Cotledge v. Dart

• Court: District Court, N.D. Illinois
• Decided: December 10, 2020
• Docket: 1:20-cv-02629
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

DORIAN COTLEDGE,

Plaintiff, Case No. 20-cv-2629 v. Judge Mary M. Rowland THOMAS DART, SHERIFF, et. al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Dorian Cotledge, a prisoner at Cook County Department of Corrections, alleges that despite his requests for accommodation, Defendants have not allowed him to use his CPAP machine for his sleep apnea in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Sheriff Thomas Dart and Cook County (Defendants) have moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the reasons explained below, the Court denies the Rule 12(b)(6) motion [14]. I. Background Cotledge was processed into the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) on September 22, 2018. (Complaint, Dkt. 1 ¶ 2). Cotledge suffers from sleep apnea, a condition which substantially limits his ability to sleep. (Id. ¶ 5). Since approximately 2014 Cotledge has required a CPAP machine to sleep. (Id.). Shortly after entering the CCDOC Cotledge was provided a CPAP machine at all times, but beginning in February 2020 he was not provided the machine for an hour in the morning, and then on or about March 20, 2020, his CPAP machine was removed by Defendants. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 11). Without this machine Cotledge is unable to sleep through the night, gags, suffers from headaches, and shortness of breath. (Id. ¶¶ 8,

11). Cotledge has requested in writing for his CPAP machine to be returned and for an accommodation in order to be able to sleep but Defendants have refused. (Id. ¶12). Based on these allegations, Cotledge claims Defendants have violated his rights under Section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132.1 II. Standard A motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of a complaint, not the merits of the case.

Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir. 1990). “To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must provide enough factual information to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face and raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Haywood v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, 887 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotations and citation omitted). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a complaint to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”). A court deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion accepts plaintiff’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all permissible inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc., 763 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2014). A plaintiff need not plead “detailed factual allegations”, but “still must provide more than mere labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action for her complaint to be

1 This case is related to case nos. 20-cv-01459 and 20-cv-01381. considered adequate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.” Bell v. City of Chi., 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper “when the allegations in a

complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007). Deciding the plausibility of the claim is “‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” McCauley v. City of Chi., 671 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009)).

III. Analysis Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Defendants argue that dismissal with prejudice is warranted because Cotledge is not a qualified individual with a disability, has not been denied a program, service or activity, does not allege

any physical injury for purposes of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), and is not entitled to injunctive relief. The Court addresses each argument in turn. A. Qualified individual with a disability Defendants first contend that Cotledge failed to allege that he is a qualified individual with a disability. The ADA defines “disability” as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment (as described in paragraph (3)).” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). Defendants acknowledge that sleeping is a major life activity2 but argue that sleep

apnea is not a disability under the ADA. To support their argument, Defendants rely on out-of-circuit summary judgment cases that did not involve sleep apnea. Anderson v. Discovery Commc'ns, LLC, 517 F. App'x 190 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (May 3, 2013); Ramage v. Rescot Sys. Grp., Inc., 834 F. Supp. 2d 309 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (plaintiff did not provide enough evidence that her difficulties sleeping showed substantial limitation in sleeping).3 Defendants concede that these cases involve “courts

weigh[ing] evidence.” (Dkt. 18 at 3). Moreover, in Ramage, the court cited Peter v. Lincoln Tech. Inst., Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 417 (E.D. Pa. 2002) in which the court found plaintiff did create an issue of fact about whether her sleep apnea substantially impaired her ability sleep, and recognized that the “ADA requires an individualized,

2 Major life activities are “[c]aring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2.

3 In their motion and reply brief, Defendants maintain that sleep apnea is not a disability under the ADA. Even assuming the cases cited (see Dkt. 18 at 3) are binding on this court, which they are not, they do not require dismissal here. In Kolecyck-Yap v. MCI Worldcom, Inc., 2001 WL 245531 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2001), the court recognized that sleep apnea can substantially limit major life activities of breathing and sleep but on summary judgment in that case, plaintiff did not provide enough evidence to show a substantial limitation. Keyes v. Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, 415 F. App'x 405 (3d Cir. 2011) was also decided on summary judgment and the court found that the evidence did not support plaintiff’s claim that his sleep apnea symptoms were severe. Finally, notably, plaintiff in Ramage did not have sleep apnea. And the Ramage court did not find as a matter of law that sleep apnea is not a disability under the ADA. Rather, the court, on review of the record, did not find evidence supporting plaintiff’s claim that her difficulty sleeping was severe enough to substantially impair her ability to sleep. 834 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21. case-by-case approach to evaluating whether a plaintiff’s impairment is severe enough to constitute a disability.” Id. at 431, 434. The Seventh Circuit has similarly stated that the question of whether an individual is disabled is “an individualized

one, and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citation and quotations omitted); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (“The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment”). The Seventh Circuit also acknowledged, in a Section 1983 case, that “sleep apnea can result in death.” Orlowski v. Milwaukee Cty., 872 F.3d 417, 423 (7th Cir. 2017).

Accordingly, Cotledge has plausibly alleged that he is qualified individual with a disability, and further factual development will reveal the extent to which his condition limits one or more major life activities.4 Therefore the Court declines Defendants’ invitation to find as a matter of law at this early stage that Cotledge’s sleep apnea does not qualify him as an individual with a disability. B. Denial of the benefit of a service, program, or activity Defendants argue that Cotledge’s complaint should be dismissed because sleeping

is not a program or activity of the public entity under the ADA. Defendants rely on Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996). However, courts in this district have distinguished that case. In Simmons v. Godinez, 2017 WL 3568408 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 2017), the court relied on United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006), which was decided after Bryant and in which the Supreme Court explained that “the alleged

4 For this reason, the Court need not address Defendants’ alternative argument at this time that Cotledge is not “regarded as” having such an impairment. deliberate refusal of prison officials to accommodate [plaintiff’s] disability-related needs in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs constituted ‘exclu[sion] from participation in or ... deni[al of] the

benefits of’ the prison's ‘services, programs, or activities.’” 546 U.S. at 157. Defendants reference Simmons in their reply brief, but do not acknowledge that the court there specifically rejected IDOC’s argument that sleeping is not an activity or program under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, and held that “[b]ecause Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Wexford and IDOC failed to take steps that would allow Plaintiff to access a bed…the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim

under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act at this early stage.” Simmons, 2017 WL 3568408, at *6. In another case, Paine ex re. Eilman v. Johnson, 2010 WL 785397, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2010), the court noted that the Bryant plaintiffs alleged poor treatment or medical malpractice, not failure to reasonably accommodate, and “[v]iolations of a public entity’s duty to accommodate disabilities can provide a basis for liability under Title II of the ADA.” Moreover, since Bryant, the Seventh Circuit has recognized, for

example, outdoor recreation and meals and showers as programs or activities at a prison under the Rehabilitation Act. Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2012); Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2012).5

5 In addition, Defendants’ reliance on Harper v. Dart for support is not convincing. First, Harper did not involve sleep apnea. Second, the Harper court was clear that plaintiff there “[came] close, but fail[ed], to state a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act” and “it would not have taken much to adequately allege a failure to provide equal access.” 2015 WL 6407577, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 2015). Because plaintiff there merely alleged he had “’great difficulty’ showering, toileting, and getting into bed,” the court found “[t]hose two words alone Defendants assert that Cotledge does not claim that they have prevented him from sleeping during the designated time that all detainees are permitted to sleep. (Dkt. 14 at 8). But Cotledge’s claim is not about being permitted a “designated time” to

sleep; it is about not being able to sleep because Defendants failed to provide him with a needed accommodation. He alleges that he is unable to sleep in the same way as similarly situated non-disabled inmates and experiences shortness of breath, gags, is unable to sleep through the night, and suffers from headaches without the CPAP machine. (Compl. ¶¶8, 9, 11). Here, unlike in Bryant, Cotledge does not bring a disguised medical malpractice

or inadequate medical treatment case. Rather he alleges a failure to accommodate his sleep-related disability, giving rise to the permissible inference that such failure constituted a denial of the benefits of the prison’s services, programs, or activities. That is sufficient at this pleading stage. C. By reason of his disability Defendants next argue that Cotledge fails to plead denial or discrimination by reason of his alleged disability because he does not allege why Defendants removed

his CPAP machine. First, Defendants’ cases are not convincing because they involve deliberate indifference claims decided on summary judgment. See Forbes v. Edgar,

do not explain how [plaintiff] was denied equal access.” Id. Here Cotledge’s complaint alleges more than that. He alleges that his sleep apnea substantially limits his ability to sleep and since 2014 he has required a CPAP machine in order to sleep. (Compl. ¶5). He alleges that although he was initially provided a CPAP machine at all times after entering the CCDOC that changed in February 2020. (Id. ¶¶6, 7). Without the machine he gags, experiences shortness of breath, is unable to sleep through the night, and suffers from headaches. (Id. ¶¶8, 11). He has specifically requested the return of the machine. (Id. ¶12). These allegations meet the threshold pleading requirement. 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); Harrison v. Cty. of Cook, 2011 WL 4036115 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2011). (Defendants also cite to Bryant and Harper again but those cases are distinguishable for the reasons already discussed).

Second, although Defendants may have had a good reason for removing the CPAP machine, at the pleading stage, the Court takes Cotledge’s allegations as true that he was denied accommodation for his disability and as a result was unable to sleep on a basis equal to that of non-disabled inmates. (Compl., ¶¶ 8-12). Deciding or accepting Defendants’ reason for removing the machine at this stage would be inappropriate. See Fortres Grand, 763 F.3d at 700; see also Boyce v. Martella, 2014 WL 4947681, at

*3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 1, 2014) (court cannot resolve factual disputes on motion to dismiss). D. Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) Defendants contend that Cotledge does not meet the PLRA standard for a more than de minimus physical injury because Cotledge alleges that sleeping without a CPAP machine causes him “shortness of breath, gagging, headache, and restless night’s sleep” which are not physical injuries. (Dkt. 14 at 12). However, the case law cited by Defendants does not support their specific contention here. By contrast, in

Love v. Godinez, 2018 WL 2096375, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2018), for example, the court held that plaintiff set forth a sufficient showing on summary judgment that he suffered a physical injury from sleep deprivation for purposes of the PLRA. And in Gurley v. Sheahan, 2009 WL 2178685 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2009), the court explained that it could “think of no reason why sleep deprivation and headaches would not constitute physical injury.” Id. at *7. See also Orlowski, 872 F.3d at 423 (recognizing sleep apnea can result in death). Accordingly Cotledge’s allegations give rise to a plausible inference that he suffered de minimus physical injury in order to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss. E. Injunctive Relief Finally, Defendants argue that Cotledge fails to state facts sufficient to entitle him to injunctive relief. Defendants argue that “shortness of breath and paused breathing only rise to de minimis injuries, if injuries at all.” (Dkt. 18 at 15). However, drawing permissible inferences in Cotledge’s favor as it must at this point, the Court finds that he has plausibly alleged injury: without the CPAP machine, his sleep- related condition causes him to have shortness of breath, gag, get headaches, and not be able to sleep. For similar reasons to the reasoning discussed related to de minimus physical injury, Cotledge has made a sufficient showing of injury at this pleading stage. IV. Conclusion For the stated reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [14] is denied.

ENTER: Dated: December 10, 2020 Mug but L/ “MARYM.ROWLAND United States District Judge