Cowdery, Ecker & Murphy, LLC v. United States Department of the Interior

511 F. Supp. 2d 215, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68099
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedSeptember 14, 2007
DocketCivil Action 3: 07cv00879 (SRU)
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 511 F. Supp. 2d 215 (Cowdery, Ecker & Murphy, LLC v. United States Department of the Interior) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cowdery, Ecker & Murphy, LLC v. United States Department of the Interior, 511 F. Supp. 2d 215, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68099 (D. Conn. 2007).

Opinion

RULING ON MOTION FOR EXPEDITED IN CAMERA REVIEW OF WITHHELD DOCUMENTS

STEFAN R. UNDERHILL, District Judge.

I. Introduction

The plaintiff Cowdery, Ecker & Murphy, LLC (“plaintiff’ or “CEM”) commenced this action under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, et seq. (“FOIA”). CEM seeks to compel the Department of the Interior (“the Department” or “DOI”) to disclose Senior Executive Service Performance Plan documents (“the performance reviews”) prepared in the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 for Mr. James E. Cason, the nominal Associate Deputy Secretary of the Department of the Interior. In a separate lawsuit, CEM is challenging a decision by the Department to strip the Schaghticoke Tribal Nation (“the Tribe”) of federal recognition as a tribal nation. Specifically, CEM argues that Cason was not confirmed by the Senate and therefore was not properly installed in his position at the Department.

CEM requested the documents at issue in a FOIA request dated January 23, 2007, and argues that their disclosure is necessary and bears on its appeal of the Department’s decision. The Department now claims two exemptions from disclosure under FOIA: exemption 6, that disclosure would constitute an unwarranted invasion of Cason’s privacy, and exemption 5, that these documents would not be available by law in litigation with the agency because of the deliberative process privilege that protects candid internal discussions of legal or policy matters. The Department has produced redacted versions of the requested documents to CEM. CEM argues that the redacted performance reviews do not satisfy its FOIA request, and that neither exemption 6 nor exemption 5 properly applies here.

I have reviewed the briefs of both parties, as well as the redacted and unredacted performance reviews. The material facts related to this case are undisputed, only the legal import of those facts is contested. For the reasons discussed below, I treat the plaintiffs motion as one for summary judgment, grant that motion, and order that the Department disclose non-redacted versions of the performance reviews to CEM. 1

II. Exemption 6

Exemption 6 under FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6), states that FOIA shall not apply to “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The question before me, then, is whether disclosure of the re *218 dacted information in the performance reviews would constitute an unwarranted invasion of Cason’s privacy. Apart from Cason’s social security number, the redacted information includes self-assessment of his performance in a number of areas, Department officials’ recommendations with justifications for Cason’s performance level and summary rating, and the final decision and justification regarding Ca-son’s summary rating. According to the Department, this information, particularly Cason’s self-assessment, is personal in nature, and disclosure would invade Cason’s privacy in an unwarranted manner.

The Second Circuit has laid out a five-part balancing test to determine whether exemption 6 applies.

In balancing a government employee’s privacy interests against the public’s interest in disclosure, a court should consider several factors, including: (1) the government employee’s rank; (2) the degree of wrongdoing and strength of evidence against the employee; (3) whether there are other ways to obtain the information; (4) whether the information sought sheds light on a government activity; and (5) whether the information sought is related to job function or is of a personal nature. The factors are not all inclusive, and no one factor is dispositive.

Perlman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 312 F.3d 100, 107 (2d Cir.2002), vacated by 541 U.S. 970, 124 S.Ct. 1874, 158 L.Ed.2d 464 (2004), reinstated after remand, 380 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.2004).

A.The Government Employee’s Rank

In Perlman, 312 F.3d at 107, the Second Circuit found that the official in question’s “high rank, combined with his direct responsibility for the serious allegations examined ... tilts strongly in favor of disclosure.” Here, both parties agree that Cason is a high-ranking government official. Resp. at 9; Reply at 2. CEM argues that Cason is “the de facto third in command” at the Department. Reply at 2. Cason’s high rank in the Department weighs towards disclosure.

B. Degree of Wrongdoing and Strength of Evidence Against the Employee

The Department argues that CEM has not alleged wrongdoing against Cason, only that the Department did not follow certain requisite procedures in his appointment. The Department further argues that Cason was properly appointed and authorized to carry out his duties at DOI. Whether Cason was properly appointed is the ultimate issue in the related litigation between CEM and DOI, and it is not for me to decide that issue here, although I will note that, as CEM argues, the performance reviews may shed light on that ultimate issue.

CEM alleges that Cason has acted and continues to act in an ultra vires manner, unconstitutionally exceeding his authority. These are allegations that, if true, would constitute fairly serious wrongdoing. The strength of CEM’s evidence against Cason is questionable; the unredacted performance reviews could prove to be the strongest evidence in support of CEM’s allegations. Nevertheless, CEM has claimed serious wrongdoing on the part of Cason. Although stronger evidence would weigh more heavily in favor of disclosure, the degree of wrongdoing weighs towards disclosure.

C. Availability of Other Means to Obtain the Information Sought

As Perlman states, “this factor examines whether the government is the only means for obtaining the desired information.” 312 F.3d at 108. The Department claims, without citing any legal authority, that this factor can be extended to the question whether other information *219 from within the government would serve a similar purpose without invading the privacy of government employees. Without deciding that question, I do not believe that the other means of obtaining the sought-after information that the Department identifies — Cason’s deposition testimony, the already-disclosed redacted performance reviews, and other documents relating to the substantive activity in which Cason engaged — adequately provide the requested information. 2

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Bluebook (online)
511 F. Supp. 2d 215, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68099, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cowdery-ecker-murphy-llc-v-united-states-department-of-the-interior-ctd-2007.