COTE v. SCHNELL INDUSTRIES

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedNovember 16, 2021
Docket4:18-cv-01440
StatusUnknown

This text of COTE v. SCHNELL INDUSTRIES (COTE v. SCHNELL INDUSTRIES) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
COTE v. SCHNELL INDUSTRIES, (M.D. Pa. 2021).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

DAYTON COTE, No. 4:18-CV-01440

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

U.S. SILICA COMPANY, NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION, SCHNELL INDUSTRIES, and FB INDUSTRIES,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

NOVEMBER 16, 2021 In February 2016, Dayton Cote nearly lost his hand while operating a large, industrial machine used to transport frac sand. After the accident, Cote filed suit against four defendants: (1) Schnell Industries, the manufacturer of the machine; (2) FB Industries, Schnell’s exclusive distributor in North America and the company that sold the machine to Cote’s employer; (3) U.S. Silica Company, the owner of the quarry where the sand originated; and (4) Norfolk Southern Corporation, the company that transported the U.S. Silica’s sand from its quarry to Cote’s worksite. Cote brought two products liability claims against Schnell and FB Industries, sounding in negligence and strict liability, and separate negligence claims against U.S. Silica and Norfolk Southern. Relevant here, U.S. Silica also filed a crossclaim against Norfolk Southern for contribution. After concluding discovery, Schnell, FB Industries, and U.S. Silica moved for summary judgment on the claims brought by Cote. Norfolk Southern likewise

filed a motion for summary judgment as to U.S. Silica’s crossclaim. However, the evidence presented establishes genuine factual disputes on the issues material to Cote’s claims against Schnell, FB Industries, and U.S. Silica as well as to U.S.

Silica’s crossclaim against Norfolk Southern. For this reason, as further explained below, the motions for summary judgment are denied. I. BACKGROUND The accident occurred on February 27, 2016 at the transfer yard in Wysox,

Pennsylvania owned and operated by Shale Rail, LLC, a subsidiary of Northeast Freight Transfer, Inc.1 At the time, Cote worked for Shale Rail, transferring frac sand from railcars to tractor-trailers using a piece of equipment called a transloader.2 Under ideal conditions, Cote used the transloader to open a sliding

gate on the bottom of the railcars, out of which sand flowed freely—a process known as “gravity feeding.”3 But if the sand inside a rail car became wet, it would not always flow freely onto the transloader (i.e., it would not “gravity feed”).4 To

1 Doc. 51 ¶¶ 2, 45. 2 Id. ¶ 2; see also Doc. 146, Ex. I (Feb. 6, 2020 D. Cote Dep.) 16:23–17:8. 3 Doc. 51 ¶ 36; see also Doc. 169, Ex. 1 (Tarkanian Report). extract wet, clogged sand from a railcar, Cote and his coworkers had to reach inside the railcar and manually dislodge the sand.5

On the day of the accident, Cote was unloading sand with his Shale Rail coworkers Caleb Spencer and Mitchell Jones.6 Although it was neither raining nor snowing, all railcars that Cote unloaded that day contained wet sand.7 At around

6:30 pm, Cote, Spencer, and Jones were unloading a railcar when the wet sand inside clogged, preventing it from gravity-feeding from the railcar to the transloader.8 Cote went down to inspect the railcar’s sliding gate, while Spencer and Jones remained at the rear side of the transloader.9 Cote attempted to dislodge

the sand by adjusting the railcar door and banging on the outside of the railcar with a hammer, but these efforts proved ineffective.10 Cote then reached his hand inside the railcar to manually break up the sand clumps.11

While Cote was dislodging the sand, Spencer used the transloader to close the railcar gate.12 The gate closed on Cote’s hand, nearly severing it from his arm.13

5 Doc. 146, Ex. I (Feb. 7, 2020 D. Cote Dep.) 32:24–33:10, 119:6–120:18; Doc. 146, Ex. P (Feb. 6, 2020 C. Spencer Dep.) 22:6–23:1, 63:16–64:17. 6 Doc. 146, Ex. I (Feb. 7, 2020 D. Cote Dep.) 42:12–24. 7 Id. at 96:23–97:6. 8 Id. at 65:3–8; Doc. 146, Ex. P (Feb. 6, 2020 C. Spencer Dep.) 27:13–29:4. 9 Doc. 146, Ex. I (Feb. 7, 2020 D. Cote Dep.) at 42:12–43:7, 58:14–20. 10 Id. at 100:3–14, 188:16–189:19, 198:3–7. 11 Id. at 194:16–195:14. 12 Spencer did not realize that Cote’s hand was inside the railcar. See Doc. 146, Ex. P (Feb. 6, 2020 C. Spencer Dep.) 63:14–64:9; Doc. 169, Ex. 5 (C. Spencer Post-Incident Investigation Statement). A. The Transloader The transloader involved in Cote’s accident—a model TLX36—was

designed, manufactured, and sold by Defendant Schnell.14 Schnell had an exclusive distribution agreement with FB Industries, granting FB Industries sole authority to distribute the TLX36 transloader in North America.15 As such, FB Industries sold

the transloader involved in Cote’s accident to Northeast Freight Transfer, Cote’s employer.16 The transloader was designed to transfer frac sand from railcars to separate holding or transport containers.17 It was equipped with a “power takeoff” (“PTO”), which opened and closed the railcar’s sliding gate with a hydraulic lever,

rather than a hand crank.18 Once the PTO opened the railcar’s sliding gate, sand would gravity-feed from the railcar to the transloader’s stinger for sifting.19 The sand was then carried via conveyor belt to the separate containers.20

In a report analyzing the TLX36 transloader, Cote’s engineering expert, Michael Tarkanian, P.E., opined that the transloader was defective in the following respects:

14 Doc. 169, Ex. 10 (Mar. 4, 2020 H. Friesen Dep.) 50:14–21. 15 Id. at 105:3–12. 16 See id. at 59:1–12, 133:1–16 (objections omitted); Doc. 144, Ex. D (Jan. 8, 2020 B. Dueck Dep.) 121:6–122:16. 17 See Doc. 146, Ex. R (Eagar Report) at 1. 18 Doc. 169, Ex. 1 (Tarkanian Report) at 7–9. 19 Id.  It failed to contain a “lock out” or “tag out” device to protect users from hazardous energy;21  The PTO control panel was located at the rear of the machine, obstructing the operator from observing the transloder’s stinger;22 and  The accompanying product manual did not address required regulatory safety procedures and contained incomplete and contradictory safety instructions.23 Tarkanian attributed these defects to a lack of engineering input during the design process.24 Schnell’s chief principal, Fred Dueck, designed the TLX36 transloader, but he was not an engineer and Schnell had no engineers on staff.25 FB Industries likewise “had no expertise in engineering,”26 and neither company engaged a third-

party engineer to certify compliance with industry safety standards.27 Indeed, FB industries’ founder and president testified that the company’s clients have a right to

21 Id. at 2–4, 16–17. Schell argues that per OSHA regulations, the ignition key on the TLX36 transloader “is an energy isolating device” that qualifies as a “lockout” because “turning off the ignition and removing the key would have prevented the closure of the hopper gate.” Doc. 156 at 22 (citing 29 CFR 1910.147). Tarkanian rejected this assertion, arguing that “a keyed ignition is not a lock out device” and, thus, “[t]here is no lock out device on the TLX36 according to OSHA 1910.147.” Doc. 169, Ex. 1 (Tarkanian Report) at 3. 22 Doc. 169, Ex. 1 (Tarkanian Report) at 9. 23 Id. at 4–6. 24 Id. at 2–3 (“The lack of engineers, failure to hire third-party engineers, and lack of experience with OSHA, ANSI and other relevant standards, all contributed to the defective design of improperly relying on a keyed ignition to be a lock out device.”). 25 Doc. 156, Ex. 15 (Jan. 8, 2020 B. Dueck Dep.) 33:1–25. FB Industries was fully aware of this fact. See Doc. 169, Ex. 10 (Mar. 4, 2020 H. Friesen Dep.) 50:14–21 (“Q. Okay. When you asked Fred [Dueck] to get involved in designing a trans loader, were you aware of the fact that there were no engineers working for the company? A. Yes. Q. Were you aware of the fact that he had never built a trans loader before? A. Yes.”). 26 Doc. 169, Ex. 10 (Mar.

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COTE v. SCHNELL INDUSTRIES, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cote-v-schnell-industries-pamd-2021.