County of Bexar v. Cooper

351 S.W.2d 956
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 29, 1961
Docket13836
StatusPublished
Cited by19 cases

This text of 351 S.W.2d 956 (County of Bexar v. Cooper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
County of Bexar v. Cooper, 351 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Ct. App. 1961).

Opinion

BARROW, Justice.

This is a condemnation suit by Bexar County against Earl Cooper and wife to condemn for highway purposes, a strip of land eighty-six feet wide and some 2,300 feet long, consisting of 4.629 acres out of a tract of land containing 168 acres. The case was tried to the jury which returned a verdict, finding (1) that the market value of the land condemned was $16,500.00; (2) that the value of the remainder of the land immediately before the taking was $515,000.00, and (3) that the value of the remainder immediately after the taking was $476,500.00. Based upon the verdict, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of appellees for $16,500.00, the value of the land taken, plus the sum of $38,500.00, the severance damage to the remainder.

Appellant predicates this appeal upon two principal contentions: (1) That the judgment should be reversed on account of improper argument of appellees’ counsel to the jury; and (2) that the verdict of the jury is greatly excessive and against the great weight of the evidence.

Appellant’s first contention is overruled. The complaint as to the argument of appellees’ counsel was not preserved in the proper way; that is, by bill of exceptions. Pritchett v. Highway Insurance Underwriters, 158 Tex. 116, 309 S.W.2d 46.

We sustain appellant’s second contention. The 168-acre tract involved herein lies along the west side of Fredericksburg Road, some two miles north of Loop 410 in Bexar County, Texas. It has a frontage on said road of about 1600 feet. There are approximately 90 acres of land in almost a rectangular shape next to the highway. The balance of the tract is triangular or wedge shape, extending westward to the point of the wedge. In the extreme northeast corner of the tract there is a live-oak grove. Appellees’ improvements, consisting of a large two-story home, which has been described as “beautiful”, together with barns, stables and other improvements, are all located in this grove. The grove occupies a small area and is the high point of the entire tract. From this live-oak hill the remainder of the land slopes toward the west and southwest. Except for the live-oak grove, the land is all brushy country, predominantly mesquite. The strip of land condemned enters the tract about 300 feet west of the northeast corner, to the rear of all the improvements, and extends in a southwesterly direction through the pasture land. The strip does not take or interfere with any of appellees’ improvements these improvements were valued by the witnesses from $50,000.00 to $60,000.00.

Appellees presented five expert witnesses. Roland Reinhardt testified that the value of the part taken was $36,000.00; that the value of the remainder before the taking was $530,000.00, and after taking $467,000.00; severance damages $63,000.00. Mrs. Cecile Burke testified that the value of the part taken was $35,000.00; the value of the remainder before taking was $525,000.00, and after taking, $465,000.00; severance damages $60,000.00. Fred Green testified that the value of the part taken was $34,425.00; the value of the remainder before taking $535,000.00, and after taking $475,425.00; severance damages $59,575.00. Gilbert Kinder did not value the land taken, but testified the value of the remainder before taking was $550,000.00, and severance damages amounted to $102,000.00. Bert Fry testified that the value of the part taken was $31,500.00, the value before taking $525,000.00, value after taking was $467,078.00, resulting in a severance damage of $57,922.00. Mrs. Burke testified that the highest and best use of the subject, land was for estate purposes; the other four witnesses, that it was for subdivision purposes.

The appellant presented one expert witness, George French, who valued the land *958 taken at $9,200.00, and the remainder before taking at $400,022.00, and after taking at $441,479.00. This witness also testified to numerous recent comparable sales of land in the immediate vicinity of the subject land, giving the names of persons involved, the dates of the sales, the acreage, and the volume and pages of the record of the deeds. These sales ranged from $1,000.00 to $1,700.00, and from $1,750.00 to $2,000.00 per acre. The tracts sold ranged from twenty to one hundred and seventy-five acres in size. On the other hand, appellees’ witnesses testified that they knew of no comparable sales. They did not in any way dispute these actual sales, either the fact that they were made or that the land was comparable. They simply ignored this testimony.

Considering the evidence as a whole, we find that appellees’ expert witnesses in testifying to the values placed by them, simply gave expression to their own opinion, and their opinions are not supported by any information upon which to evaluate them. The testimony amounts to no more than a mere conclusion. While it is well settled that the opinions of expert witnesses are admissible in evidence, yet in considering the value of these opinions, they fall within the criticism of Judge Norvell in Tennessee Gas & Transmission Co. v. Zirjacks, Tex.Civ.App., 244 S.W.2d 837, 838: “One claiming damages to land must show the nature of the damage, the effect upon various portions of the tract and the relationship of the same to market value. A mere conclusion as to market value is insufficient for this purpose.” When we analyze the testimony, we find that appellees’ witnesses have valued the remainder of the tract, including all improvements, at from $3,000.-00 to $3,200.00 per acre, and at the same time they value the strip of brush land taken, which had no improvements, at from $7,000.00 to near $8,000.00 per acre. Thus valuing this strip through the pasture land at more than double the remainder of the tract with all the improvements, and almost four times the price comparable land sells for in the vicinity, according to the undisputed evidence. In addition thereto, we find that in valuing the remainder of the land after the taking, they merely fixed an arbitrary amount which they considered to be severance damages, and subtracted that figure from the value before taking, and thus arrived at the value after the taking. The reason assigned by some of the witnesses for this severance damage is because the strip taken runs diagonally across the land, consequently, in subdividing the tract the streets would necessarily he shorter and result in increasing the cost of paving and installing utilities. We agree that might be true .to some extent, as to the ninety acres of land through which the strip extends, but we fail to see how it could possibly be true of the wedge shaped triangle which lies entirely to the west of the strip. The witnesses also stated that there would be some loss of land. It would be difficult to find a tract of land lying in such shape, and with such dimensions as this tract, that there would not be some loss in subdividing it into blocks, lots, streets and alleys.

On the other hand, we find the highest price involved in any comparable sale in the immediate vicinity was $2,000.00 per acre. The opinion of the witness French is in line with this value. He testified that the market value of appellees’ land with improvements was from $2,000.00 to $2,500.00 per acre. The value he placed on this tract, including improvements, was slightly less than $2,500.00 per acre.

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351 S.W.2d 956, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/county-of-bexar-v-cooper-texapp-1961.