 17. 3 For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends: (1) accepting this Report 4 and Recommendation; (2) DENYING the Petition; (3) DENYING the Motion for 5 Bail; and (4) DISMISSING this action with prejudice. 6 II. 8 On September 29, 2022, Petitioner, who is in federal custody and proceeding 9 pro se, constructively filed3 the instant Petition. Dkt. 1. Petitioner argues he is entitled to the application of 630 days of earned time credit (“ETC”) under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”). Dkts. 1 at 3–4; 2 at 11–12. Petitioner contends that, if all his ETCs were applied correctly, he would be entitled to release into a Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) halfway house immediately. In their Answer, Respondent confirms that BOP determined Petitioner was eligible for ETCs under the FSA, and that, as of October 10, 2022, Petitioner had earned a total of 630 ETCs. Dkt. 13-1 at 3–4. However, as discussed below, Respondent contends Petitioner misapprehends the application of his ETCs and the interaction between his ETCs and his case manager’s recommendation. Dkt. 13 at 7– 10. Petitioner filed a Motion for Bail, Dkt. 16, and a Traverse, Dkt. 17. Petitioner maintains that a correct application of his remaining ETCs would entitle him to release into a BOP halfway house immediately. Id. /// /// ///

3 Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a pleading to mail to court, the court deems the pleading constructively “filed” on the date it is signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 2 Case 2:22-cv-07273-JAK-MAR Document 23 Filed 02/27/23 Page 3 of 7 Page ID #:408

4 Under the FSA, “[t]ime credits earned . . . shall be applied toward time in 5 prerelease custody or supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(C). “If the 6 sentencing court included as a part of the prisoner’s sentence a requirement that the 7 prisoner be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment . . . , [the BOP] 8 may transfer the prisoner to begin any such term of supervised release at an earlier 9 date, not to exceed 12 months, based on the application of time credits.” Id. § 3624(g)(3) (emphasis added); see also 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(d)(3) (“The application of FSA Time Credits would result in transfer to supervised release no earlier than 12 months before the date that transfer to supervised release would otherwise have occurred.”). “Early transfer to supervised release effectively reduces an inmate’s sentence by, at max, one year.” Mills v. Starr, No. 21-cv-1335, 2022 WL 4084178, at *1, *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 17, 2022); see also, e.g., Roberts v. Cox, No. 4:20-CV-04187, 2022 WL 742489, at *2 (D. S.D. Mar. 11, 2022) (“Further, the BOP cannot grant an inmate more than twelve months of supervised release for earned time credits under the First Step Act.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(3))). Additionally, “[u]nder the First Step Act, an inmate is only eligible to have their time credits applied if they meet certain criteria under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g).” Mills, 2022 WL 4084178, at *4. “That criteria includes having accumulated time credits in an amount that is equal to the remainder of [the inmate’s] imposed term of imprisonment . . . .” Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(g)(1)(A) (eligibility requirement that prisoner “has earned time credits . . . in an amount that is equal to the remainder of the prisoner’s imposed term of imprisonment”); 28 C.F.R. § 523.44(b)(1) (time credits may be applied toward prerelease custody or early transfer to supervise release if eligible inmate has “[e]arned FSA Time Credits in an amount that is equal to the remainder of the inmate’s imposed term of imprisonment”). “In other words, the 3 Case 2:22-cv-07273-JAK-MAR Document 23 Filed 02/27/23 Page 4 of 7 Page ID #:409

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Related

Roberts v. Marshall
627 F.3d 768 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Reeb v. Thomas
636 F.3d 1224 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Harrison v. Ollison
519 F.3d 952 (Ninth Circuit, 2008)