Cowart v. PEARL RIVER TUNG CO.

67 So. 2d 356, 218 Miss. 472, 39 Adv. S. 5, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 563
CourtMississippi Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 19, 1953
Docket38841
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 67 So. 2d 356 (Cowart v. PEARL RIVER TUNG CO.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Mississippi Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cowart v. PEARL RIVER TUNG CO., 67 So. 2d 356, 218 Miss. 472, 39 Adv. S. 5, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 563 (Mich. 1953).

Opinion

*475 McGehee, C. J.

This litigation arose under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, Chapter 354, Laws of 1948, as amended by Chapter 412, Laws of 1950, (Section 6998, et seq., Title 25, Yol. 5-a, Revised Miss. Code of 1942) and grew out of the death of Rosa May, a Negro woman, who appears to have been at least fifty-five years of age on December 18, 1950, when she died of a “massive cerebrovascular accident” (explained in the testimony as a rupture of a blood vessel on the brain) while actually engaged about the work of her employment in picking up tung (oil) nuts under the trees in the tung orchard of the appellee, Pearl River Tung Company.

Section 6998-04 of Vol. 5-a of said Code provides that: “Compensation shall be payable for disability or death of an employee from injury arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault as to the cause of the injury.”

The right of the appellant, Carrie Cowart, as guardian of Clara May, a non compos mentis, and also as guardian of Charlotte May and John Lee May, the small *476 minor children of said non compos mentis, who is the daughter of the deceased Bosa May, to prosecute this proceeding under the Workmen’s Compensation Act is not challenged, since it is virtually conceded that the wards were solely dependent upon Bosa May for their support and maintenance at the time of her death. Nor is the regularity of the guardianship proceedings and the validity of the decree which authorized the bringing of the suit by the guardian in any wise brought into question.

In other words, the sole question presented to the attorney-referee and the commission for decision was whether or not the death of Bosa May, who was admittedly an employee of the appellant and actually engaged in performing the duties of her employment at the time she was taken ill, was caused from an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment.

The attorney-referee denied liability on the claim presented by the guardian and his action was affirmed by two members of the three-member commission, including the said attorney-referee. Appeal to the circuit court was under Section 6998-26 of Yol. 5 of said revised Code, and the circuit court affirmed the action of the commission although expressing some doubt in the judgment rendered as to the correctness thereof.

The testimony is without conflict as to the nature and character of the work in which the employee was engaged at the time she was taken ill. The only apparent conflict in the testimony is in the particulars of what was testified to by the medical experts. We shall later discuss whether the conflict in this testimony is one of substance as to whether the preexisting illness of the employee was aggravated by the exertion required of the employee in the performance of her work, since the exertion is not required to be the sole, proximate cause of the injury which resulted in her death.

*477 The employee was working with twenty-three others, at the moment she was taken violently ill, while bending or stooping over to pick np the tnng (oil) nuts on the occasion in question. She had been engaged in this work during four previous seasons of the picking np of these nuts under the trees in the orchard of the appellant, Pearl River Tnng Company, and had sustained no previous injury on account thereof. Nor is it shown that any of the other employees had sustained an injury in connection with the performance of this work, some of whom had likewise been employed during previous seasons.

The manner of doing the work was shown to be that two of the employees would be assigned a row of trees in the orchard and that one would pick up the nuts on one side of the tree and the other those on the other side;' that the trees were about twenty-two feet apart and that the employees would each have a wire net basket that would hold a bushel of the nuts; that no basket would be filled more than half full while being carried from tree to tree; that thereupon the employee would use an empty basket while picking up enough additional nuts to pour into the original basket and completely fill it; and that a sack man would then empty the completely filled basket into a sack and credit the worker with the bushel of nuts; that the work was known as “piece work” and that each employee was paid so much per bushel, and had the right to work for only the number of hours that the employee might desire to work and was thereby able to control his or her own activities as to the amount of exertion to be undergone before quitting for the day.

However, it was further shown that ordinarily the workers would begin at 7 a.m. and continue until 12 noon and then resume work at 1 p.m. and continue until 4 p.m. It was further shown that the nuts were, of course, picked up off the ground underneath the trees and that ordinarily the employee performed the work by stooping *478 or bending over to pick the nuts off the ground and put them in the basket; that while employees could get on their knees or crawl on the ground to pick up the nuts, they could pick up a greater quantity by stooping or bending over while standing and doing their work, and that this was the method ordinarily employed by the workers. ■

On the occasion in question the employee, Rosa May, had worked from 7 o’clock in the forenoon until 12 noon and had resumed her work at 1 p.m., and at about 2 p.m. while she was actually stooping or bending over and picking up nuts she complained, called a coworker and stated she was turning blind, and this attracted the attention of other employees who said that she was staggering before she was assisted to lay down and was then carried to a hospital at Bogalusa, Louisiana, where she died at about 7 p.m. on the same day.

The surgeon’s report, signed by Dr. G. H. St. Dizier of Bogalusa, Louisiana, and who did not testify in the case, was introduced in evidence by agreement, and it disclosed that the patient was in a comatose condition upon arrival at the hospital, and that a bystander related to him that the patient “was bending over tung nuts and fell over unconscious.” This surgeon stated his objective findings to be: “Massive cerebrovascular accident; patient was comatose, completely unable to respond to stimuli, or move any extremity.”

The employer’s first report, signed by the President of the appellant Pearl River Tung Company, which was introduced in evidence by agreement, disclosed that the accident was caused from “picking up tung nuts” and that the employee “fainted, was taken to the hospital, and never regained consciousness. ’ ’ He further reported that the nature and location of the injury was “massive cerebrovascular accident (brain). ’ ’

The proof further disclosed without dispute that on October 13, 1948, the employee had high blood pressure *479 of 220/100 and that this was of course considered high; that in September, 1950, her blood pressure was shown to be 160/90, and there was no showing as to the status of her blood pressure on December 18, 1950, which was the date of her death. However, Dr. J. S.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Taylor v. Salvation Army-Pascagoula Corps
744 So. 2d 825 (Court of Appeals of Mississippi, 1999)
Metal Trims Industries, Inc. v. Stovall
562 So. 2d 1293 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1990)
Holloway v. Prassell Enterprises, Inc.
348 So. 2d 771 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1977)
Universal Manufacturing Company v. Barlow
260 So. 2d 827 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1972)
Knox Glass, Inc. v. Evans
197 So. 2d 784 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1967)
Hall Engineering & Construction Co. v. Jones
186 So. 2d 773 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1966)
Malone & Hyde of Tupelo, Inc. v. Hall
183 So. 2d 626 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1966)
Miller Transporters, Ltd. v. Dean
179 So. 2d 552 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1965)
Powers v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co.
173 So. 2d 670 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1965)
Dependent of Payton v. Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co.
165 So. 2d 336 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1964)
I. B. S. Mfg. Co. v. Dependents of Cook
130 So. 2d 557 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1961)
Shannon v. City of Hazlehurst
116 So. 2d 546 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1959)
Central Electric Power Ass'n v. Hicks
110 So. 2d 351 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1959)
Wilson v. International Paper Co.
108 So. 2d 554 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1959)
Poole v. R. F. Learned & Son
103 So. 2d 396 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1958)
Lewis v. TRACKSIDE GASOLINE STATION
103 So. 2d 868 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1958)
Insurance Dept. of Miss. v. Dinsmore
102 So. 2d 691 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1958)
Williams v. Vicksburg Wholesale Poultry Co.
102 So. 2d 378 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1958)
Kahne v. Robinson
100 So. 2d 132 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1958)
Rushing v. Water Valley Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
98 So. 2d 870 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1957)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
67 So. 2d 356, 218 Miss. 472, 39 Adv. S. 5, 1953 Miss. LEXIS 563, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cowart-v-pearl-river-tung-co-miss-1953.