Courtney, John W. v. Halleran, Neal T.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedMay 7, 2007
Docket05-1244
StatusPublished

This text of Courtney, John W. v. Halleran, Neal T. (Courtney, John W. v. Halleran, Neal T.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Courtney, John W. v. Halleran, Neal T., (7th Cir. 2007).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 05-1244, 05-3500, 05-3642, 05-3651 JOHN W. COURTNEY, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, Cross-Appellees, v.

NEAL T. HALLERAN, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Cross-Appellants. ____________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 02 C 6926—Joan B. Gottschall, Judge. ____________ ARGUED SEPTEMBER 25, 2006—DECIDED MAY 7, 2007 ____________

Before BAUER, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges. WOOD, Circuit Judge. This case was brought by frus- trated depositors of Superior Bank FSB (“Superior”) in an effort to recoup some of the money they lost when the bank failed. A class of plaintiffs, represented by John W. Courtney, Frances T. Lax, Lawrence M. Green, and Irene Kortas, charged that the defendant bank’s owners, officers, directors, and accountants violated the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq., the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (CFA) and the Illinois Public Accounting Act, 225 ILCS 450/0.01 et seq., through the actions they took while Superior was going under. The district court dismissed the 2 Nos. 05-1244, 05-3500, 05-3642, 05-3651

RICO claims for lack of standing, and it dismissed without prejudice the supplemental state claims. It also initially dismissed a request for an injunction as unripe, but on reconsideration it denied the motion, finding that the requested relief would violate the prohibition in the banking laws on judicial interference with actions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j). Although the plaintiffs urge us to revive some or all of this litigation, we conclude that the district court resolved matters correctly, and we therefore affirm.

I During the latter part of the 1980s, more than a thou- sand savings and loan associations in the United States failed. See “Savings and Loan Crisis,” http:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Savings_and_Loan_crisis (visited April 24, 2007); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., “The S&L Crisis: A Chrono-Bibliography,” http://www.fdic.gov/bank/ historical/s&l/ (FDIC Chronology) (visited April 24, 2007). The rate of failure was so great that the General Account- ing Office1 (GAO) declared the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) fund insolvent by at least $3.8 billion in January 1987. See FDIC Chronology. Dur- ing this crisis, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora- tion (FDIC) had organized a program that permitted the consolidation of several failing or failed thrift organiza- tions into one larger entity, which (the FDIC hoped) would enjoy greater economies of scale and which would be eligible for significant government assistance. See LaSalle Talman Bank, F.S.B. v. United States, 317 F.3d 1363,

1 As a result of the GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 (2004), the name of the agency was changed to the Government Accountability Office. We refer to it here under the name it had at the time. Nos. 05-1244, 05-3500, 05-3642, 05-3651 3

1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2003). It dubbed this the “Phoenix program.” See id. at 1366. One of the institutions that failed was the Lyons (Illi- nois) Savings Bank, which went under in December 1988. Taking advantage of the Phoenix program, a group of investors including Penny Pritzker, Thomas Pritzker, and Alvin Dworman, through a holding company called Coast- to-Coast Financial Corporation (CCFC), acquired Lyons at the end of 1988. The group paid $42.5 million of its own money, and it received assistance from the FSLIC, which contributed a package of cash, tax credits, and loan guarantees worth $645 million. The Pritzkers (together) and Dworman each owned 50% of CCFC; CCFC in turn created a company called Superior Holdings, Inc., which was the nominal owner of the successor bank, Superior Bank FSB. As the district judge did, we refer to the owners as the CCFC defendants or group. The term “Bank defen- dants” refers to the officers and directors of Superior. After the take-over, Superior began accumulating high- risk assets associated with retained interests in mortgage securitizations. Essentially, Superior would make a high- risk loan to an auto or home buyer with a poor credit history; it then pooled groups of these loans and sold the portfolios to investors. Superior then collected the income due from the underlying loans, and paid a fixed rate of return to the investors. This was capable of being a winning strategy as long as Superior correctly estimated the rate of default or prepayment of the underlying loans, and as long as it was not obligated to pay too high a fixed rate to its investors. The plaintiffs were depositors of Superior. They claim that the CCFC group plundered Superior’s assets by withdrawing excessive amounts of money from the bank and by engaging in self-interested transactions with it. For example, they charge that the CCFC principals 4 Nos. 05-1244, 05-3500, 05-3642, 05-3651

took out large loans from Superior that they had no intention of repaying, and that they drained Superior’s assets by directing Superior to pay CCFC $188 million in dividends over the ten-year period from 1989 to 1999. Eventually, Superior was not able to withstand the alleged financial hemorrhage and it was forced to declare insolvency. (This is the second time that this court has been asked to consider aspects of that collapse. See FDIC v. Ernst & Young LLP, 374 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2004).) According to plaintiffs, the CCFC group initially was able to conceal its misfeasance in several ways. First, its auditors, the accounting firm of Ernst & Young, allegedly cooperated in the cooking of Superior’s books so that they reflected vastly inflated values for the bank’s assets. Based on Ernst & Young’s purported conclusions, the CCFC group and the Bank defendants made statements to depositors designed to assure them that Superior was financially sound. Plaintiffs also allege that the Bank defendants misrepresented the availability of FDIC insurance to existing and potential depositors. They charge that the Bank defendants told them that if they opened up multiple accounts in different names, then each account would be insured up to the maximum permitted by the FDIC. This was inaccurate, but, in reliance on this advice, the plaintiffs say that they were duped into depositing far more than the maximum that could be insured, just when Superior was about to fold. By 1998, Superior’s alleged mismanagement could no longer be ignored. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the FDIC began to investigate, and they determined that several of Superior’s audited financial statements significantly overstated the value of its assets. In January 2001, Ernst & Young conceded that its accounting treat- ment of Superior’s retained interests was incorrect, and it agreed to re-evaluate its conclusions. That led to a write- down of Superior’s retained interests first by $270 million, Nos. 05-1244, 05-3500, 05-3642, 05-3651 5

and later by another $150 million. Insolvency followed soon thereafter; on July 27, 2001, the OTS appointed an FDIC receiver for Superior.

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