Cousins v. Dep't of Corrections
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Opinion
FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON APRIL 11, 2024 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON APRIL 11, 2024 ERIN L. LENNON SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
TERRY COUSINS, ) ) No. 101769-3 Petitioner, ) ) v. ) En Banc ) STATE OF WASHINGTON and ) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) Filed: April 11, 2024 ) Respondents. ) ____________________________________)
YU, J. — This case concerns Terry Cousins’ efforts to obtain public records
pertaining to her sister, who died in the custody of the Department of Corrections
(DOC). Cousins commenced this action in January 2021, alleging that DOC’s
response to her public records request violated the Public Records Act (PRA), ch.
42.56 RCW. We must decide whether Cousins’ PRA action is barred by the one-
year statute of limitations, RCW 42.56.550(6). The answer is no. In accordance
with Belenski v. Jefferson County, 186 Wn.2d 452, 378 P.3d 176 (2016), we hold
that the limitations period did not start running until DOC issued its final “closing
letter” in June 2021. Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Belenski holds that the PRA’s one-year limitations period starts to run when
an agency provides its “final, definitive response” to a PRA request. Id. at 462. A
sufficient closing letter from an agency can, and usually will, satisfy Belenski’s
final, definitive response test. However, an agency’s use of the word “closed” is
not determinative. Instead, a closing letter must be objectively “sufficient to put [a
nonattorney requester] on notice” that the one-year limitations period had started
running because the agency does “not intend to disclose records or further address
[the] request.” Id. at 461. To assess the sufficiency of a closing letter, courts and
agencies should consult the attorney general’s advisory model rules on public
records compliance (Advisory Model Rules), ch. 44-14 WAC, and the guidance
provided in today’s opinion.
Here, DOC produced multiple installments of records responsive to Cousins’
PRA request and then sent Cousins a letter in January 2019 stating that her request
was “now closed” (January 2019 closing letter). Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 44. The
January 2019 closing letter properly invited Cousins to ask follow-up questions, as
all closing letters should do. See WAC 44-14-04006(1). Cousins promptly asked
about specific records she believed were missing, and she repeatedly followed up
when DOC initially failed to fully answer her questions. Eventually, DOC
reopened Cousins’ original PRA request to conduct an additional search, leading to
the production of hundreds of pages of previously undisclosed responsive records,
2 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
followed by a second letter stating that the request was “now closed” in June 2021
(June 2021 closing letter). CP at 1440.
DOC argues that the January 2019 closing letter was its final, definitive
response, making Cousins’ PRA action untimely. On this record, we cannot agree.
Instead, we hold that the June 2021 closing letter was DOC’s final, definitive
response to Cousins’ PRA request.
DOC was certainly not required to reopen Cousins’ PRA request after
issuing the January 2019 closing letter. Indeed, after issuing a sufficient closing
letter, an agency may choose to answer follow-up questions by simply reiterating
that the statute of limitations has started running because the agency does not
intend to further address the request. In this case, however, DOC selected a
different course of action. First, when Cousins timely asked questions following
the January 2019 closing letter, DOC chose to provide a partial, ambiguous answer
that was not sufficient to put Cousins on notice that DOC did not intend to further
address her request. As a result, the January 2019 closing letter failed to provide
Cousins with a final, definitive response to her PRA request.
When Cousins persisted in her efforts to communicate with DOC, DOC
ultimately chose to reopen her original PRA request, conduct an additional search,
and produce additional responsive records before closing the request again in June
2021. This second and final closing letter was DOC’s final, definitive response,
3 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
triggering the PRA’s one-year limitations period in accordance with Belenski.
Records produced after the June 2021 closing letter may be relevant to DOC’s
liability or penalties, but they did not restart the limitations period.
Thus, Cousins’ PRA action is not barred by the statute of limitations. We
decline to reach her alternative argument regarding the discovery rule of accrual,
and we reject DOC’s alternative argument that Cousins’ action must be dismissed
as premature. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because the issues in this case are heavily fact dependent, it is necessary to
provide a detailed timeline. This case is before us on DOC’s motion for summary
judgment, and the facts are undisputed except where noted otherwise. We
“construe the facts in the light most favorable to [Cousins,] the nonmoving party.”
Sanders v. State, 169 Wn.2d 827, 845, 240 P.3d 120 (2010).
A. Renee Field’s death in DOC custody
This case begins with the death of Cousins’ sister, Renee Field, in DOC
custody. In January 2016, Field experienced “sudden-onset neck and head pain”
and later developed “visual changes and right side numbness.” CP at 472, 481.
However, she was never given “a comprehensive evaluation by a physician or
advanced practitioner.” Id. at 475.
4 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
On March 6, 2016, Field experienced a severe headache with “shooting pain
on the right side of the head and neck.” Id. at 473. She was given medication and
sent “back to her living unit in a wheelchair because she was unable to walk.” Id.
at 481. Overnight, Field fell out of bed and had a seizure. Instead of calling an
ambulance, a DOC physician assistant transferred Field to a different corrections
facility. Field arrived there in a state of medical emergency, and staff called 911.
Field was taken by ambulance to an outside hospital where doctors attempted
surgery, but she “died on March 14, 2016 . . . from a ruptured aneurysm, a stroke,
hydrocephalus, and respiratory failure.” Id. at 482.
Following an investigation, the Office of Corrections Ombuds concluded
that the medical care Field received from DOC “did not meet community
healthcare standards, and her death could have been prevented.” Id. at 475. The
Washington Medical Commission also imposed sanctions against the DOC
physician assistant for “contribut[ing] to [Field’s] death.” Id. at 487.
B. Cousins’ PRA request to DOC
1. Request, initial response, and production of first two installments
Cousins is the personal representative of Field’s estate. On July 21, 2016,
Cousins submitted a PRA request to DOC through counsel, seeking “[a]ny and all
records regarding Renee A. Field . . .
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FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON APRIL 11, 2024 IN CLERK’S OFFICE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON APRIL 11, 2024 ERIN L. LENNON SUPREME COURT CLERK
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
TERRY COUSINS, ) ) No. 101769-3 Petitioner, ) ) v. ) En Banc ) STATE OF WASHINGTON and ) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ) Filed: April 11, 2024 ) Respondents. ) ____________________________________)
YU, J. — This case concerns Terry Cousins’ efforts to obtain public records
pertaining to her sister, who died in the custody of the Department of Corrections
(DOC). Cousins commenced this action in January 2021, alleging that DOC’s
response to her public records request violated the Public Records Act (PRA), ch.
42.56 RCW. We must decide whether Cousins’ PRA action is barred by the one-
year statute of limitations, RCW 42.56.550(6). The answer is no. In accordance
with Belenski v. Jefferson County, 186 Wn.2d 452, 378 P.3d 176 (2016), we hold
that the limitations period did not start running until DOC issued its final “closing
letter” in June 2021. Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Belenski holds that the PRA’s one-year limitations period starts to run when
an agency provides its “final, definitive response” to a PRA request. Id. at 462. A
sufficient closing letter from an agency can, and usually will, satisfy Belenski’s
final, definitive response test. However, an agency’s use of the word “closed” is
not determinative. Instead, a closing letter must be objectively “sufficient to put [a
nonattorney requester] on notice” that the one-year limitations period had started
running because the agency does “not intend to disclose records or further address
[the] request.” Id. at 461. To assess the sufficiency of a closing letter, courts and
agencies should consult the attorney general’s advisory model rules on public
records compliance (Advisory Model Rules), ch. 44-14 WAC, and the guidance
provided in today’s opinion.
Here, DOC produced multiple installments of records responsive to Cousins’
PRA request and then sent Cousins a letter in January 2019 stating that her request
was “now closed” (January 2019 closing letter). Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 44. The
January 2019 closing letter properly invited Cousins to ask follow-up questions, as
all closing letters should do. See WAC 44-14-04006(1). Cousins promptly asked
about specific records she believed were missing, and she repeatedly followed up
when DOC initially failed to fully answer her questions. Eventually, DOC
reopened Cousins’ original PRA request to conduct an additional search, leading to
the production of hundreds of pages of previously undisclosed responsive records,
2 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
followed by a second letter stating that the request was “now closed” in June 2021
(June 2021 closing letter). CP at 1440.
DOC argues that the January 2019 closing letter was its final, definitive
response, making Cousins’ PRA action untimely. On this record, we cannot agree.
Instead, we hold that the June 2021 closing letter was DOC’s final, definitive
response to Cousins’ PRA request.
DOC was certainly not required to reopen Cousins’ PRA request after
issuing the January 2019 closing letter. Indeed, after issuing a sufficient closing
letter, an agency may choose to answer follow-up questions by simply reiterating
that the statute of limitations has started running because the agency does not
intend to further address the request. In this case, however, DOC selected a
different course of action. First, when Cousins timely asked questions following
the January 2019 closing letter, DOC chose to provide a partial, ambiguous answer
that was not sufficient to put Cousins on notice that DOC did not intend to further
address her request. As a result, the January 2019 closing letter failed to provide
Cousins with a final, definitive response to her PRA request.
When Cousins persisted in her efforts to communicate with DOC, DOC
ultimately chose to reopen her original PRA request, conduct an additional search,
and produce additional responsive records before closing the request again in June
2021. This second and final closing letter was DOC’s final, definitive response,
3 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
triggering the PRA’s one-year limitations period in accordance with Belenski.
Records produced after the June 2021 closing letter may be relevant to DOC’s
liability or penalties, but they did not restart the limitations period.
Thus, Cousins’ PRA action is not barred by the statute of limitations. We
decline to reach her alternative argument regarding the discovery rule of accrual,
and we reject DOC’s alternative argument that Cousins’ action must be dismissed
as premature. We reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Because the issues in this case are heavily fact dependent, it is necessary to
provide a detailed timeline. This case is before us on DOC’s motion for summary
judgment, and the facts are undisputed except where noted otherwise. We
“construe the facts in the light most favorable to [Cousins,] the nonmoving party.”
Sanders v. State, 169 Wn.2d 827, 845, 240 P.3d 120 (2010).
A. Renee Field’s death in DOC custody
This case begins with the death of Cousins’ sister, Renee Field, in DOC
custody. In January 2016, Field experienced “sudden-onset neck and head pain”
and later developed “visual changes and right side numbness.” CP at 472, 481.
However, she was never given “a comprehensive evaluation by a physician or
advanced practitioner.” Id. at 475.
4 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
On March 6, 2016, Field experienced a severe headache with “shooting pain
on the right side of the head and neck.” Id. at 473. She was given medication and
sent “back to her living unit in a wheelchair because she was unable to walk.” Id.
at 481. Overnight, Field fell out of bed and had a seizure. Instead of calling an
ambulance, a DOC physician assistant transferred Field to a different corrections
facility. Field arrived there in a state of medical emergency, and staff called 911.
Field was taken by ambulance to an outside hospital where doctors attempted
surgery, but she “died on March 14, 2016 . . . from a ruptured aneurysm, a stroke,
hydrocephalus, and respiratory failure.” Id. at 482.
Following an investigation, the Office of Corrections Ombuds concluded
that the medical care Field received from DOC “did not meet community
healthcare standards, and her death could have been prevented.” Id. at 475. The
Washington Medical Commission also imposed sanctions against the DOC
physician assistant for “contribut[ing] to [Field’s] death.” Id. at 487.
B. Cousins’ PRA request to DOC
1. Request, initial response, and production of first two installments
Cousins is the personal representative of Field’s estate. On July 21, 2016,
Cousins submitted a PRA request to DOC through counsel, seeking “[a]ny and all
records regarding Renee A. Field . . . from January 1, 2014 to present.” Id. at 36.
The request was assigned to Public Records Specialist Gaylene Schave.
5 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
On July 25, 2016, Schave e-mailed Cousins a tracking number for her PRA
request, PDU-43037, 1 and explained that Field’s medical and chemical
dependency records would be processed separately in their respective departments
rather than DOC’s centralized public records unit. Schave told Cousins to expect
additional correspondence by October 11, 2016. Meanwhile, the medical and
chemical dependency departments reviewed their records, producing the medical
records in August 2016 and the chemical dependency records in February 2017.
In late September 2016, Cousins’ PRA request was reassigned to Public
Records Specialist Sheri Izatt. On October 28, Izatt sent a cost bill for the first
installment (Installment 1). Cousins’ counsel asked to cancel the PRA request,
which Izatt confirmed. However, the following week, counsel e-mailed to “re-
open” the request and asked Izatt to communicate directly with Cousins. Id. at 40.
Izatt responded that the records would be released when the costs were paid. On
November 15, Cousins e-mailed Izatt to confirm that she was sending payment,
and asked to verify that her PRA request included “video or audio recordings”
from the corrections facilities. Id. at 1274. Izatt did not respond.
Cousins sent payment, and DOC sent Installment 1 to her on November 22,
2016. Izatt promised further correspondence by February 28, 2017, but later
1 The record variously refers to this request as “PRU-43037,” “16-43037,” “PDU-43037,” and “P-43037.” CP at 44, 586, 1256, 1444.
6 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
extended the deadline. New counsel appeared on Cousins’ behalf in early
February, and Izatt later sent counsel a cost bill for the next installment. Cousins
paid the bill, and Installment 2 was produced on April 17, 2017. At this point, her
PRA request had been pending for approximately nine months.
2. Cousins notifies DOC that specific records are allegedly missing
Upon reviewing Installments 1 and 2, Cousins came to believe that some
records were missing, such as e-mail attachments. On May 24, 2017, Cousins e-
mailed Izatt through counsel with a list of documents that “appear to have been
omitted from the first and second installment of records,” including specific
reports, letters, and attachments that were referenced in other records but had not
been produced.2 Id. at 491. The May 2017 e-mail explicitly stated, “To the extent
any of the requested records is not covered by our current public records request,
Tracking No. PDU-43037, please consider this letter our formal public records
request seeking those records.” Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
There is no indication that DOC opened a new PRA request for the allegedly
missing records. Instead, Izatt responded that Cousins’ original PRA “request
[was] still open” and that DOC was “still in the process of gathering records.” Id.
at 499. Izatt further explained that “e[-]mails were maintained via hardcopy and
2 The merits of Cousins’ PRA action are not before us. We express no opinion as to whether, or when, these allegedly missing records should have been produced.
7 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
did not maintain the attachments,” but she promised that responsive records “will
be in future installments.” Id. at 500.
3. Additional installments and January 2019 closing letter
Over the next 14 months, DOC produced Installments 3 through 6. In
October 2017, between Installments 3 and 4, Cousins asked Izatt to communicate
directly with her again rather than through counsel. Thereafter, Izatt worked
directly with Cousins, but DOC’s internal file for Cousins’ PRA request continued
to list Cousins’ former counsel as the sole requester. By the time Installment 6 was
produced in September 2018, Cousins’ PRA request had been pending for over two
years. DOC still had not produced any of the allegedly missing records Cousins
had identified in May 2017.
On October 31, 2018, Izatt sent Cousins a cost bill for Installment 7.
Cousins timely sent payment, but her check was never cashed. On December 10,
Izatt entered a notation in DOC’s internal file that the request was closed for
nonpayment. Unaware of the closure, Cousins e-mailed Izatt to ask about
Installment 7. When Izatt responded that the costs had not been paid, Cousins
promptly re-sent the payment, as directed by Izatt. DOC received Cousins’
payment and produced Installment 7 on January 17, 2019.
Installment 7 included a cover letter from Izatt explicitly stating that
Cousins’ payment “was received on January 14, 2019.” Id. at 44. However, Izatt
8 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
never updated DOC’s internal file with this information. As a result, the internal
file continued to state that Cousins’ request was closed for nonpayment in
December 2018, with no subsequent entries until July 2020. In deposition, Izatt
said that she “forgot” to update DOC’s internal file but suggested that it was
unimportant because it was “just notes to other staff.” Id. at 561. In fact, as
discussed below, the inaccuracies in DOC’s internal file concerning the identity of
the requester and Cousins’ payment history caused significant confusion for the
records specialist who took over after Izatt, to Cousins’ detriment.
The final line of Izatt’s cover letter for Installment 7 states, “PRU-43037 is
now closed. However, if you should have any questions related to this request, you
may contact me at the address below (or via e-mail . . .).” Id. at 44. According to
DOC, this January 2019 closing letter was its final, definitive response to Cousins’
PRA request. The letter did not explain why DOC had closed the request or,
indeed, what it meant for a request to be “closed.”
Cousins thought the January 2019 closing letter reflected DOC’s view that it
“had found all responsive records to [her] request,” which Cousins believed was a
mistake because DOC had not yet addressed the allegedly missing records she had
identified in May 2017. Id. at 105. Relying on the letter’s explicit invitation to ask
questions, Cousins e-mailed Izatt.
9 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
4. Cousins promptly asks DOC about the allegedly missing records
On January 22, 2019, five days after the closing letter, Cousins e-mailed
Izatt to ask about (1) Field’s medical and chemical dependency records and (2) the
allegedly missing records she had identified in May 2017. Izatt responded that she
would look into the medical and chemical dependency records but did not address
Cousins’ second question about the allegedly missing records. Cousins promptly
sent a follow-up e-mail, asking again about the “specific reports that [she]
requested in addition to the medical or chemical dependency records,” with the
May 2017 e-mail included for reference. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
The next day, January 23, Izatt e-mailed Cousins the dates on which the
medical and chemical dependency records had been produced. Once again, Izatt
failed to address the allegedly missing records. Izatt did restate the language of
Cousins’ “initial request” from July 2016, but this was not responsive to Cousins’
question. Id. As discussed above, Izatt had assured Cousins that the allegedly
missing records identified in May 2017 would be produced in “future installments”
of her original PRA request, “PDU-43037.” Id. at 500.
Cousins sent another follow-up e-mail, reiterating that she sought “the
specific documents [she] requested after the second installment.” Id. at 593. Izatt
did not respond. On February 1, Cousins e-mailed Izatt again, explaining that she
10 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
had been waiting nearly three years for her request to be fulfilled. In response,
Izatt re-sent her e-mail from January 23.
Because Izatt had answered Cousins’ question about the medical and
chemical dependency records, but had not yet addressed the allegedly missing
records, Cousins believed that she and Izatt were still “conversing about what
records were missing and where they were.” Id. at 1525. Moreover, based on the
gaps in communication and delays in production for Installments 1 through 7,
described above, Cousins believed that Izatt’s failure to promptly respond
indicated that Izatt was looking into the allegedly missing records. However,
Cousins never heard from Izatt again.
Izatt ended her employment with DOC in April 2019. Cousins e-mailed
Izatt again in October 2019, but no one responded. Cousins asserts that she did not
even receive an automated reply stating that Izatt’s e-mail account had been
disabled, although DOC disputes this. Cousins also called DOC’s public records
unit and left voice messages twice. Id. at 117 (October 24, 2019, at 10:59 AM), 118
(October 25, 2019, at 4:11 PM).
On October 29, 2019, Public Records Specialist Paula Terrell responded to
Cousins’ voice messages by e-mail. Terrell told Cousins that she was not the
requester based on the inaccurate information in DOC’s internal file, which
continued to list Cousins’ former counsel as the sole requester. Cousins responded
11 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
immediately, providing a detailed timeline of her former attorneys and urging
Terrell to “[p]lease check [her] records.” Id. at 62.
The following week, Terrell re-sent the January 2019 closing letter and told
Cousins that “[t]his request is and remains closed.” Id. Cousins responded that
she already had the January 2019 closing letter, but no one had answered her
follow-up questions about the allegedly missing records identified in May 2017.
Without addressing those records, Terrell invited Cousins to “respond with any
questions [she] may have regarding [her] closed public records request, PRU-
43037.” Id. Terrell did not explain why the request was closed, what it meant for
a request to be “closed,” or what Cousins could hope to accomplish by asking
about allegedly missing records in a closed request.
On November 14, 2019, Cousins e-mailed Terrell a list of outstanding items,
including the allegedly missing records she had identified in May 2017. Relying
on the inaccurate information in DOC’s internal file, Terrell responded that
Cousins’ PRA request “was closed due to [DOC] not receiving payment” for
Installment 7. Id. at 65. As explained above, Cousins had, in fact, made payment,
but Izatt never updated DOC’s internal file with this information.
Because Cousins knew she had paid for, and received, Installment 7, she e-
mailed Terrell again in “disbelief.” Id. at 1537. Cousins reiterated that her PRA
request “was closed due to [DOC’s] assumption that [her] request was completely
12 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
filled,” which Cousins believed was incorrect because she had “not received all of
the records as stated in [her] earlier e[-]mail.” Id. at 65. Terrell never responded.
In deposition, Terrell did not explain why she stopped communicating, saying only
that there was a “lapse” in “responding to [Cousins] and reopening the request.”
Id. at 571. Terrell admitted that she should have reopened the request at that time,
and she could not recall why she did not do so.
Cousins believed Terrell was still working on her PRA request because
Cousins had thoroughly explained the situation and answered all of Terrell’s
questions, and Terrell “did not come back and say no, I’m not working on it.” Id.
at 1540. Nevertheless, according to DOC, the PRA’s one-year limitations period
expired in January 2020 while Cousins waited for a response to the questions
Terrell had explicitly invited her to ask.
5. DOC reopens Cousins’ original PRA request
When Terrell failed to respond, Cousins e-mailed her again in July 2020,
using the same e-mail thread from November 2019. At this point, Terrell finally
realized that she was mistaken in thinking that Cousins’ PRA request had been
closed for nonpayment. Moreover, after reviewing the file, Terrell believed that
there had been “a misunderstanding” between Cousins and Izatt in January 2019,
and that Cousins’ PRA request should be reopened. Id. at 581.
13 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
According to DOC’s internal file, Terrell “re-opened” Cousins’ original
PRA request (“16-43037”) on July 15, 2020, to “conduct an additional search.” Id.
at 590, 586. That same day, Terrell e-mailed Cousins to verify the records she was
seeking. Cousins verified the list of records and, on July 30, Terrell confirmed that
responsive records would be provided pursuant to Cousins’ original request,
“PRU-43037.” Id. at 548. Terrell cautioned that if Cousins had “additional
records to add to this request, it may be that we treat those additional requested
records as a new request,” but Cousins promptly clarified that this was not “a new
request for ‘additional’ documents.” Id. at 551, 1380. Terrell admitted in
deposition that the records were not new and that they should have been “included
in [the] any and all requests that [Cousins] originally did in 2016.” Id. at 580.
On August 26, 2020, Terrell sent the list of records to DOC staff, using the
subject line “PDU-43037 records request.”3 Id. at 727. From August 2020 to June
2021, staff actively searched for and successfully located numerous responsive
records, including some of the records that Cousins had identified in May 2017. In
October 2020, DOC produced “Installment #8 of PRU-43037,” followed by
Installments 9 and 10 in November and December, respectively. Id. at 1402.
3 On the same day, a different records specialist allegedly opened “a new request” with “a new and different tracking number,” which Cousins disputed “[b]ecause it wasn’t a new request.” CP at 6, 1541. There is no indication that DOC followed up on this “new” request.
14 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
C. Cousins commences her PRA action while DOC continues producing records
In January 2021, after receiving Installment 10, Cousins filed a complaint
against the State of Washington and DOC, alleging “denial of access to public
records without justification or exemption, intolerable delay, a failure to conduct
an investigation to identify responsive records, and a lack of any explanation as to
why these public records continue to be withheld.” Id. at 7-8. DOC filed its
answer in February 2021, asserting the statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense. While Cousins’ lawsuit was pending, DOC continued searching for
records, producing Installments 11 through 15 from February to May 2021.
On June 23, 2021, DOC produced Installment 16, which included over 300
pages of previously undisclosed responsive records bearing the notation, “Printed:
8/30/2016 11:45:02 AM.” Id. at 120-425. According to Izatt, these documents had
likely been “waiting in the queue to be reviewed somewhere in the records office”
since the August 2016 print date. Id. at 562. She could not explain why they were
not produced earlier.
Installment 16 was accompanied by a cover letter stating, “This public
records request, PDU-43037[ ]is now closed” (June 2021 closing letter). Id. at
1440 (emphasis added). Cousins’ litigation counsel e-mailed counsel for DOC,
asserting that specific responsive records had not been produced. “[I]n an attempt
to address [the] concerns regarding this request . . . without waiving any argument
15 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
in the ongoing litigation,” DOC produced “[I]nstallment #17” in August 2021, with
a cover letter stating that “P-43037 remains closed.” Id. at 1444. DOC’s own
filings state that Installments 8 through 17 included hundreds of pages of
previously undisclosed responsive records. See id. at 1493-1517.
D. Summary judgment and appeal
In September 2021, one month after producing Installment 17, DOC moved
for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. DOC acknowledged
that it “did reopen [Cousins’] request and provide additional installments” starting
“[i]n the summer of 2020.” Id. at 94. Nevertheless, DOC argued that “[a]ny PRA
claims accrued when the request was closed” in January 2019, and its subsequent
“production of additional records does not change the result.” Id. at 96-97. In
support of its motion, DOC relied heavily on Dotson v. Pierce County, 13 Wn.
App. 2d 455, 464 P.3d 563, review denied, 196 Wn.2d 1018 (2020).
Dotson was the first published appellate opinion to apply the final, definitive
response test this court adopted in Belenski. Like DOC in this case, the agency in
Dotson produced responsive records, then sent the requester a letter “‘closing’” her
PRA request. Id. at 461 (quoting record). However, unlike DOC, the agency in
Dotson specified why the request was being closed, stating that the requester had
“‘received responsive documents.’” Id. (quoting record). In addition, unlike
16 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Cousins, the requester in Dotson did not ask any “questions regarding the produced
records or amend her PRA request” in response to the closing letter. Id. at 462.
Several months later, the agency in Dotson discovered additional responsive
records in the ordinary course of business and provided them to the requester. Id.
at 462-63. The requester filed a PRA action less than one year after the additional
records were provided but more than one year after the closing letter. Id. at 462.
The Court of Appeals held that the action was time barred, reasoning that the
closing letter was the agency’s final, definitive response because it sufficiently
“alert[ed] Dotson that there would be no forthcoming documents.” Id. at 471.
Here, DOC argued that Cousins’ case was “[j]ust like” Dotson. CP at 96.
Therefore, according to DOC, the PRA’s one-year limitations period started
running with the January 2019 closing letter, notwithstanding the subsequent
production of Installments 8 through 17. Cousins opposed summary judgment,
urging the trial court to distinguish Dotson or, alternatively, to apply equitable
tolling. Cousins also moved for a show cause hearing on the merits of her PRA
claims. See RCW 42.56.550(1)-(2). Following oral argument, the trial court
granted summary judgment to DOC, ruling that the decision was “constrained by
established case[ ]law, specifically the Court of Appeals’ decision in Dotson.” CP
17 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
at 1802. The trial court further declined to apply equitable tolling, denied Cousins’
show cause motion as moot, and dismissed her PRA action. 4
Cousins appealed, arguing that Dotson was both factually distinguishable
and incorrectly decided. Alternatively, Cousins argued that her PRA action was
timely filed in accordance with the discovery rule of accrual. She did not appeal
the trial court’s decision denying equitable tolling. DOC urged the appellate court
to affirm the trial court’s ruling on the statute of limitations or, in the alternative, to
affirm dismissal on the basis that Cousins’ action was premature.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split, published opinion. Cousins v.
Dep’t of Corr., 25 Wn. App. 2d 483, 523 P.3d 884 (2023). The majority
interpreted Belenski to establish a “bright line rule” that the PRA’s limitations
period is always triggered when an agency tells a requester “that the request is
closed.” Id. at 493. Acknowledging “that the facts here are different than in
Dotson,” the majority nevertheless held that “the different facts do not change the
result.” Id. at 492-93. The majority also declined to apply the discovery rule of
accrual. Id. at 495. A partial dissent rejected “[t]he majority’s bright line rule,”
4 In an oral ruling, the trial court appeared to address the underlying merits of Cousins’ PRA claims. See CP at 1794. However, counsel asked to confirm that “the Court did not reach the actual merits,” and the trial court agreed. Id. at 1796. The written order did not reach the merits, instead denying Cousins’ show cause motion “as moot.” Id. at 1802 (capitalization omitted). “[I]n the event of a conflict, a written order will control over an oral ruling.” State v. Sims, 193 Wn.2d 86, 99, 441 P.3d 262 (2019). Therefore, the merits of Cousins’ PRA action were not decided by the trial court and are not before us on review. The record also references a “Motion to Strike,” but that motion is not in the record, so we do not address it. CP at 1800.
18 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
arguing that the “drastically different facts” presented in Cousins’ case “warrant a
different result” and warning that the majority “creates incentives that are contrary
to the purpose of the [PRA].” Id. at 499 (Glasgow, C.J., dissenting in part).
Cousins petitioned for review, asking this court to distinguish or overrule
Dotson or, in the alternative, to adopt the discovery rule of accrual for PRA
actions. We granted review without limitation and accepted two joint amici briefs,
one supporting Cousins and the other supporting DOC.5
ISSUES
A. When does an agency letter “closing” a PRA request trigger the one-
year statute of limitations in RCW 42.56.550(6)?
B. Is Cousins’ PRA action barred by the one-year statute of limitations?
C. If Cousins’ PRA action is not barred by the statute of limitations,
should dismissal be affirmed on the alternative basis that the action is premature?
ANALYSIS
This case requires us to interpret the statute of limitations for seeking
judicial review of agency actions in PRA cases. The statute provides, “Actions
under this section must be filed within one year of the agency’s claim of exemption
5 Cousins is supported by the American Civil Liberties Union of Washington, the Human Rights Defense Center, the Washington Coalition for Open Government, Columbia Legal Services, and the Washington Employment Lawyers Association. DOC is supported by the Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys, the Washington Association of County Officials, and the Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys.
19 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
or the last production of a record on a partial or installment basis.” RCW
42.56.550(6). When interpreting the PRA, “[o]ur review is de novo.” Rental
Hous. Ass’n of Puget Sound v. City of Des Moines, 165 Wn.2d 525, 536, 199 P.3d
393 (2009) (citing RCW 42.56.550(3)).
The PRA has included a statute of limitations since its original enactment in
1973, and the language of the current statute has not changed since 2005. LAWS OF
1973, ch. 1, § 41; LAWS OF 2005, ch. 483, § 5(6). However, this court has
interpreted it only twice, first in 2009 with Rental Housing, 165 Wn.2d 525, and
later in 2016 with Belenski, 186 Wn.2d 452. Therefore, we take this opportunity to
further develop our precedent and to address, as a matter of first impression,
whether an agency’s “closing letter” may trigger the PRA’s limitations period.
DOC supports the bright-line rule adopted by the Court of Appeals’
majority, which holds that the statute of limitations always starts running “when an
agency notifies the requester that the request is closed.” Cousins, 25 Wn. App. 2d
at 485. Cousins argues that the statute of limitations should never start running
with “an agency’s ‘closing’ of a request,” particularly “where the agency later
produces responsive records.” Am. Pet. for Discr. Rev. at 2. DOC emphasizes the
importance of certainty and finality, while Cousins emphasizes the PRA’s strong
mandate for broad disclosure of public records. Our task is to balance these
20 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
important, and sometimes competing, interests by “determin[ing] and enforc[ing]
the intent of the legislature.” Rental Hous., 165 Wn.2d at 536.
We hold that a sufficient closing letter will generally trigger the PRA’s
statute of limitations; the subsequent production of records may be relevant to
liability or penalties but ordinarily will not restart the limitations period. However,
to trigger the limitations period, a closing letter must be sufficient; an agency’s use
of the word “closed,” without more, is not determinative. Instead, the closing letter
must satisfy Belenski’s final, definitive response test in accordance with the
attorney general’s Advisory Model Rules and the guidance provided in today’s
opinion. An insufficient or premature closing letter may not trigger the limitations
period at all or it may provide a basis for equitable tolling.
A closing letter is sufficient if it provides at least the following information
to the requester, in plain language targeted to a lay audience: (1) how the PRA
request was fulfilled and why the agency is now closing the request, (2) that the
PRA’s one-year statute of limitations to seek judicial review has started to run
because the agency does not intend to further address the request, and (3) that the
requester may ask follow-up questions within a reasonable time frame, which may
be specified by the agency. If the requester asks timely follow-up questions, the
agency is not required to search for additional records, although it may choose to
do so. However, if the agency does not intend to further address the request, it
21 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
must explicitly say so and reiterate that the statute of limitations has started to run.
The final, definitive response test is an objective inquiry, so the agency’s
subjective intent and the requester’s subjective understanding are not relevant.
In this case, DOC sent Cousins a purported “closing letter” in January 2019.
However, when Cousins asked timely follow-up questions, DOC initially chose to
ignore one of her questions, creating ambiguity as to whether Cousins’ PRA
request was still being processed. As a result, the January 2019 closing letter was
not DOC’s final, definitive response to Cousins’ PRA request. DOC later chose to
reopen Cousins’ original PRA request and produce additional records before
closing the request again in June 2021. Therefore, we hold that the June 2021
closing letter was DOC’s final, definitive response triggering the one-year
limitations period. Cousins’ PRA action is not barred by the statute of limitations. 6
A. A sufficient closing letter that satisfies Belenski’s final, definitive response test will ordinarily trigger the PRA’s limitations period
To resolve the issues before us, it is first necessary to review our precedent
interpreting the PRA’s statute of limitations. Although our precedent is limited, it
reflects a consistent effort to balance the interests of certainty and finality with the
PRA’s strong mandate for public disclosure, culminating in our adoption of
Belenski’s final, definitive response test. We affirm that Belenski provides the
6 In light of this holding, we need not reach Cousins’ alternative argument regarding the discovery rule of accrual, and we decline to do so.
22 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
correct analytical framework for all PRA cases, and we largely affirm Dotson’s
application of Belenski to the closing letter in that case, with certain clarifications.
However, Dotson did not adopt, and we decline to recognize, a bright-line rule that
Belenski is necessarily satisfied by the word “closed.” Instead, an agency’s closing
letter will trigger the PRA’s limitations period if, but only if, the letter satisfies the
final, definitive response test in accordance with the attorney general’s Advisory
Model Rules and the guidance provided in today’s opinion.
1. Overview of this court’s precedent
Guided by legislative intent, our precedent interpreting RCW 42.56.550(6)
has sought to balance the “theme of finality” reflected in the statute of limitations
with the PRA’s “strongly-worded mandate for broad disclosure of public records.”
Belenski, 186 Wn.2d at 460; Rental Hous., 165 Wn.2d at 535. Most recently, this
balanced approach led us to adopt Belenski’s “final, definitive response” test. 186
Wn.2d at 462. The same balanced approach guides our decision today.
We first interpreted the PRA’s statute of limitations in Rental Housing.
There, an agency “refused to provide hundreds of pages” of records, asserting
various exemptions. 165 Wn.2d at 528. However, the refusal letter “did not
describe individual documents and did not provide a privilege exemption log.” Id.
at 529. The requester asked for “a privilege log specifically describing each
23 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
withheld individual document and the basis for withholding,” which the agency
“attempted to provide” six months later. Id. at 529, 533.
The requester in Rental Housing commenced a PRA action more than one
year after the agency’s initial refusal letter but less than one year after the agency
sent the privilege log. Id. at 533-34. The agency moved to dismiss, arguing that
the limitations period started running from the initial refusal letter because that
letter made a “claim of exemption” as contemplated by the statute. Id. at 534-36;
see RCW 42.56.550(6).
Rental Housing rejected the agency’s position. Instead, we considered the
statutory language, prior case law, and relevant regulations to conclude that “a
claim of exemption requires a detailed privilege log.” Rental Hous., 165 Wn.2d at
536. However, we did not treat the words “privilege log” as conclusive. Instead,
we looked to the record to determine whether the agency’s initial refusal letter
functioned as “a valid claim of exemption” by “includ[ing] the sort of ‘identifying
information’ a privilege log provides.” Id. at 538 (quoting Progressive Animal
Welfare Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash, 125 Wn.2d 243, 271 n.18, 884 P.2d 592 (1994)
(plurality opinion)). We concluded that the refusal letter “was insufficient to
constitute a proper claim of exemption and thus did not trigger the one-year statute
of limitations.” Id. at 539.
24 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Thus, Rental Housing took a functional approach to balance the interests at
stake. The agency argued that this approach would “undermine[ ] the public policy
favoring statutes of limitation,” including “certainty and finality, and protecting
against stale claims.” Id. at 540. However, we held these interests were better
served by “liberally construing the PRA to effectuate open government—as we
must.” Id.; see RCW 42.56.030.
We next considered the statute of limitations in Belenski. On its face, the
PRA’s statute of limitations lists only two types of agency responses: (1) “the
agency’s claim of exemption” or (2) “the last production of a record on a partial or
installment basis.” RCW 42.56.550(6). However, the agency in Belenski
responded differently, asserting that it had “‘no responsive records.’” 186 Wn.2d
at 455 (quoting record). The requester sued two years later, after learning that
responsive records did exist, but the agency believed it “need not provide them.”
Id. Thus, we were asked to determine “the appropriate starting point for the statute
of limitations when an agency’s response does not fall strictly within the two types
of responses listed in RCW 42.56.550(6).” Id. at 459.
The requester argued that the PRA’s limitations period starts running only
when the agency provides one of the “two very specific agency responses” listed in
the statute. Id. Belenski rejected this interpretation because “there are many other
ways an agency may respond, whether permitted under the statute or not.” Id.
25 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Instead, Belenski considered the broader language and purposes of the PRA to
conclude that the agency responses listed in the statute are illustrative examples,
not a “definitive list.” Id. at 460. Therefore, we held “that the legislature intended
to impose a one year statute of limitations beginning on an agency’s final,
definitive response to a public records request,” even where the agency’s response
does not strictly fit within the statutory language. Id.
Based on the specific facts presented, Belenski held the agency’s assertion
that it had no responsive records constituted a “final, definitive response” because
it “was sufficient to put [the requester] on notice that the [agency] did not intend to
disclose records or further address this request.” Id. at 461. Even if the agency’s
answer was not “truthful or correct,” it could trigger the statute of limitations
because, if the requester “was unsatisfied with this answer, he could sue . . . as
soon as [the agency] gave this response.” Id. In this way, Belenski effectuated the
legislature’s intent to establish a “theme of finality . . . for all possible responses
under the PRA, not just the two expressly listed in RCW 42.56.550(6).” Id. at 460.
Nevertheless, Belenski recognized “legitimate concerns” that giving
conclusive effect to an agency’s “dishonest response” could be “fundamentally
unfair in certain circumstances.” Id. at 461. Such an approach “could incentivize
agencies to intentionally withhold information and then [attempt to] avoid liability
due to the expiration of the statute of limitations . . . contrary to the broad
26 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
disclosure mandates of the PRA.” Id. Therefore, to balance the legislature’s dual
interests in finality and broad public disclosure, Belenski remanded to the trial
court “to determine whether the doctrine of equitable tolling applies to toll the
statute of limitations in this case.” Id. at 462.
Belenski and Rental Housing are certainly “distinguishable” from each other
on the facts and issues presented. Id. at 461 n.2. Nevertheless, both opinions
balanced the PRA’s strong mandate for broad public disclosure with the need for
certainty and finality in PRA actions. The result of this balanced approach was
Belenski’s final, definitive response test. We take the same approach in resolving
the issues now before us.
2. Dotson does not adopt a bright-line rule that all purported “closing letters” automatically trigger the PRA’s limitations period
Neither Rental Housing nor Belenski considered whether, or under what
circumstances, an agency’s “closing letter” may trigger the PRA’s statute of
limitations. The seminal case addressing that question is the Court of Appeals’
opinion in Dotson, 13 Wn. App. 2d 455, which is central to the parties’ arguments
in this case. The parties interpret Dotson to create a bright-line rule that the PRA’s
limitations period is automatically triggered whenever an agency issues a
purported “closing letter.” We cannot agree with the parties’ interpretation of
Dotson, and we take this opportunity to clarify Dotson’s holdings.
27 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Dotson primarily addressed an issue that was left open by this court’s
opinion in Belenski. As discussed above, Belenski adopted the final, definitive
response test in the context of “an agency’s response [that] does not fall strictly
within the two types of responses listed in RCW 42.56.550(6).” 186 Wn.2d at 459.
Belenski further suggested, albeit in dicta, that the same analysis should apply in all
PRA cases because it would be “absurd” to apply different statutes of limitations
“based on how the agency responded.” Id. at 460-61. This dicta from Belenski
was directly at issue in Dotson.
As discussed above, the agency in Dotson produced records responsive to a
PRA request, issued a letter closing the request, and then subsequently produced
additional records that were inadvertently discovered in the ordinary course of
business. The question was whether the limitations period started to run with the
closing letter (as the agency argued) or with the agency’s subsequent production of
the “last installment of responsive records” (as the requester argued). Dotson, 13
Wn. App. 2d at 470. The requester pointed to “the plain language” of the statute of
limitations and argued that Belenski “controls only where RCW 42.56.550(6) does
not clearly apply.” Id. at 470-71.
Thus, the primary issue in Dotson was not how to apply Belenski, but
whether Belenski applied at all. Dotson concluded that it did and held that the
closing letter triggered the limitations period because it was “‘was sufficient’ to put
28 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Dotson ‘on notice that the County did not intend to disclose records or further
address [the] request.’” Id. at 471 n.7 (alteration in original) (quoting Belenski,
186 Wn.2d at 461). We denied review in Dotson, so this our first opportunity to
interpret and apply its holdings.
Both parties, the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and amici supporting
Cousins7 all appear to interpret Dotson to impose an “extratextual ‘bright line rule’
under which the statute of limitations on a PRA claim begins to run as soon as the
agency sends a letter asserting the request is ‘closed.’” Amicus Curiae Br. of Am.
Civ. Liberties Union of Wash. et al., at 2; see also CP at 1802; Cousins, 25 Wn.
App. 2d at 491-93; Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 15-16; Suppl. Br. of DOC at 17-18. DOC
supports this bright-line rule, arguing that the statute of limitations started running
in this case with the January 2019 closing letter. See Suppl. Br. of DOC at 18
(citing Dotson, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 470-72). Cousins argues that Dotson’s alleged
bright-line rule should be rejected because it “bestows preclusive effect on
something called a ‘closing letter,’ a term that is found nowhere in the statute or
regulations, even where the agency subsequently produces additional documents.”
Am. Pet. for Discr. Rev. at 16. The parties’ arguments on this point are misplaced.
No language in Dotson sets forth a bright-line rule that the PRA’s limitations
period is always triggered by every purported “closing letter.” Instead, Dotson
7 Amici supporting DOC do not address Dotson.
29 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
explicitly considered the particular “closing language chosen by the [agency]” in
that case, as well as the requester’s failure to ask follow-up “questions regarding
the produced records or amend her PRA request.” 13 Wn. App. 2d at 471, 462. In
doing so, Dotson correctly made a case-specific holding by properly applying
Belenski’s final, definitive response test to the particular facts presented. Dotson
does not purport to adopt a bright-line rule for all closing letters in all cases, and
we decline to interpret it in that way.
Indeed, if Dotson had adopted a bright-line rule that an agency’s use of the
word “closed” will always trigger the PRA’s statute of limitations, we would reject
it. As discussed further below, such a rule would improperly prioritize finality for
agencies over all other relevant interests, including certainty for requesters and the
PRA’s strong mandate for broad public disclosure. Our opinions in Rental
Housing and Belenski require a more balanced approach, and we interpret Dotson
in accord with this precedent.
Thus, we clarify that Dotson did not adopt a bright-line rule but, instead,
properly reached a case-specific result by applying Belenski to the particular facts
presented. Dotson’s analysis supports the following propositions: (1) Belenski’s
final, definitive response test applies in all PRA cases, (2) a sufficient closing letter
can satisfy the final, definitive response test, and (3) following a sufficient closing
30 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
letter, the production of additional records does not ordinarily restart the
limitations period. We now expressly adopt each of these holdings.
3. Subject to equitable tolling, a sufficient closing letter will trigger the PRA’s limitations period, even if additional records are later produced
Having reviewed the principles established by Rental Housing, Belenski, and
Dotson, we now address the proper analytical framework to determine whether a
closing letter is sufficient to trigger the PRA’s one-year statute of limitations. We
reaffirm Belenski’s final, definitive response test, subject to equitable tolling. We
further recognize that a closing letter will ordinarily trigger the limitations period
if, but only if, the letter is objectively sufficient to satisfy the final, definitive
response test. The subsequent production of records may be relevant to liability or
penalties but will generally not restart the limitations period.
a. The limitations period for all PRA actions is determined in accordance with Belenski’s final, definitive response test
As discussed above, Belenski suggested in dicta that the final, definitive
response test should apply in all PRA actions because it would be “absurd” to
apply different statutes of limitations “based on how the agency responded.” 186
Wn.2d at 460-61. Dotson agreed, rejecting the requester’s argument that Belenski
“controls only where RCW 42.56.550(6) does not clearly apply, or in cases where
the responding agency claimed it had no records.” 13 Wn. App. 2d at 471. We
31 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
now affirm that Belenski’s final, definitive response test provides the applicable
framework for measuring the statute of limitations in all PRA actions.
Cousins does not ask this court to overrule or limit Belenski. However, she
argues that the limitations period for her PRA action should be measured from
“‘the last production of a record on a partial or installment basis’” based on “[t]he
plain language of RCW 42.56.550(6).” Am. Pet. for Discr. Rev. at 14 (quoting
RCW 42.56.550(6)). In Cousins’ view, this occurred when DOC produced
Installment 17 in August 2021. Therefore, Cousins argues, DOC’s prior closing
letters from January 2019 and June 2021 should be disregarded as “incorrect and
legally meaningless.” Id. at 16. We disagree with Cousins on this point.
In essence, Cousins argues that an agency response that is listed in the
statute automatically supersedes an agency response that is not listed in the
statute—regardless of which one occurred first. Dotson explicitly rejected this
interpretation, and correctly so, because it is inconsistent with the analysis set forth
in Belenski. See 13 Wn. App. 2d at 471-72.
It is certainly true that “[w]here the meaning of statutory language is plain
on its face, we must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of
legislative intent.” Rental Hous., 165 Wn.2d at 536. However, we do not read
specific statutory phrases in isolation. Instead, we must “look at the [PRA] in its
32 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
entirety in order to enforce the law’s overall purpose,” taking guidance from prior
case law interpreting the same statutory language. Id.
As discussed above, our case law recognizes that the PRA’s broad public
disclosure mandate must be balanced with the “valuable purposes” served by the
statute of limitations, including “certainty and finality, and protecting against stale
claims.” Id. at 540. We recognized in Belenski that the proper balance can be
achieved only by reading the two types of agency responses listed in RCW
42.56.550(6) as illustrative rather than “a definitive list.” 186 Wn.2d at 460.
As a result, Belenski does not distinguish between agency responses based
on whether they fit within the statutory examples. To the contrary, “the legislature
intended to impose a one year statute of limitations beginning on an agency’s final,
definitive response to a public records request . . . for all possible responses under
the PRA.” Id. (emphasis added). Regardless of the type of response an agency
gives, the inquiry remains the same: When did the agency provide a final,
definitive response “sufficient to put [the requester] on notice that the [agency] did
not intend to disclose records or further address this request”? Id. at 461.
Belenski’s reasoning is firmly grounded in the plain language of the statute,
which “does not use terms like ‘either’ or ‘only’ to limit the triggering events.” Id.
at 460. Moreover, Belenski properly recognizes that the legislature does not intend
to create “absurd results—leaving either no statute of limitations or a different
33 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
statute of limitations to apply based on how the agency responded.” Id. at 460-61.
In addition, the legislature has not amended the statute in the years since Belenski
was decided, strongly indicating that our interpretation was consistent with
legislative intent. See State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 190-92, 481 P.3d 521 (2021)
(discussing principles of legislative acquiescence).
Thus, we reaffirm that the legislature intended to create a single, uniformly
applicable standard for measuring when the statute of limitations has started to run
in a PRA action. The correct standard is Belenski’s final, definitive response test,
regardless of whether an agency’s response fits within the examples listed in RCW
42.56.550(6). Cousins’ approach would improperly elevate the statute’s
illustrative examples above other types of agency responses, undermining the
uniform application of Belenski and limiting agencies’ flexibility to respond in a
manner appropriate to the specific PRA request at issue. Therefore, we decline to
adopt Cousins’ approach and, instead, we apply the final, definitive response test.
b. A sufficient closing letter ordinarily satisfies the final, definitive response test
Belenski holds that an agency’s final, definitive response to a PRA request
need not conform to the types of responses explicitly listed in RCW 42.56.550(6)
in order to trigger the limitations period. However, to constitute a final, definitive
response, the agency’s response must be objectively sufficient to put a reasonable,
nonattorney requester on notice that the one-year limitations period has started to
34 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
run because the agency does not intend to disclose additional records or further
address the request. 186 Wn.2d at 461. It is clear that a sufficient closing letter
can, and usually will, meet this standard. Nevertheless, an agency’s use of the
word “closed,” without more, is not determinative. When assessing the sufficiency
of closing letters, courts and agencies should consult the attorney general’s
Advisory Model Rules and the guidance in today’s opinion.
Preliminarily, Cousins appears to argue that closing letters should rarely, if
ever, trigger the PRA’s statute of limitations. She correctly points out that the
PRA does not explicitly address closing letters and that the word “closed” is not
defined within the PRA. See Am. Pet. for Discr. Rev. at 16; RCW 42.56.010
(definitions). However, the attorney general’s Advisory Model Rules have
explicitly encouraged the use of closing letters for nearly 20 years. See WAC 44-
14-04006, -04007; Wash. St. Reg. 06-04-079.
The Advisory Model Rules provide that a request “can be closed” by an
agency only when the request “has been fulfilled.” WAC 44-14-04006(1).
Fulfillment may occur in a number of ways:
[W]hen a requestor has inspected all the requested records, all copies have been provided, a web link has been provided (with assistance from the agency in finding it, if necessary), an entirely unclear request has not been clarified, a request or installment has not been claimed or reviewed, or the requestor cancels the request.
35 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Id. When a request is fulfilled, the agency “should provide a closing letter stating
the scope of the request and memorializing the outcome,” including an explanation
of how the request was fulfilled (inspection, providing copies, etc.). Id. “The
closing letter should also ask the requestor to promptly contact the agency if [they]
believe[ ] additional responsive records have not been provided.” Id. When the
closure process is complete, “[a]n agency has no obligation to search for records,”
although the agency should provide any “later-discovered records to the
requestor.” WAC 44-14-04007.
The Advisory Model Rules are not binding, but the legislature has clearly
expressed its intent for agencies and courts to consult the Advisory Model Rules
when interpreting the PRA. See RCW 42.56.570; Kilduff v. San Juan County, 194
Wn.2d 859, 872-73, 453 P.3d 719 (2019); Rental Hous., 165 Wn.2d at 539; Cantu
v. Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7, 23 Wn. App. 2d 57, 91 & n.10, 514 P.3d 661 (2022).
Therefore, we must conclude that the use of closing letters in accordance with the
Advisory Model Rules is consistent with legislative intent, and we reject Cousins’
suggestion that closing letters are inherently suspect.
At the same time, we reject any bright-line rule giving determinative effect
to the word “closed.” An experienced public records specialist or judicial officer
might automatically understand the word “closed” as a legal term of art, meaning
“that the agency no longer intends to disclose additional records or further address
36 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
a request.” Cousins, 25 Wn. App. 2d at 493. However, agencies and courts cannot
assume that a requester has, or should have, the same understanding.
A person need not have any training in the law or the PRA to request public
records from an agency, and every person who makes a PRA request is entitled to
“the fullest assistance . . . and the most timely possible action.” RCW 42.56.100.
A bright-line rule giving determinative effect to the word “closed” would
undermine the PRA’s “‘central tenets’” to preserve “‘the accountability to the
people of public officials and institutions.’” Wade’s Eastside Gun Shop, Inc. v.
Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 185 Wn.2d 270, 277, 372 P.3d 97 (2016) (quoting
Progressive Animal Welfare Soc’y, 125 Wn.2d at 251, and citing RCW 42.56.030).
We “must avoid interpreting the PRA in a way that would tend to frustrate that
purpose.” Worthington v. WestNET, 182 Wn.2d 500, 507, 341 P.3d 995 (2015).
Moreover, as discussed above, Belenski requires a consistent, uniform
approach to triggering the statute of limitations “for all possible responses under
the PRA.” 186 Wn.2d at 460. Such consistency is necessary to preserve the
“valuable purpose” of “certainty and finality” reflected in the statute of limitations.
Rental Hous., 165 Wn.2d at 540. The only way for courts to consistently apply
Belenski, without putting nonattorneys at a disadvantage, is to conduct an objective
inquiry assuming that the requester is a lay person with no specialized knowledge
or expertise.
37 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Indeed, although we largely affirm Dotson, as discussed above, we must
correct a portion of its analysis suggesting that Belenski imposes a subjective
inquiry. In deciding whether the agency’s closing letter was a final, definitive
response, Dotson addressed the requester’s “concerns of ‘gamesmanship’” and
what the agency “intended” for the letter to mean. 13 Wn. App. 2d at 471. An
agency’s subjective intent, like a requester’s subjective understanding, is irrelevant
to Belenski’s final, definitive response test. Subjective intent affects some issues
that may arise in a PRA action, including equitable tolling and statutory penalties,
but those are separate issues that should not be conflated with the objective inquiry
required by Belenski. See Fowler v. Guerin, 200 Wn.2d 110, 121, 515 P.3d 502
(2022) (equitable tolling); Neigh. All. of Spokane County v. Spokane County, 172
Wn.2d 702, 717, 261 P.3d 119 (2011) (penalties).
In sum, we hold that a sufficient closing letter will ordinarily trigger the
PRA’s one-year statute of limitations pursuant to Belenski’s final, definitive
response test. In accordance with the attorney general’s Advisory Model Rules,
agencies must refrain from closing a request until the request has been fulfilled
pursuant to applicable regulations. See WAC 44-14-04006(1). When the agency
has a good faith belief that a PRA request is subject to closure, the agency may
satisfy Belenski’s final, definitive response test with a sufficient closing letter.
38 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Sufficient closing letters must be written in plain language targeted to a lay
audience and should include at least the following information: (1) how the PRA
request was fulfilled and why the agency is now closing the request, (2) that the
PRA’s one-year statute of limitations to seek judicial review has started to run
because the agency does not intend to further address the request, and (3) that the
requester may ask follow-up questions within a reasonable time frame, which may
be explicitly specified by the agency.
If the requester asks timely follow-up questions, the agency is not required
to search for additional records, although it may choose to do so. However, if the
requester asks timely follow-up questions and the agency does not intend to further
address the request, the agency should explicitly say so and reiterate that the statute
of limitations has started to run. An insufficient or premature closing letter may
not trigger the statute of limitations, or it may provide a basis for equitable tolling,
depending on the particular circumstances presented.
c. Absent equitable tolling, records produced subsequent to a sufficient closing letter do not restart the limitations period
Finally, Cousins argues that even if a closing letter could trigger the statute
of limitations, “the subsequent production of records [means] the ‘closing letter’ is
at best incorrect and legally meaningless, and at worst is a dishonest response from
the agency.” Am. Pet. for Discr. Rev. at 16. We cannot agree.
39 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
The attorney general’s Advisory Model Rules are instructive on this point,
providing that “[a]n agency has no obligation to search for records responsive to a
closed request. Sometimes an agency discovers responsive records after a request
has been closed. An agency should provide the later-discovered records to the
requestor.” WAC 44-14-04007. There is no indication that providing such later-
discovered records restarts the PRA’s statute of limitations, and we hold that it
does not, unless equitable tolling applies. Contrary to Cousins’ suggestion, this
approach promotes full agency disclosure rather than inhibiting it.
Dotson provides a practical example. As explained by the Court of Appeals,
“the additional records produced [in Dotson] were discovered accidentally in the
regular course of business and in response to Dotson’s summary judgment
motion.” Cousins, 25 Wn. App. 2d at 492 (citing Dotson, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 462-
63). If producing those additional records automatically restarted the limitations
period, as Cousins argues it should, agencies would clearly be discouraged from
producing later-discovered records.
We must promote “a culture of compliance among agencies and a culture of
cooperation among requestors,” in part by encouraging agencies to “work[ ] with
requesters after the agency has provided the requester with the agency’s final,
definitive response.” WAC 44-14-00001; Br. of Amicus Submitted on Behalf of
Wash. State Ass’n of Mun. Att’ys et al. 7; see also Suppl. Br. of DOC at 16-18.
40 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Cousins’ approach essentially treats all closing letters as contingent and subject to
revocation, regardless of whether they were properly issued in the first instance.
This would undermine cooperative efforts and eliminate much of the certainty and
finality the PRA’s statute of limitations is meant to promote.
Where an agency issues a sufficient closing letter but subsequently produces
additional responsive records, the subsequent production may be relevant to
assessing the agency’s liability and penalties, as well as equitable tolling in
appropriate cases. However, the subsequent production will not ordinarily restart
the limitations period.
In sum, we reaffirm Belenski’s final, definitive response test. A sufficient
closing letter in accordance with the Advisory Model Rules will ordinarily satisfy
Belenski, even if the agency subsequently produces additional responsive records.
We must now consider the record presented in this case to determine when DOC
provided its final, definitive response to Cousins’ PRA request.
B. Cousins’ PRA action is not barred by the statute of limitations because the June 2021 closing letter was DOC’s final, definitive response
In this case, DOC argues that its January 2019 closing letter was the final,
definitive response to Cousins’ PRA request. Cousins argues that neither of
DOC’s closing letters was a final, definitive response, so the limitations period did
not start to run until DOC produced Installment 17 in August 2021. We disagree
with both parties and hold that DOC’s June 2021 closing letter was its final,
41 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
definitive response to Cousins’ PRA request. Therefore, her January 2021 PRA
action is not barred by the statute of limitations.
As discussed, the sufficiency of a closing letter should be assessed in
accordance with the guidance provided by today’s opinion and the attorney
general’s Advisory Model Rules. Of course, today’s opinion was not available to
DOC while it was processing Cousins’ PRA request. Therefore, it is not surprising
that neither of the closing letters DOC sent to Cousins in January 2019 and June
2021 strictly complies with the standards set forth in today’s opinion. However,
this fact is not determinative, as we do not claim to impose a retroactive standard
of strict compliance.
Indeed, such an approach would be entirely inconsistent with the balanced,
functional approach taken by our precedent, as discussed above. See Rental Hous.,
165 Wn.2d at 538 (analyzing whether refusal letter functioned as a claim of
exemption by “includ[ing] the sort of ‘identifying information’ a privilege log
provides”); Belenski, 186 Wn.2d at 461 (analyzing whether response functioned as
a final, definitive response “to put [the requester] on notice that the [agency] did
not intend to disclose records or further address this request”). Therefore, we must
determine whether the January 2019 or June 2021 closing letters functioned as a
final, definitive response by sufficiently putting Cousins on notice that DOC did
not intend to produce additional records or further address her request. As
42 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
discussed above, the sufficiency of a closing letter must be considered objectively,
applying the standard of a reasonable lay person.8
DOC argues, and the trial court and Court of Appeals agreed, that the
January 2019 closing letter was DOC’s final, definitive response to Cousins’ PRA
request. However, as discussed above, this was based on the mistaken view that
Dotson establishes a bright-line rule that all purported “closing letters” satisfy the
final, definitive response test. Instead, as clarified in today’s opinion, Doston held
that the specific closing letter in that case was sufficient. Here, the closing letter
DOC sent to Cousins in January 2019 was not sufficient.
Contrary to the Advisory Model Rules, and unlike the closing letter in
Dotson, DOC’s January 2019 closing letter simply stated that Cousins’ request was
“closed,” without explaining what that meant or why the request had been closed.
CP at 44. Contra WAC 44-14-04006(1); Dotson, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 461 (closing
letter explaining that the requester had “‘received responsive documents’”). We
emphasize again that although the word “closed” may be familiar to courts and
agencies as a term of art, it is not defined in the PRA, and it may not hold any legal
8 At the trial court, DOC sought a “credibility determination[ ]” that Cousins did not subjectively believe her request was still open following the January 2019 closing letter based on her alleged “experience submitt[ing] PRA requests.” CP at 1743. Such a determination may be relevant to other issues in this case, which are not before us, but it is irrelevant to the objective inquiry required by Belenski’s final, definitive response test.
43 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
significance to a reasonable lay person. Therefore, DOC’s use of the word
“closed,” in itself, was not sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations.
Nevertheless, the January 2019 closing letter properly invited Cousins to ask
follow-up questions. CP at 44; cf. WAC 44-14-04006(1); Dotson, 13 Wn. App. 2d
at 462. With this added language, the January 2019 closing letter was sufficient to
put a reasonable, nonattorney requester on notice that DOC would not further
address the PRA request, unless they had additional questions.
Cousins did have additional questions pertaining to (1) medical and
chemical dependency records and (2) the allegedly missing records she had
identified in May 2017. Contra Dotson, 13 Wn. App. 2d at 462 (requester asked
no follow-up questions). She e-mailed DOC within five days of the January 2019
closing letter. DOC promptly answered Cousins’ question about the medical and
chemical dependency records but repeatedly ignored Cousins’ specific questions
about the allegedly missing records. This ambiguous, partial response was not
objectively sufficient to put a reasonable lay person on notice that DOC did not
intend to further address Cousins’ request.
To the contrary, any reasonable person would expect DOC’s final, definitive
response to include some answer to Cousins’ timely follow-up questions. Even a
simple statement that “DOC does not intend to produce additional records” could
provide Cousins with all the information she needed to file a PRA action. See
44 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Strickland v. Pierce County, No. 75203-1-I, slip op. at 6 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 29,
2018) (unpublished) (“[T]he public records officer responded by letter that ‘we
have already provided you all of the records in the possession of this office.’”),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/752031.pdf; cf. Belenski, 186 Wn.2d at
461.
However, without some kind of answer from DOC, Cousins could not know
if DOC was denying her request for the allegedly missing records, or if DOC
believed that the allegedly missing records did not exist, or if DOC was still in the
process of locating and reviewing the allegedly missing records to be produced in a
future installment. Thus, a direct answer to Cousins’ timely follow-up questions—
any answer—was necessary for Cousins to know whether there was any basis to
“sue to hold [DOC] in compliance with the PRA.” Belenski, 186 Wn.2d at 461.
Because DOC chose to ignore Cousins’ questions, the January 2019 closing letter
did not function as its final, definitive response to her PRA request.
DOC’s June 2021 closing letter was similar to the January 2019 closing
letter. See CP at 1440. Nevertheless, under the circumstances presented here, and
in light of the fact that DOC did not yet have the guidance provided in today’s
opinion, we conclude that the June 2021 closing letter was sufficient to satisfy
Belenski’s final, definitive response test. By that time, Cousins had already
commenced her PRA action and was represented by litigation counsel. Moreover,
45 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Cousins did not ask any follow-up questions after receiving the June 2021 closing
letter, although her litigation counsel did so, leading to the production of
Installment 17. For the reasons discussed above, Installment 17 may be relevant to
DOC’s liability or penalties, but it did not restart the limitations period. As noted,
the issue of equitable tolling is not before us in the case.
Thus, the one-year statute of limitations for Cousins’ PRA action started to
run with the June 2021 closing letter. Because Cousins commenced her PRA
action in January 2021, the action is not barred by the statute of limitations.
C. We reject DOC’s alternative argument that Cousins’ PRA action must be dismissed as premature
Finally, DOC raised an alternative argument at the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, which neither court reached. DOC argued that if the limitations period
did not start running until the summer of 2021, then Cousins’ PRA action should
be dismissed as “premature under Hobbs v. [Wash.] State [Auditor’s Off.], 183 Wn.
App. 925, 936, 335 P.3d 1004 (2014).” Resp’t’s Br. at 32 (Wash. Ct. App. No.
56996-5-II (2022)); see CP at 97. We reject DOC’s argument on this point. See
RAP 13.7(b). 9
9 “If the Supreme Court reverses a decision of the Court of Appeals that did not consider all of the issues raised which might support that decision, the Supreme Court will either consider and decide those issues or remand the case to the Court of Appeals to decide those issues.”
46 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
Hobbs holds that “a requester may only initiate a lawsuit to compel
compliance with the PRA after the agency has engaged in some final action
denying access to a record.” 183 Wn. App. at 935-36. Hobbs was decided in the
specific context “when a person has ‘been denied an opportunity to inspect or copy
a public record by an agency.’” Id. at 936 (quoting RCW 42.56.550(1)). As the
Court of Appeals later clarified, Hobbs “was not addressing ‘the situation where an
agency completely ignores a records request for an extended period.’” Cantu, 23
Wn. App. 2d at 90-91 (quoting Hobbs, 183 Wn. App. at 937 n.6).
Here, Cousins’ PRA action is based, at least in part, on DOC’s alleged
“intolerable delay” in responding to her PRA request, a situation not addressed in
Hobbs. CP at 7. DOC does not distinguish between Cousins’ various PRA claims,
arguing that her entire “lawsuit [is] premature and subject to dismissal without
prejudice under Hobbs.” Resp’t’s Br. at 33 (Wash. Ct. App. No. 56996-5-II
(2022)). Hobbs does not support dismissal of Cousins’ entire PRA action.
Therefore, we reject DOC’s alternative argument.
CONCLUSION
When interpreting and applying the PRA’s statute of limitations, we must
balance the PRA’s strong mandate for broad disclosure of public records with the
interests of certainty and finality underlying all limitations periods. Although we
decline to adopt a bright-line rule for all purported “closing letters,” we recognize
47 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
that a sufficient closing letter will ordinarily satisfy Belenski’s final, definitive
response test, thereby triggering the PRA’s one-year limitations period.
To ensure their closing letters are sufficient, agencies should provide at least
the following information, in plain language targeted to a lay audience: (1) how the
PRA request was fulfilled and why the agency is now closing the request, (2) that
the PRA’s one-year statute of limitations to seek judicial review has started to run
because the agency does not intend to further address the request, and (3) that the
requester may ask follow-up questions within a reasonable time frame, which may
be specified by the agency. If the requester asks timely follow-up questions, the
agency is not required to locate additional records, although it may choose to do
so. However, if the agency does not intend to further address the request, it must
explicitly say so and reiterate that the PRA’s one-year statute of limitations has
started to run.
In this case, DOC sent a letter in January 2019 telling Cousins that her
request was now closed and inviting Cousins to ask follow-up questions, which she
did. DOC promptly answered one of Cousins’ questions but repeatedly ignored the
other. Had DOC simply answered both of Cousins’ questions by explicitly stating
that no additional records would be produced, the January 2019 closing letter
might have functioned as its final, definitive response. Instead, DOC provided an
ambiguous partial response that was objectively insufficient to notify Cousins that
48 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
DOC did not intend to further address her PRA request. Therefore, the January
2019 closing letter did not satisfy Belenski’s final, definitive response test.
DOC eventually chose to reopen Cousins’ request, searched for additional
records and produced multiple installments, and then issued a second closing letter
in June 2021. We hold that the June 2021 closing letter was DOC’s final,
definitive response to Cousins’ PRA request, notwithstanding DOC’s subsequent
production of Installment 17. These later-produced records may affect DOC’s
liability or penalties, but they did not restart the limitations period.
Thus, Cousins’ January 2021 PRA action is not barred by the statute of
limitations. We reject DOC’s alternative argument that the action must be
dismissed as premature, and we decline to reach Cousins’ alternative argument
regarding the discovery rule of accrual. We reverse the Court of Appeals and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
49 Cousins v. State & Dep’t of Corr., No. 101769-3
WE CONCUR:
Lawrence-Berrey, J.P.T.
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