Cox v. Department of Human Resources

334 S.E.2d 683, 255 Ga. 6, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 866
CourtSupreme Court of Georgia
DecidedOctober 1, 1985
Docket42294
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 334 S.E.2d 683 (Cox v. Department of Human Resources) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cox v. Department of Human Resources, 334 S.E.2d 683, 255 Ga. 6, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 866 (Ga. 1985).

Opinions

Gregory, Justice.

The Georgia Department of Human Resources (DHR) provided public assistance in the form of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), OCGA § 49-4-100 et seq., to petitioner Cox and to her illegitimate minor child. It is not disputed that petitioner is the custodial parent of the minor child, and that the child’s father, who is absent from the home, does not provide child support. When petitioner received $7,500 as the named beneficiary of a life insurance policy, she became disqualified to receive further AFDC benefits.1 The DHR then initiated this action on behalf of the minor child against petitioner, pursuant to the Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-1 et seq., to recover $6,853 paid to petitioner for the benefit of the minor child. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the DHR and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Cox v. DHR, 174 Ga. App. 377 (330 SE2d 120) (1985). We granted certiorari, and reverse.

The Child Support Recovery Act, OCGA § 19-11-5, provides:

“The payment of public assistance to or on behalf of a child creates a debt due and owing the state by the parent or parents responsible for the support of the child. The amount of the debt is the amount necessary to meet the total needs of the child or children and the person having custody, if included in the public assistance grant, as determined by the department in conformity with the federal Social Security Act; provided, however, that, where a court has ordered child support incident to a final divorce or in a criminal proceeding for nonsupport or where the responsible parent has entered into a legally enforceable and binding agreement, the debt created shall be equal to the amount set in such decree, order, hearing, or agreement.”

The Court of Appeals concluded that under OCGA § 19-7-24,2 petitioner was required to provide support to her illegitimate minor child until he reaches the age of majority. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that petitioner was liable for the debt created by OCGA § 19-11-5.

Under the Public Assistance Act of 1965, OCGA Ch. 49-4 et seq., Ga. Laws 1965, p. 385, the Department of Human Resources is authorized to establish certain categories of public assistance, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children. OCGA § 49-4-3 (a) (4). The purpose of the Act is to “[pjrovide for maximum cooperation with [7]*7other agencies, public and private, of this state, or other states, and of the federal government3 in rendering services to maintain and strengthen family life and to help applicants for public assistance and recipients thereof to attain self-support or self-care.” OCGA § 49-4-3 (b) (1). (Emphasis supplied.)

To be eligible for public assistance under AFDC, a child must be “dependent” within the meaning of OCGA § 49-4-101 (2). That is, he must be under 18 years of age, meet certain educational and residential requirements, and be “deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from home or physical or mental incapacity of a parent. . . .” The Act thus contemplates that AFDC is to be provided where a parent, because of death, or physical or mental incapacity, is not able to provide support for the child, or by his continued absence from the home has chosen to not provide support. The legislature has determined that in these circumstances, the dependent child’s family life with the custodial parent (or other specified relations, see OCGA § 49-4-101 (2) (C)) may be strengthened, and the self-sufficiency of the family unit encouraged, by a grant of public assistance.

The goals are consistent with the purposes of The Child Support Recovery Act which are “to provide that public assistance to needy children is a supplement” to the parental contribution, and “to provide for the enforcement of an able parent’s obligation to furnish support.” OCGA § 19-11-2 (a). (Emphasis supplied.) Thus the goals of both AFDC and The Child Support Recovery Act are to strengthen family life, to encourage a parent able to provide support to contribute to the family unit, and ultimately, to assist the family unit in attaining self-sufficiency. OCGA §§ 49-4-3 (b) (1) and 19-11-2 (a).

We conclude that these expressed legislative purposes are inconsistent with the interpretation the Court of Appeals has given to OCGA § 19-11-5. Where, as in this case, there is an absent parent who does not provide support, and the payment of public assistance is for the support of both the dependent child and the custodial parent who is not able, without the benefit of public assistance, to provide sup[8]*8port and maintenance for the child, it is inconsistent with both the goals of The Public Assistance Act and The Child Support Recovery Act to conclude that the payment of AFDC imposes upon the custodial parent “a debt due and owing the state.” OCGA § 19-11-5. In this case the dependent status of the minor child, within the meaning of OCGA § 49-4-101 (2), is created solely by the continued absence from home of the father. The mother, petitioner here, has done nothing to contribute to this dependent status.4

If this custodial parent is required to repay a debt of $6,853 from the $7,500 proceeds of the insurance policy, there is every reason to believe she and the child will almost immediately become eligible for a new grant of Aid to Families with Dependent Children. On the other hand, if she is free of debt, the $7,500 nest egg may afford the opportunity for this petitioner to “attain self-support or self-care” for herself and her child on a permanent basis, and thereby break the cycle of public assistance. The facts of this case are quite compelling, but hypothetical situations can be envisioned which virtually demand the construction now given the statute, and the legislative intent attributed to the Georgia General Assembly. For example, suppose the mother and infant child lived alone because of the desertion of the husband and father.

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Related

Department of Human Resources v. Fleeman
439 S.E.2d 474 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1994)
Department of Human Resources v. Prince
401 S.E.2d 342 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1991)
Mundy v. State
385 S.E.2d 666 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1989)
Cox v. Department of Human Resources
338 S.E.2d 43 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1985)
Cox v. Department of Human Resources
334 S.E.2d 683 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1985)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
334 S.E.2d 683, 255 Ga. 6, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 866, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cox-v-department-of-human-resources-ga-1985.