Cotton States Mutual Insurance v. Lashley

Supreme Court of Georgia

Cotton States Mutual Insurance v. Lashley

335 S.E.2d 855, 255 Ga. 71, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 920

CourtSupreme Court of Georgia

DecidedOctober 23, 1985

Docket42279

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 335 S.E.2d 855 (Cotton States Mutual Insurance v. Lashley) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Cotton States Mutual Insurance v. Lashley, 335 S.E.2d 855, 255 Ga. 71, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 920 (Ga. 1985).

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Weltner, Justice.

Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company appeals from grant of the insured’s motion for partial summary judgment and from denial of its motion for summary judgment as to the issue of optional PIP benefits. The jurisdiction of this court is based upon certain constitutional claims, which we do not reach.

1. In December 1974, Mrs. Lashley’s husband returned to Shield Insurance Company a signed form by which he indicated that he did not want his insurance policy (first issued by Shield Insurance Company in 1973) to be amended to include optional PIP benefits. The form complied with the requirements of Wiard v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 698 (310 SE2d 221) (1983).

2. In May 1976, Mrs. Lashley’s husband received notice from his insurance agent that, because of his exemplary driving record, he was entitled by the underwriting policies of Shield Insurance Company and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company to transfer his policy from Shield to Cotton States, and thereby pay a lower premium. Shield and Cotton States are related entities, with different rate structures. Cotton States did not offer either to Mrs. Lashley or to her husband optional PIP coverage at any time. In July 1981, anticipating a divorce, Mrs. Lashley was substituted on the policy as named insured.

3. We are asked to determine whether Cotton States was required to offer optional PIP benefits (a) to Mrs. Lashley’s husband at the time that his policy was changed from Shield to Cotton States, or (b) when Mrs. Lashley was substituted as the named insured.

We answer both questions in the negative.

(a) Mrs. Lashley’s husband had responded to a proper offer to accept or reject the optional coverages. We decline to hold that the transfer of his coverage from one insurance company to another related company for the purpose of obtaining a lower premium necessitated a second opportunity to accept or reject optional PIP benefits. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Drexler, 254 Ga. 98 (326 SE2d 741) [72]*72(1985); Pritchard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 254 Ga. 290 (328 SE2d 362) (1985).

(b) We further decline to hold that the substitution of Mrs. Lashley as named insured required Cotton States to extend another such opportunity. Drexler, supra. To the extent that Dixson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 167 Ga. App. 198 (305 SE2d 900) (1983), may point to a differing result, it is disapproved.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., who dissents.

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Weltner, Justice.

Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company appeals from grant of the insured’s motion for partial summary judgment and from denial of its motion for summary judgment as to the issue of optional PIP benefits. The jurisdiction of this court is based upon certain constitutional claims, which we do not reach.

1. In December 1974, Mrs. Lashley’s husband returned to Shield Insurance Company a signed form by which he indicated that he did not want his insurance policy (first issued by Shield Insurance Company in 1973) to be amended to include optional PIP benefits. The form complied with the requirements of Wiard v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 698 (310 SE2d 221) (1983).

2. In May 1976, Mrs. Lashley’s husband received notice from his insurance agent that, because of his exemplary driving record, he was entitled by the underwriting policies of Shield Insurance Company and Cotton States Mutual Insurance Company to transfer his policy from Shield to Cotton States, and thereby pay a lower premium. Shield and Cotton States are related entities, with different rate structures. Cotton States did not offer either to Mrs. Lashley or to her husband optional PIP coverage at any time. In July 1981, anticipating a divorce, Mrs. Lashley was substituted on the policy as named insured.

3. We are asked to determine whether Cotton States was required to offer optional PIP benefits (a) to Mrs. Lashley’s husband at the time that his policy was changed from Shield to Cotton States, or (b) when Mrs. Lashley was substituted as the named insured.

We answer both questions in the negative.

(a) Mrs. Lashley’s husband had responded to a proper offer to accept or reject the optional coverages. We decline to hold that the transfer of his coverage from one insurance company to another related company for the purpose of obtaining a lower premium necessitated a second opportunity to accept or reject optional PIP benefits. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Drexler, 254 Ga. 98 (326 SE2d 741) [72]*72(1985); Pritchard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 254 Ga. 290 (328 SE2d 362) (1985).

(b) We further decline to hold that the substitution of Mrs. Lashley as named insured required Cotton States to extend another such opportunity. Drexler, supra. To the extent that Dixson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 167 Ga. App. 198 (305 SE2d 900) (1983), may point to a differing result, it is disapproved.

Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., who dissents.

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335 S.E.2d 855, 255 Ga. 71, 1985 Ga. LEXIS 920, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cotton-states-mutual-insurance-v-lashley-ga-1985.

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