Coven v. Coven

82 A.D.3d 1144, 919 N.Y.2d 866
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedMarch 29, 2011
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 82 A.D.3d 1144 (Coven v. Coven) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Coven v. Coven, 82 A.D.3d 1144, 919 N.Y.2d 866 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2011).

Opinion

[1145]*1145“The purpose of pendente lite relief is to ensure that a needy spouse is provided with funds for his or her support and reasonable needs pending trial, and it is not to determine the correct ultimate distribution” (Viola v Viola, 294 AD2d 493, 493 [2002]; see Albanese v Albanese, 234 AD2d 489, 490 [1996]). “Modifications of pendente lite awards should rarely be made by an appellate court and then only under exigent circumstances, such as where a party is unable to meet his or her financial obligations, or justice otherwise requires” (Malik v Malik, 66 AD3d 968, 968 [2009] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). “Consequently, any perceived inequities in pendente lite [relief] can best be remedied by a speedy trial, at which the parties’ financial circumstances can be fully explored” (Dowd v Dowd, 74 AD3d 1013, 1014 [2010]). Here, the defendant wife has not demonstrated any exigency which warrants modification of the pendente lite maintenance or child support awards (see Shurka v Shurka, 68 AD3d 488 [2009]; Marohn v Marohn, 157 AD2d 771, 772 [1990]; Samuelsen v Samuelsen, 124 AD2d 650 [1986]).

A determination of an application for interim counsel fees is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court (see Dodson v Dodson, 46 AD3d 305 [2007]). Such an award is intended to “[ensure] that the nonmonied spouse will be able to litigate the action, and do so on equal footing with the monied spouse” (Prichep v Prichep, 52 AD3d 61, 65 [2008]). Under the circumstances of this case, the award of the sum of $10,000 in interim counsel fees was a provident exercise of the court’s discretion (see Domestic Relations Law § 237 [a]; McMahan v McMahan, 66 AD3d 971 [2009]; Rosenbaum v Rosenbaum, 55 AD3d 713 [2008]).

[1146]*1146The wife’s remaining contentions are without merit. Covello, J.E, Dickerson, Eng and Sgroi, JJ, concur.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
82 A.D.3d 1144, 919 N.Y.2d 866, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/coven-v-coven-nyappdiv-2011.