Craig A. Yost v. Esther Saldana Nunez, et al.

• Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00918
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

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3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE

9 10 CRAIG A. YOST, CASE NO. C25-0918JLR 11 Plaintiff, ORDER v. 12 ESTHER SALDANA NUNEZ, et al., 13 Defendants. 14

15 I. INTRODUCTION 16 Before the court are (1) Defendant Snohomish County Superior Court’s (“SCSC”) 17 motion to dismiss (SCSC MTD (Dkt. # 22); SCSC Reply (Dkt. # 33)); and (2) Defendant 18 Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, Tacoma Division of Child 19 Support’s (“DSHS”) motion to dismiss (DSHS MTD (Dkt. # 25); DSHS Reply (Dkt. 20 # 28)). SCSC and DSHS (together, “Moving Defendants”) petition the court to dismiss 21 Plaintiff Craig Yost’s claims against them with prejudice pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 22 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (SCSC MTD at 1; see also DSHS 1 MTD at 1.) Mr. Yost, who is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), opposes 2 both motions to dismiss. (Resp. (Dkt. # 30).) The court has considered Mr. Yost’s

3 complaint, the parties’ submissions, and the governing law. Being fully advised,1 the 4 court GRANTS Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss; DISMISSES with prejudice Mr. 5 Yost’s claims against all Defendants for violations of his civil rights under § 1983, 6 violation of the SCRA, and civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); and DECLINES 7 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Yost’s state-law claims 8 II. BACKGROUND

9 On June 25, 2025, Mr. Yost filed a complaint against the Moving Defendants and 10 individual Defendants Esther Saldana Nunez, Tracy D. Finnegan, Stephanie L. McNulty, 11 and Leslie E. Gilbertson (“Individual Defendants,” and together with Moving 12 Defendants, “Defendants”), in which he contends Defendants (1) violated his rights under 13 the Fourteenth Amendment and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (“SCRA”), 50

14 U.S.C. § 3931, and (2) engaged in a conspiracy to violate those rights. (Compl. (Dkt. # 12 15 at 1-15) at 11-12.) Mr. Yost further asserts state-law claims against Defendants for civil 16 conspiracy,2 intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and violation of 17 Washington Civil Rule 60. (Id.) He seeks damages and injunctive relief. (Id. at 5; see 18

19 1 Mr. Yost requests oral argument on Defendants’ motions to dismiss. (See MTD Resp. at 1.) The court, however, concludes that oral argument would not assist in its resolution of these 20 motions. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4) (providing that all motions will be decided by the court without oral argument, unless otherwise ordered by the court). 21 2 Because Mr. Yost alleges that Defendants engaged a civil conspiracy to deprive him of his servicemember and constitutional rights (see Compl. at 12), the court liberally construes the 22 complaint to raise claims of civil conspiracy under both federal and state law. 1 also id. at 13.) Mr. Yost does not name as a defendant or bring suit against any state 2 officials acting in their individual or official capacity; instead, the individual Defendants

3 are Mr. Yost’s former spouse and the attorneys who represented her in legal proceedings 4 in Snohomish County Superior Court. (See generally Compl.; see generally MTD Resp.) 5 Mr. Yost, a Staff Sergeant in the U.S. Army, petitioned for dissolution of his 6 marriage to Ms. Nunez in Snohomish County Superior Court in April 2019. (See Compl. 7 Exs. (Dkt. # 12 at 16-34) at 31.3) The matter was the subject of a bench trial that took 8 place on March 31, 2022. (See id.) In a declaration he filed in Snohomish County

9 Superior Court, Mr. Yost asserts that he “never once appeared in person” during the 10 dissolution proceedings but instead “consistently participated remotely, fulfilling all 11 required obligations without issue.” (See id. at 27.) He also asserts that, despite being 12 “on active duty . . . for the entire duration” of the proceedings and “stationed overseas in 13 South Korea” for two of the four years, his “remote participation [was] effective and [he]

14 fully complied with court orders and procedures.” (Id.) Mr. Yost did not, however, 15 appear at the bench trial and, as a result, “the judgment was defaulted against [him].” 16 (See id. at 31-32.) 17 On May 13, 2022, the Snohomish County Superior Court entered a judgment in 18 the dissolution action regarding spousal support, child support, child visitation, and

19 division of marital assets, and entered a restraining order against Mr. Yost. (See id.) Mr. 20 Yost moved to vacate that judgment and filed a formal complaint with the Washington 21

22 3 For exhibits to the complaint, the court cites to the page numbers in the ECF header. 1 State Bar Association alleging misconduct by Ms. Finnegan, Ms. McNulty, and Ms. 2 Gilbertson because they knew of his active-duty status and “failed to disclose or correct

3 this fact before the court.” (Compl. at 11; see also Compl. Exs. at 30.) Subsequently, 4 DSHS enforced the judgment, “initiating wage garnishment, reporting to credit bureaus, 5 and [the suspension of Mr. Yost’s] passport[.]” (Compl. at 11.) Mr. Yost contends the 6 SCRA prohibits these actions, which resulted in “significant financial losses, reputational 7 harm, and severe emotional distress[.]” (Id.) 8 III. ANALYSIS

9 Below, the court reviews Moving Defendants’ motions and addresses each 10 argument in turn. Then, the court considers whether any federal claims survive against 11 the Individual Defendants and determines whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 12 over any remaining state-law claims. The court is mindful that Mr. Yost is proceeding 13 pro se and, therefore, it must construe his pleadings liberally. See McGuckin v. Smith,

14 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, a pro se litigant must follow the 15 same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. See, e.g., Briones v. Riviera Hotel & 16 Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997). 17 A. Motions to Dismiss 18 The court first reviews the Moving Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) arguments

19 pertaining to Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and then 20 considers their Rule 12(b)(6) arguments pertaining to Mr. Yost’s § 1983, SCRA, and civil 21 conspiracy claims. 22 1 1. Rule 12(b)(1) - Subject Matter Jurisdiction 2 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may seek dismissal of an

3 action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Absent subject 4 matter jurisdiction, the court lacks authority to hear a case. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 5 Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). The party asserting the court has jurisdiction 6 bears the burden of proof. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 7 (1994) (citations omitted). A defendant may raise a challenge to the court’s subject 8 matter jurisdiction either factually or facially. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d

9 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Facial attacks, like those Moving Defendants raise here, 10 assert that the allegations on the face of the complaint, even if true, are insufficient to 11 invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. 12 a. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 13 State agencies are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suits brought in

14 federal court for either private damages or injunctive relief. Sato v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t 15 of Educ., 861 F.3d 923, 928 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 16 343 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also id. (affirming that the Eleventh 17 Amendment prevents federal courts from hearing suits against a state, or an arm of the 18 state, unless the state consents or Congress has abrogated the immunity).

19 Moving Defendants argue that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. 20 Yost’s claims against them because they are immune from suit under the Eleventh 21 Amendment. (See generally SCSC MTD at 3-5; DSHS MTD at 4.) The court agrees. 22 First, in the Ninth Circuit, county courts are generally recognized as arms of the state and 1 equivalent to state agencies. See Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin, 2 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that “a suit against [a county court] is a

3 suit against the State, barred by the Eleventh Amendment”); see Lubiba v. King County 4 Superior Court – Family Law Division, No. C25-0799JNW, 2025 WL 1736326, at *2 5 (W.D. Wash. June 23, 2025) (holding that a Washington superior court is an arm of the 6 state protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity) (citing Franceschi v. Schwartz, 57 7 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995)). Second, DSHS, too, is a state agency that has not waived 8 its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43,

9 69 (1997) (affirming that even if a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity, 10 § 1983 “creates no remedy against a [s]tate”); see Vaster v. W. State Hosp., No. C23- 11 5571JLR-GJL, 2024 WL 779571, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2024) (holding that DSHS is 12 an “arm[] of the State of Washington”). Accordingly, both Moving Defendants are 13 immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

14 b. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 15 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, district courts are generally precluded from 16 exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court judgments. Lance v. Dennis, 546 17 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 18 280, 284 (2005)). Rooker-Feldman is a “narrow doctrine[] confined to cases brought by

19 state court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before 20 the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection 21 of those judgments.” Id. (citing D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 22 (1983)). 1 Moving Defendants assert that Mr. Yost’s claims are barred by the 2 Rooker-Feldman doctrine. (SCSC MTD at 5; see id. DSHS MTD at 56.) Again, the

3 court agrees. Although Mr. Yost contends that he “does not seek to relitigate a divorce 4 decree” (Resp. at 5), he ultimately seeks relief in federal district court from the adverse 5 state-court final judgment in his dissolution action (see Compl. Exs. at 29). As a result, 6 Rooker-Feldman applies and the court lacks jurisdiction to disturb the final state-court 7 judgment. See Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that 8 when the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, district courts properly dismiss claims for

9 lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides a 10 second ground for dismissing Mr. Yost’s claims against Moving Defendants for lack of 11 subject matter jurisdiction. 12 2. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim 13 Even if the court had subject matter jurisdiction over Moving Defendants’ claims,

14 it would nevertheless dismiss those claims for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 15 of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 12(b)(6), the court construes the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable 17 to the nonmoving party, Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 18 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2005), and asks whether the claim contains “sufficient factual matter,

19 accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]’” Ashcroft v. 20 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 21 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 22 1 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 2 misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

3 a. § 1983 4 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that 5 (1) they suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal 6 statute and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of 7 state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added). 8 Here, Mr. Yost fails to state a claim upon which relief can be provided because

9 neither Moving Defendant is a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. As discussed above, 10 both Moving Defendants are arms of the state, and, thus, neither is a “person” that can be 11 sued under § 1983. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 69 (“§ 1983 actions do not lie against a 12 state”); Cornel v. Hawaii, 37 F.4th 527, 531 (9th Cir. 2022) (“States or governmental 13 entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes are not

14 ‘persons’ under § 1983.”) (citing Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab’y, 131 F.3d 836, 15 839 (9th Cir. 1997)). Therefore, Mr. Yost’s § 1983 claims against Moving Defendants 16 are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.4 17 b. SCRA 18 The SCRA protects servicemembers by preventing courts from issuing default

19 judgments against them in any civil or child custody proceeding when the servicemember 20

21 4 Because the court dismissed Mr. Yost’s § 1983 cclaims against Moving Defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, the court declines to consider 22 whether the statute of limitations on those claims has expired. (See DSHS MTD at 4-5.) 1 fails to appear in court. 50 U.S.C. app. § 502(1); Brewster v. Sun Tr. Mortg., Inc., 742 2 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2014). SCRA protections only apply to servicemembers who do

3 not make an appearance in a legal action. See 50 U.S.C. § 3931(a) (“This section applies 4 to any civil action or proceeding, including any child custody proceeding, in which the 5 defendant does not make an appearance.”). When a party makes a submission or 6 presentation to a court, they are generally considered to have made an appearance in that 7 court. Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1986), amended, 807 F.2d 1514 (9th 8 Cir. 1987) (“An appearance ordinarily is an overt act by which the party comes into court

9 and submits to the jurisdiction of the court.”) (citation omitted); cf. Wilson v. Moore & 10 Assocs., Inc., 564 F.2d 366, 369 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The appearance [needed to bring an 11 action for default judgment] need not necessarily be a formal one, i.e., one involving a 12 submission or presentation to the court.”). Therefore, because initiating litigation 13 necessarily involves an appearance in court, SCRA protections do not apply to

14 servicemembers who initiate the underlying litigation. See Wilson, 564 F.2d at 369. 15 Here, Mr. Yost is not entitled to SCRA protections because he initiated the 16 underlying action to dissolve his marriage to Ms. Nunez. (See Compl. Exs. at 29; see 17 also id. at 31 (“[Mr. Yost] petitioned for Dissolution of Marriage in Snohomish County, 18 WA in 2019 while stationed at USAG Humphreys, South Korea.”)); 50 U.S.C. § 3931(a).

19 Consequently, Mr. Yost fails to state a claim against Moving Defendants for violation of 20 the SCRA. 21 22 1 c. Civil Conspiracy 2 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive “any person . . . the equal

3 protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” See 42 4 U.S.C. § 1985(3). To state a claim under § 1985(3), the plaintiff must plausibly allege 5 that he or she suffered an actual injury or deprivation of rights as a result of the 6 conspiracy and that the defendants conspired together to accomplish that deprivation. 7 Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). “[A]t 8 least one of the wrongdoers in the alleged conspiracy [must] be a state actor.” Pasadena

9 Republican Club v. W. Just. Ctr., 985 F.3d 1161, 1171 (9th Cir. 2021); see also Sever v. 10 Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (listing elements of a § 1985(3) 11 claim). 12 Here, as discussed above, neither of the Moving Defendants is a proper defendant 13 under § 1983, and Mr. Yost is not a proper plaintiff under the SCRA. Because Mr. Yost

14 cannot sustain a claim against Moving Defendants for depriving him of constitutional or 15 statutory rights, he also cannot sustain a claim that they conspired to deprive him of those 16 same rights. Sever 978 F.2d at 1536. Thus, Mr. Yost fails to state a claim against 17 Moving Defendants for civil conspiracy under federal law. 18 B. Individual Defendants

19 The court liberally construes Mr. Yost’s complaint as raising federal-law claims 20 against the Individual Defendants for violation of the SCRA and for civil conspiracy 21 under §1985(3), in addition to state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional 22 distress and civil conspiracy. (See Compl. at 11-12.) Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) a 1 federal district court must dismiss a claim filed IFP “at any time” if it determines (1) the 2 action is frivolous or malicious; (2) the action fails to state a claim; or (3) the action seeks

3 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see 4 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. 5 § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). 6 As discussed above, Mr. Yost fails to state a claim for violation of the SCRA 7 because he initiated the underlying litigation, see Wilson, 564 F.2d at 369, and for civil 8 conspiracy under § 1985(3) because he is unable to show an actual deprivation of rights,

9 Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536. Thus, the court must dismiss Mr. Yost’s federal-law claims 10 against the individual Defendants for violation of the SCRA and civil conspiracy 11 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 12 C. Leave to Amend 13 When granting a motion to dismiss, a district court is generally required to grant

14 the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to amend the complaint was made, unless 15 the complaint could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Cook, Perkiss 16 & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). Here 17 the court finds that amendment would be futile because Mr. Yost cannot allege facts that 18 would cure the deficiencies described in this order. Therefore, the court declines to grant

19 Mr. Yost leave to amend his complaint and dismisses his federal-law claims against 20 Defendants with prejudice. 21 22 1 D. Supplemental Jurisdiction 2 When a district court has original jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s federal claims, it

3 also has supplemental jurisdiction to decide related state law claims. See Pell v. Nunez, 4 99 F.4th 1128, 1135 (9th Cir. 2024) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)). When a district court 5 “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,” however, it “may 6 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction” over remaining state law claims. 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1367(c)(3). In determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the court 8 considers several factors, including judicial economy, comity, convenience, and fairness.

9 See O’Connor v. State of Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 363 (9th Cir. 1994). 10 Given the absence of viable federal claims against Defendants, the court 11 determines that the interests of judicial economy, comity, convenience, and fairness 12 weigh against exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Yost’s state-law claims. 13 Therefore, the court exercises its discretion to DECLINE supplemental jurisdiction over

14 Mr. Yost’s state-law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The court, therefore, dismisses the 15 state-law claims without prejudice to Mr. Yost raising those claims in state court. 16 IV. CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS SCSC and DSHS’s motions to 18 dismiss (Dkt. ## 22, 25) and DISMISSES Mr. Yost’s federal claims against the

19 Individual Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court DISMISSES 20 with prejudice Mr. Yost’s claims against all Defendants for violations of his civil rights 21 under § 1983, violation of the SCRA, and civil conspiracy under § 1985(3). The court 22 1 DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Yost’s state-law claims 2 without prejudice to Mr. Yost refiling those claims in state court.

3 Dated this 2 8th day of October, 2025. A 4 JAMES L. ROBART 5 United States District Judge 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

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