Coston v. NYS DOCCS

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided March 11, 2020·No. 1:20-cv-00350·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ASHANTE COSTON, Plaintiff, 20-CV-350 (CM) -against- ORDER TO AMEND NYS DOCCS, Defendant. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Downstate Correctional Facility, submitted a letter to this Court that the Clerk’s Office treated as a complaint and opened as a new civil action.1 By order dated February 6, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

1 Because Plaintiff did not submit the filing fees or a completed in forma pauperis (IFP) application and prisoner authorization, it was not clear that Plaintiff intended to file a new civil action. On January 16, 2020, the Court directed Plaintiff to either pay the fee or submit the documents necessary to seek IFP status, if his intention was to file a new civil action. The court received those documents from Plaintiff on February 3, 2020. 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the

court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Because Plaintiff’s submission is in the form of a letter, it is not clear who the defendants are in this action. Plaintiff sets forth the following facts. On December 27, 2019, the sergeant on duty forced Plaintiff to leave the mess hall line and return to his housing unit, and said to Plaintiff, “shut the hell up!” Sgt. Merrit made “harsh comments” about Plaintiff’s religion, such as, “You’re a little Muslim, you’ll be okay.” Officer Cannon said that she would look into getting Plaintiff a food tray, because he had been forced off the mess hall line before he had received any

food. But “no porter had a tray for” him, and all Plaintiff had to eat was “bread & juice” that another prisoner gave him. Plaintiff’s “keeplock status did not come w/ a ticket, therefore [his] keeplock was illegal & unofficial.” Plaintiff alleges that he has “been treated unfairly and harshly.” DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). A plaintiff proceeding under § 1983 must also allege facts showing the defendants’ direct

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