CP6 Eastown LLC v. Edwin Noguera, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJanuary 5, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-12009
StatusUnknown

This text of CP6 Eastown LLC v. Edwin Noguera, et al. (CP6 Eastown LLC v. Edwin Noguera, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
CP6 Eastown LLC v. Edwin Noguera, et al., (C.D. Cal. 2026).

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 CP6 EASTOWN LLC, Case No. 2:25-cv-12009-CV (AGRx) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING ACTION 13 v. 14 EDWIN NOGUERA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 On December 19, 2025, Defendant Edwin Noguera (“Defendant”) removed from 19 California state court what appears to be a routine unlawful detainer action filed by Plaintiff 20 CP6 Eastown LLC. Doc. # 1 (“NOR”). Defendant asserted federal question jurisdiction 21 under 28 U.S.C. sections 1331 and 1441. Id. at 2. 22 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 23 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 24 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Federal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary 25 appears affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 26 342 n.3 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte before 27 proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 28 1 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 2 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). 3 “The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state 4 court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” 5 Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal quotation marks 6 omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes, unless 7 otherwise stated, are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. See id. Unless 8 otherwise expressly provided by Congress, “any civil action brought in a State court of 9 which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed 10 by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis 11 v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013) (same). A removing defendant bears the 12 burden of establishing that removal is proper. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 13 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical 14 rule that the burden on removal rests with the removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 15 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction 16 means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”) 17 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if there is any doubt regarding the existence 18 of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts in favor of remanding 19 the action to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected 20 if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”). 21 “Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove [an] action pursuant 22 to that provision, [the removing defendant] must demonstrate that original subject-matter 23 jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta Crop Protection, 537 U.S. at 33. Failure 24 to do so requires that the case be remanded, as “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be 25 waived, and . . . the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. 26 Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). Indeed, 27 “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter 28 jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Emrich v. Touche Ross 1 & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (“It is elementary that the subject matter 2 jurisdiction of the district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by 3 one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or 4 reviewing court.”); Washington v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *1 (C.D. 5 Cal. 2009) (a district court may remand an action where the court finds that it lacks subject 6 matter jurisdiction either by motion or sua sponte). 7 Here, the Court’s review of the Notice of Removal and the attached state-court 8 complaint makes clear that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the instant matter. 9 The state court complaint contains a single cause of action for unlawful detainer and 10 discloses no federal statutory or constitutional question that would support federal question 11 jurisdiction. See NOR at 6–9; see also Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, 2010 WL 12 4916578, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“An unlawful detainer action does not arise under federal 13 law.”) (citation omitted); see also lndymac Fed. Bank., F.S.B. v. Ocampo, 2010 WL 14 234828, *2 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“No federal claim is alleged in the Complaint,” where “[t]he 15 Complaint contains a single cause of action for unlawful detainer.”). To the extent 16 Defendant’s defenses to the unlawful detainer action are based on alleged violations of 17 federal law (see NOR at 10), those defenses do not provide a basis for federal question 18 jurisdiction. It is well-settled that a “case may not be removed to federal court on the basis 19 of a federal defense . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and 20 even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” 21 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 (1987). Thus, there is no federal question 22 jurisdiction. 23 Because the complaint raises no federal claim and Defendant has not shown any 24 other basis for jurisdiction, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, IT IS 25 ORDERED that: 26 1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the 27 State of California for the County of Los Angeles for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 28 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court and close 2 || the action administratively. 3 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 6 || Dated: 1/5/26 lipathin Valenzuela 7 IOM. CYNTHIA VALENZUELA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Related

Walker v. Griffin's Heirs
24 U.S. 375 (Supreme Court, 1826)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
482 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Ruhrgas Ag v. Marathon Oil Co.
526 U.S. 574 (Supreme Court, 1999)
Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson
537 U.S. 28 (Supreme Court, 2002)
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno
547 U.S. 332 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co.
846 F.2d 1190 (Ninth Circuit, 1988)
Dennis Ex Rel. PICO Holdings, Inc. v. Hart
724 F.3d 1249 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
CP6 Eastown LLC v. Edwin Noguera, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cp6-eastown-llc-v-edwin-noguera-et-al-cacd-2026.