CP6 Eastown LLC v. Justin Weatherford, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedOctober 2, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-08894
StatusUnknown

This text of CP6 Eastown LLC v. Justin Weatherford, et al. (CP6 Eastown LLC v. Justin Weatherford, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CP6 Eastown LLC v. Justin Weatherford, et al., (C.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 CP6 EASTOWN LLC, Case No. 2:25-cv-08894-CV (MBKx) 12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER REMANDING ACTION v. 14 JUSTIN WEATHERFORD, et al. 15 Defendants 16 17 On September 18, 2025, Defendant Justin Weatherford (“Defendant”), having been 18 sued by Plaintiff CP6 Eastown LLC (“Plaintiff”) in what appears to be a routine unlawful 19 detainer action in California state court, removed that action on federal question grounds 20 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. Doc. # 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at 2–3. 21 Defendant subsequently filed a motion and a separate ex parte application to remand the 22 case back to state court. See Doc. ## 7 (“Motion”), 8 (Ex Parte Application). 23 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 24 authorized by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 25 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary 26 appears affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 27 342 n.3 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte before 28 proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 1 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 2 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 3 “The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state 4 court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” 5 Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal quotation marks 6 omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes, unless 7 otherwise stated, are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. See id. Unless 8 otherwise expressly provided by Congress, “any civil action brought in a State court of 9 which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed 10 by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis 11 v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013) (same). A removing defendant bears the 12 burden of establishing that removal is proper. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 13 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical 14 rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 15 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction 16 means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if there is any doubt regarding the existence 18 of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding 19 the action to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected 20 if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). 21 “Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove [an] action pursuant 22 to that provision, [the removing defendants] must demonstrate that original subject-matter 23 jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta Crop Protection, 537 U.S. at 33. Failure 24 to do so requires that the case be remanded, as “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be 25 waived, and . . . the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. 26 Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). Indeed, 27 “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 28 jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Emrich v. Touche Ross 1 & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It is elementary that the subject matter 2 jurisdiction of the district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by 3 one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or 4 reviewing court.”); Washington v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. 5 Cal. 2009) (a district court may remand an action where the court finds that it lacks subject 6 matter jurisdiction either by motion or sua sponte). 7 The Court’s review of the NOR and the attached state court Complaint makes clear 8 that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words, Plaintiff 9 could not have originally brought this action in federal court on the basis of federal question 10 jurisdiction. The state court Complaint contains a single cause of action for unlawful 11 detainer and discloses no federal statutory or constitutional question that would support 12 federal question jurisdiction. See generally NOR, Ex. B; see also Wescom Credit Union v. 13 Dudley, 2010 WL 4916578, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“An unlawful detainer action does not 14 arise under federal law.”) (citation omitted); see also lndymac Fed. Bank., F.S.B. v. 15 Ocampo, 2010 WL 234828, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“No federal claim is alleged in the 16 Complaint,” where “[t]he Complaint contains a single cause of action for unlawful 17 detainer.”). To the extent Defendant’s defenses to the unlawful detainer action are based 18 on alleged violations of federal law (see NOR at 2–3), those defenses do not provide a basis 19 for federal question jurisdiction. It is well-settled that a “case may not be removed to federal 20 court on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s 21 complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question 22 truly at issue.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). Moreover, 23 defendants’ contention that the action is preempted by their own federal action is without 24 merit. Thus, there is no federal question jurisdiction. 25 In short, there is no subject matter jurisdiction. 26 27 28 1 CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that: 3 1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State 4 || of California for the County of Los Angeles for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 5 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 6 2. Plaintiffs Motion (Doc. #7) and Ex Parte Application (Doc. # 8) are DENIED 7 ||as moot. The hearing on the Motion set for October 31, 2025, is hereby VACATED. 8 3. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court. 9 || Dated this second day of October, 2025. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 ||Dated: 10/2/25 Capathia. Valun2zusla 14 HOW. CYNTHIA VALENZUELA 1s UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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