C.R. v. PLB Management LLC

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: January 31, 2023
• Docket: 2:21-cv-03275
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

Case 2:21-cv-03275-ODW-JEM Document 113 Filed 01/31/23 Page 1 of 7 Page ID #:3516

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8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

11 C.R., Case № 2:21-cv-03275-ODW (JEMx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 13 v. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION [64] 14 PLB MANAGEMENT, LLC et al.,

15 Defendants.

16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff C.R., by and through his guardian ad litem Tracey Joffe, brings this 19 disability discrimination action against Defendants PLB Management LLC, dba Park 20 La Brea Management, LA Park La Brea A LLC, LA Park La Brea B LLC, LA Park La 21 Brea C LLC, and Apartment Investment and Management Company (“Defendants”). 22 (Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff moves for a preliminary injunction requiring 23 Defendants to assign him a specific reserved parking space and to pay for upgraded 24 windows in his apartment, as accommodations for his disabilities. (Mot. Prelim. Inj. 25 (“Motion” or “Mot.”) 1, ECF No. 64 (filed under seal).) For the reasons discussed 26 below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion.1 27

28 1 The Court has considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion and deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. Case 2:21-cv-03275-ODW-JEM Document 113 Filed 01/31/23 Page 2 of 7 Page ID #:3517

1 II. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a thirteen-year-old boy with physical, mental, and emotional 3 disabilities. (Mot. 2.) Plaintiff alleges that these conditions affect his sensory 4 processing and cognition, limit the distance he is able to safely ambulate, and increase 5 his sensitivity to loud noise. (Id. at 2–3.) 6 Defendants own and operate the Park La Brea apartment complex in Los 7 Angeles, California. Park La Brea has more than 4,000 units and 10,000 residents 8 (Id. at 3.) Street parking in the complex is unassigned and available on a first-come, 9 first-served basis to residents, visitors, staff, and non-residents accessing Park La 10 Brea’s facilities. (Id. at 3–4.) Assigned parking throughout the complex is available 11 to residents for a rental fee. (Decl. Tracey Joffe ISO Mot. (“Joffe Decl.”) ¶ 18, ECF 12 No. 64-22; see Opp’n 2, ECF No. 68.) 13 A. Plaintiff’s Tenancy at Park La Brea 14 In March 2014, Joffe and Plaintiff moved into a Park La Brea apartment. 15 (Mot. 3.) Plaintiff’s unit is located at the perimeter of the complex. (Opp’n 3.) The 16 parking space immediately in front of Plaintiff’s unit is an unassigned, street parking 17 space (“Parking Space”). (Mot. 4.) Plaintiff asserts the Parking Space is “almost 18 always occupied,” and “it is very difficult to find an available on-street parking space 19 near” his apartment. (Id.) Plaintiff also asserts that construction projects near Park La 20 Brea cause significant noise and sound intrusion into his apartment. (Id. at 4–5.) 21 In April 2018, Defendants began a planned window upgrade project for units in 22 the complex’s interior blocks. (Opp’n 3.) The project involved providing these units 23 with double-paned windows. (Id.) Defendants did not plan to upgrade the windows 24 in perimeter block units because Defendants wanted to maintain Park La Brea’s 25 historic landmark aesthetic. (Id.) 26 In late November 2019, Plaintiff requested that Defendants “prioritize” his unit 27 for window replacement, to reduce noise as an accommodation for his disabilities. 28 (Mot. 11.) Defendants informed Plaintiff that his unit was not scheduled for the

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1 window upgrade. (Id.) In mid-December 2019, Plaintiff requested that Defendants 2 assign the Parking Space as a handicap accessible space2 to Plaintiff, also as an 3 accommodation for his disabilities. (Id. at 8; Opp’n 5.) Defendants offered Plaintiff 4 alternative assigned parking near his unit. (Opp’n 5.) Plaintiff did not accept. (Id.) 5 Through at least January 2021, Plaintiff continued to request that Defendants 6 upgrade his windows and assign him the Parking Space as a handicap accessible 7 space. (Mot. 8–13.) In response, Defendants offered alternatives including that 8 Plaintiff could cover the cost of upgrading the windows himself, accept a reserved 9 parking space near his unit, or move to another apartment in the complex, away from 10 the construction and with upgraded windows and reserved parking. (Id.; Opp’n 4–5.) 11 Plaintiff asserts that moving to a new unit would be too traumatic for him, and that 12 Defendants must cover the cost of replacing the windows and assign the Parking 13 Space to him as reasonable accommodations for his disabilities. (Mot. 1, 10.) 14 B. Department of Fair Employment and Housing Complaint 15 In February 2020, Joffe filed a housing discrimination complaint against 16 Defendants with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). 17 (Mot. 9; Joffe Decl. ¶¶ 48, 87.) In April 2021, after DFEH conducted a lengthy 18 investigation, Joffe withdrew the complaint. (Opp’n 4; Decl. Michael J. Chilleen ISO 19 Opp’n (“Chilleen Decl.”) ¶ 3, Ex. B (“Notice of Case Closure”), ECF No. 68-1.) 20 C. Procedural History 21 On April 15, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this action. (See Compl.) 22 Plaintiff asserts three causes of action: (1) violation of the Fair Housing Act, 23 42 U.S.C. § 3601, (2) violation of the California Civil Code section 54.1, and 24 (3) negligence. (Id. ¶¶ 34–61.) In February and March 2022, Plaintiff asked 25

26 2 Plaintiff requested the Parking Space be assigned to him as a handicapped space. (See Opp’n 5; Joffe Decl. ¶ 47, Ex. I (“Dec. 17, 2019 Letter”) at 8 (requesting an “assigned handicapped parking 27 space”), ECF No. 64-9.) However, in this litigation, Plaintiff asks only that Defendants assign the 28 Parking Space to him, not that they make it handicap accessible. (See Mot. 1 (requesting assignment of “the parking space in front of his unit”); Opp’n 6.)

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1 Defendants to stipulate to a dismissal without prejudice so that Plaintiff could refile 2 the case in state court. (Chilleen Decl. Exs. C, D (emails requesting dismissal).) 3 Defendants did not agree. (Opp’n 7.) On April 6, 2022, the parties mediated without 4 success. (Mediation Report, ECF No. 56.) On April 7, 2022, Plaintiff filed this 5 Motion seeking a preliminary injunction. (See Mot.) The Motion is fully briefed. 6 (See Opp’n; Reply, ECF No. 72 (filed under seal).)3 7 After the Court took Plaintiff’s Motion under submission, Defendants moved 8 for summary judgment. (See Defs. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 80.) That motion is also 9 fully briefed, and the Court took it under submission after finding it suitable for 10 resolution on the papers. (ECF No. 97.) The parties then stipulated to mediate again, 11 resulting in a stay of the case for several months. (See Stip., ECF No. 103; Order 12 Staying Action, ECF No. 104.) Mediation was again unsuccessful. (Order Lifting 13 Stay, ECF No. 106.) 14 III. LEGAL STANDARD 15 A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy never awarded as of 16 right.” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Winter v. 17 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)). A court may grant preliminary 18 injunctive relief when necessary to prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” Fed. 19 R. Civ. P. 65(b). A movant must establish that they are likely to succeed on the 20 merits, irreparable harm is likely in the absence of an injunction, the balance of 21 equities tips in their favor, and an injunction is in the public interest. Benisek v. 22 Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943–44 (2018) (citing Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). 23 The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between “prohibitory” and “mandatory” 24 injunctions. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 25 3 Defendants object to Plaintiff’s evidence on numerous bases. (See Defs. Evid. Objs., ECF 26 No. 68-4; Defs. Objs. Pl. Evid. Reply, ECF No. 74.) Even if the objections are proper, courts may consider evidence in ruling on an application for preliminary injunction that may otherwise be 27 inadmissible. See, e.g., Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A district court 28 may, however, consider hearsay in deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction.”). Accordingly, for the purposes of this Motion, Defendants’ objections are OVERRULED.

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1 873, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009). A prohibitory injunction preserves the status quo by 2 freezing “the positions of the parties until the court can hear the case on the merits.” 3 Id. at 879 (quoting Heckler v. Lopez, 463 U.S. 1328, 1333 (1983)). In contrast, a 4 mandatory injunction “orders a responsible party to ‘take action.’” Id. (quoting 5 Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996)). A party seeking a mandatory 6 injunction bears a “doubly demanding” burden, in that they “must establish that the 7 law and facts clearly favor [their] position,” Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740, and that 8 “extreme or very serious damage will result” absent injunctive relief, Marlyn, 9 571 F.3d at 879. 10 IV. DISCUSSION 11 Plaintiff concedes that the injunction he seeks is mandatory, not prohibitory. 12 (See Reply 7–8; Opp’n 7–8.) Plaintiff seeks an injunction that would require 13 Defendants to “take action,” Marlyn, 571 F.3d at 879, by assigning him the Parking 14 Space and paying for upgraded windows. Accordingly, to obtain the injunction he 15 seeks, Plaintiff must satisfy the heightened mandatory injunction standard. Park Vill. 16 Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1161 (9th Cir. 17 2011) (comparing the “baseline Winter standard” and the “heightened” mandatory 18 injunction standard). Notably, mandatory injunctions are “particularly disfavored,” 19 and “are not issued in doubtful cases or where the injury complained of is capable of 20 compensation in damages.” Marlyn, 571 F.3d at 879. 21 A. Windows 22 Plaintiff seeks an order requiring Defendants to pay for upgraded windows in 23 his apartment. (Mot. 1.) Plaintiff asserts that he lacks the financial resources to pay 24 for the windows. (Reply 8.) “Mere financial injury, however, will not constitute 25 irreparable harm if adequate compensatory relief will be available in the course of 26 litigation.” Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 739 F.2d 466, 471 (9th Cir. 1984) 27 (citing Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974)). Here, the cost of the windows is 28 easily calculable and compensable in damages should Plaintiff ultimately prevail on

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1 the merits. Accordingly, a preliminary injunction requiring Defendants to cover the 2 cost of upgrading Plaintiff’s apartment windows is not appropriate. Id. at 471–72 3 (denying injunctive relief where plaintiff’s harm “would be easily calculable and 4 compensable in damages”). 5 B. Parking 6 Plaintiff also seeks an order requiring Defendants to assign him the Parking 7 Space immediately in front of his apartment. (Mot. 1.) 8 “[A] party requesting a preliminary injunction must generally show reasonable 9 diligence.” Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1944 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 10 396 (1946)). A long delay before seeking injunctive relief “implies a lack of urgency 11 and irreparable harm.” Oakland Trib., Inc. v. Chron. Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 12 (9th Cir. 1985). “Where no new harm is imminent, and where no compelling reason is 13 apparent,” a court need not “issue a preliminary injunction against a practice which 14 has continued unchallenged for several years.” Id. 15 In March 2014, Plaintiff moved into the apartment. He did not express an issue 16 with Defendants’ unassigned parking policy until December 2019, more than five 17 years later. In February 2020, Plaintiff filed his DFEH complaint. He proceeded for 18 fourteen months with the DFEH investigation before withdrawing his complaint. In 19 April 2021, Plaintiff initiated this action in federal court and, despite having asserted 20 for more than a year that Defendants’ parking policy was causing him serious harm, 21 Plaintiff did not move for a preliminary injunction. Instead, Plaintiff proceeded with 22 this litigation for nearly a year and then attempted to dismiss this case and start over 23 again in state court. Only when Defendants refused to dismiss and mediation proved 24 unsuccessful did Plaintiff file this Motion. Plaintiff’s long delay, waiting months and 25 years before seeking injunctive relief, undercuts Plaintiff’s claimed urgency and 26 irreparable harm. See Garcia, 786 F.3d at 746 (finding a delay of months undercut 27 claim of irreparable harm); Oakland Trib., 762 F.2d at 1377 (finding a delay of years 28 implied a lack of imminent harm).

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1 Plaintiff excuses his delay by explaining that the risk of harm Defendants’ 2 parking policy poses has increased as Plaintiff has grown in age and size. (Reply 6.) 3 He also argues that he should not “be faulted for giving the Defendants one last 4 opportunity” to agree to provide the requested accommodations at mediation. (Id. 5 at 7.) However, none of this “change[s] the fact that [Plaintiff] could have sought a 6 preliminary injunction much earlier.” See Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1944 (finding 7 plaintiffs’ “years-long delay in asking for preliminary injunctive relief weighed 8 against their request”). Plaintiff fails to show that any new harm is imminent or 9 irreparable, as the parking policy has continued unchallenged for years. See id. 10 The Court finds that Plaintiff does not establish immediate and irreparable 11 injury. Accordingly, the Court need not decide whether the law and facts clearly favor 12 Plaintiff on the merits. See Oakland Trib., 762 F.2d at 1376 (“Under any formulation 13 of the [Winter] test, plaintiff must demonstrate that there exists a significant threat of 14 irreparable injury.”). 15 Moreover, the Court notes that, at this late stage, preliminary injunctive relief is 16 particularly unsupported. Dispositive motions are under submission and trial is mere 17 months away. Overall resolution of Plaintiff’s claims on the merits is forthcoming. 18 V. CONCLUSION 19 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for a 20 Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 64.) 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 January 31, 2023 25 26 ___ _________________________________ OTIS D. WRIGHT, II 27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 28