2026 IL App (1st) 250361-U No. 1-25-0361 Order filed April 14, 2026 Second Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ LISA COSENTINO, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 22 L 2417 ) MARILYN VILORIA, ) Honorable ) Preston Jones, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Ellis and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the jury’s damages awards for pain and suffering and loss of a normal life over defendant’s contention that the trial court should have granted remittitur or a new trial.
¶2 This negligence lawsuit arises out of an automobile collision in which defendant Marilyn
Viloria’s vehicle struck the rear of plaintiff Lisa Cosentino’s vehicle. Defendant admitted
negligence and, following trial, a jury awarded plaintiff $2,562,417.92 in damages, consisting of
$1,614,808.96 for pain and suffering, $885,000 for loss of a normal life, and $62,608.96 in No. 1-25-0361
stipulated medical expenses. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court should have granted
remittitur or a new trial. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Pleadings
¶5 Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that on March 31, 2021, she “was parked in her motor vehicle
with her [left] arm extended out of her driver’s side window using a drive-through ATM” at a bank
in Niles. Defendant’s vehicle struck the rear of plaintiff’s vehicle. The impact bent plaintiff’s “arm
backwards into an unnatural position internally deranging her shoulder anatomy which
necessitated surgical repair.” Plaintiff alleged that defendant’s negligent operation of her vehicle
proximately caused plaintiff to suffer economic and non-economic damages in excess of $50,000.
¶6 Defendant’s amended answer admitted negligence but disputed “exactly what economic or
non-economic losses the plaintiff has suffered.”
¶7 B. Trial
¶8 The case proceeded to a damages-only jury trial that began on September 25, 2024.
¶9 The record on appeal does not contain reports of proceedings or a bystander’s report for
the first day of trial. From the common law record, we can glean that on September 25, 2024, the
court issued pretrial rulings on motions in limine and stipulations. The court also ruled on
designations and objections to the evidence depositions of plaintiff’s treater Dr. Kevin Tu,
plaintiff’s sister Toni Cosentino, and defense expert Dr. Klaud Miller. However, we do not know
the substance of these rulings. The court’s pretrial order of September 25, 2024, says only that
“[t]he court ruled on objections in the video depositions of Dr. Tu, Dr. Miller and Toni Consentino
*** by marking the transcript.” Additionally, the record does not include the parties’ opening
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statements or any of the exhibits introduced as evidence at trial. We address these omissions from
the record below.
¶ 10 1. Plaintiff
¶ 11 Plaintiff testified that on March 31, 2021, she drove up to the ATM, parked her vehicle,
unfastened her seatbelt, and reached her left arm out of her vehicle’s window to make a transaction.
During the transaction, plaintiff felt like she was “hit by a freight train.” The accident pushed
plaintiff’s vehicle approximately 30 feet forward even though it was in park. Plaintiff “went flying
forward,” her head struck the rearview mirror and windshield, and her knee struck the dashboard.
Plaintiff’s “arm felt like it was broken in 30 places” and her “elbow was really bad.” Plaintiff
initially exited her vehicle but became dizzy and felt head pain, so she returned to her vehicle.
¶ 12 An ambulance transported plaintiff to Lutheran General Hospital’s emergency room at
approximately 4:30 p.m. Treaters determined that plaintiff suffered no broken bones and did not
require surgery. The hospital discharged plaintiff at approximately 1:00 a.m. and her sister Toni
took her home. That night, plaintiff “couldn’t move [her] arm” and felt pain in her left arm, neck,
and knee. Her nephew helped her get out of the tub so she could go to bed. The next day, plaintiff’s
pain “was ten times worse.”
¶ 13 Approximately six days later, in early April 2021, plaintiff saw orthopedic surgeon Dr.
Mark Sokolowski. He ordered further imaging and physical therapy but determined that surgery
was not necessary. Plaintiff began physical therapy at that point.
¶ 14 Approximately a day after seeing Dr. Sokolowski, plaintiff returned to her job managing
the All Inn bar, which her father owned. Plaintiff testified that she “had to get back” to work and
“had no choice.” Her father was 82 years old and “wouldn’t even know how” to run the bar because
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plaintiff had “been doing it by [her]self for all these years.” Plaintiff worked 10 to 12-hour shifts
seven days a week. When football season began in September, she sometimes worked 16-hour
shifts. Before the accident, plaintiff “d[id] everything” at the bar including managing, accounting,
stocking, and janitorial work. After the accident, plaintiff “did a lot of pointing” to direct bar staff
because she “couldn’t do anything” that required lifting or straightening her left arm.
¶ 15 After 9 to 10 months of physical therapy, plaintiff still could not lift or straighten her left
arm or fully turn her neck, so Dr. Sokolowski referred her to Dr. Tu, another orthopedic surgeon.
Dr. Tu gave plaintiff an injection that improved her “pinching” left shoulder pain but not her arm’s
range of motion. Plaintiff’s left shoulder pain returned approximately three weeks later. Dr. Tu
recommended surgery and plaintiff agreed.
¶ 16 On January 14, 2022, plaintiff underwent outpatient left shoulder surgery at Elmhurst
Surgical Center. Following surgery, plaintiff wore an ice sleeve for approximately four to five
hours a day for “a couple days.” The sleeve “really helped with the pain.” Plaintiff took only one
“batch” of the pain medication Dr. Tu prescribed because the medication made it difficult for her
to function. Approximately a week after surgery, plaintiff felt “great” and could lift and straighten
her left arm. Plaintiff returned to work at that point.
¶ 17 Plaintiff completed physical therapy on February 16, 2022, and saw Dr. Tu that day. 1 Dr.
Tu extended, rotated, and lifted plaintiff’s left arm and “[s]aid everything was good.” Plaintiff
acknowledged that she told Dr. Tu and physical therapists she was not “in any type of pain” at that
point. She meant she was not experiencing any shoulder pain but was still experiencing “pressure
1 The witnesses’ testimony suggests that plaintiff underwent two rounds of physical therapy: one that Dr. Sokolowski prescribed shortly after the accident, and post-surgery physical therapy that Dr. Tu prescribed, which ended on February 16, 2022.
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from the base up” in her neck. Plaintiff testified that her neck pain from the accident never
improved.
¶ 18 After February 16, 2022, plaintiff’s left shoulder pain “started creeping back in little by
little” to the point that she could not lift boxes or mop the bar’s floor. Plaintiff was sore while
working “[a]ll day, every day.” She had to change the way she dressed and struggled to straighten
her hair. When taking care of her father, plaintiff struggled with physical tasks such as carrying
groceries and laundry up and down stairs. Plaintiff also gained weight because she could not
exercise. Plaintiff testified that she was “not the same” and was “a little bit depressed” but felt that
“life goes on.”
¶ 19 On November 15, 2023, plaintiff saw Dr. Tu again because she “had a constant feeling like
somebody was grabbing and pinching [her] shoulder.” She could raise her left arm only partially
before it became painful. Dr. Tu gave plaintiff’s left shoulder several injections, which improved
her symptoms after a few days but made her shoulder sore.
¶ 20 On June 13, 2024, plaintiff saw Dr. Sokolowski because she “was getting a pinching pain
in [her] neck,” which was different from the daily neck pain she experienced.
¶ 21 Plaintiff testified that since 2024, her life had been “getting harder.” She hoped “things
[were] going to get better” but realized she may “just get used to them and accustomed to them”
and would “keep moving forward.” Plaintiff visited Greece a “couple weeks” before trial. She flew
to Greece by herself with “a small carry-on.” Plaintiff’s father and bartender Lilian Leung ran the
bar while plaintiff was on vacation. Plaintiff also traveled to Atlanta because her “nephew
graduated from the Army.” In addition, plaintiff and her friend Debbie took three to four trips over
approximately four years.
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¶ 22 2. Dr. Mark Sokolowski
¶ 23 Dr. Sokolowski is an orthopedic surgeon. He first saw plaintiff on April 5, 2021. Dr.
Sokolowski observed that plaintiff had limited range of motion in her left shoulder and found
“clinical evidence of left rotator cuff tendonitis, cervical radiculopathy, [and] nerve impingement
[i]n her neck.” Dr. Sokolowski prescribed physical therapy for plaintiff’s “neck, her left shoulder,
left elbow, and the numbness and tingling in her arm coming from the elbow.”
¶ 24 Dr. Sokolowski saw plaintiff again approximately six weeks later in May 2021. Plaintiff
reported significant left shoulder and elbow pain, which physical therapy had not improved. An
MRI showed tears in plaintiff’s left bicep tendon and supraspinatus muscle, which is one of the
rotator cuff muscles. Dr. Sokolowski then referred plaintiff to Dr. Tu. Plaintiff completed physical
therapy that Dr. Sokolowski prescribed in September 2021. Between April and September 2021,
plaintiff attended 25 to 30 physical therapy sessions.
¶ 25 Dr. Tu initially gave plaintiff a shoulder injection and then performed shoulder surgery on
January 14, 2022. On February 16, 2022, Dr. Tu discharged plaintiff from the postoperative
physical therapy he prescribed. Discharge records stated that plaintiff was “much better,” had no
pain, and had full range of motion. However, she did have weakness in abduction, which is moving
the arm away from the body.
¶ 26 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Sokolowski on June 11, 2024. She underwent an MRI on July 7,
2024, which showed “narrowing of the spinal canal” and mild herniation in her neck. Those
conditions had not improved since an MRI at the emergency room on March 31, 2021, first
documented them.
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¶ 27 Dr. Sokolowski last saw plaintiff on August 20, 2024. Plaintiff had nerve pain radiating
from her neck to her left arm, severe carpal tunnel in her left arm, left shoulder impingement, and
“ongoing rotator cuff tendonitis.” Dr. Sokolowski opined that the automobile accident caused these
conditions.
¶ 28 Dr. Sokolowski acknowledged that plaintiff’s long work hours could cause pain and
soreness. However, he found it significant that her pain appeared in the exact same location as her
injuries; namely, her left shoulder and neck. By contrast, repetitive motion injuries from long work
hours would likely affect both arms equally.
¶ 29 3. Dr. Kevin Tu
¶ 30 Dr. Tu testified by video-recorded evidence deposition, but the record contains no reports
of proceedings or a bystander’s report for the day of trial on which plaintiff presented his evidence
deposition. However, the record does include a transcript of Dr. Tu’s evidence deposition. That
transcript contains a handful of markings that appear to indicate defendant’s objections, although
the record does not explain what those markings mean or how the trial court ruled on them. As
best we can tell, the jury heard Dr. Tu’s evidence deposition with minimal omissions. Because
defendant is the appellant, we must resolve any doubts arising from the incompleteness of the
record against her. See Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). So, we set out all
unmarked portions of Dr. Tu’s evidence deposition.
¶ 31 Dr. Tu is a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. Plaintiff was 50 years old when Dr. Tu first
examined her on June 16, 2021. Plaintiff complained of pain in her left shoulder and elbow. Dr.
Tu initially diagnosed plaintiff with an impingement injury to her left shoulder and gave her a
lidocaine and cortisone injection to decrease pain and inflammation. Dr. Tu saw plaintiff again on
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September 15, 2021. She reported that the injection had improved her pain for a month, but it
returned and worsened thereafter. On September 29, 2021, plaintiff’s left shoulder and elbow
ranges of motion were within normal limits, but she was still experiencing pain. Dr. Tu
recommended treatment options including further physical therapy, further injections, and surgery.
Plaintiff decided to undergo surgery, which Dr. Tu performed on January 14, 2022.
¶ 32 During surgery, Dr. Tu examined plaintiff’s left shoulder joint using a small camera. He
observed several injuries consistent with the pain plaintiff described: an impingement injury, a
partial thickness rotator cuff tear, and synovitis inflammation. Dr. Tu observed “a tear in the
supraspinatus, which is the muscle that comes from over the shoulder and it goes under and
connects to the top of the shoulder joint,” as well as “a tear in the biceps tendon.” Dr. Tu opined
that the automobile accident caused “some of the acute damage” to plaintiff’s left shoulder. He
reviewed a video of the accident, and it appeared to him that plaintiff’s left arm was “torqued”
during the injury.
¶ 33 Dr. Tu surgically removed the damaged tissue from plaintiff’s supraspinatus muscle and
bicep tendon. He also removed plaintiff’s bursa, which is a sac above the rotator cuff, due to
inflammation. Additionally, Dr. Tu removed six to nine millimeters of plaintiff’s clavicle, which
is the collarbone.
¶ 34 During surgery, Dr. Tu also observed chronic conditions in plaintiff’s left shoulder,
including “early arthritic changes,” “loose bodies,” and “changes at the [acromioclavicular or AC]
joint,” which is where the collarbone joins the shoulder. These chronic conditions existed in
plaintiff’s shoulder before the accident; the accident did not cause them. Dr. Tu removed the loose
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bodies and inflammatory tissue because chronic conditions can cause pain. However, he noted that
plaintiff did not experience pain due to her chronic shoulder conditions before the accident.
¶ 35 Plaintiff’s surgery was an outpatient procedure that lasted one to two hours. Dr. Tu did not
make major incisions in plaintiff’s shoulder; he performed surgery through “three small
arthroscopic portals.” There were no complications and surgery was successful. Dr. Tu prescribed
post-surgery pain medications, but plaintiff did not order any refills of those medications.
¶ 36 When Dr. Tu next saw plaintiff on January 19, 2022, her pain had “improved significantly.”
On February 16, 2022, plaintiff’s prognosis was “excellent,” so Dr. Tu discharged her from his
care.
¶ 37 In November 2023, plaintiff returned to Dr. Tu complaining of increasing pain in her left
shoulder. Dr. Tu examined plaintiff again on February 21, 2024, and April 17, 2024. Plaintiff’s
“range of motion had decreased just a tad bit” and she was “mildly positive” for shoulder
impingement but did not have “significant symptoms.” Dr. Tu gave plaintiff a cortisone injection
for her shoulder pain. Dr. Tu opined that the pain plaintiff experienced as of 2024 was related to
the March 31, 2021, automobile accident. He also opined that plaintiff had reached “maximum
medical improvement,” meaning that her remaining symptoms would be permanent.
¶ 38 4. Lilian Leung
¶ 39 Lilian Leung testified that she worked as a bartender at All Inn. Plaintiff was Leung’s
manager. Before the accident, plaintiff took inventory, cleaned beer coolers and bathrooms,
mopped, and did general manual labor at the bar. After the accident, plaintiff “was in a lot of pain”
and could not lift or straighten her left arm, so Leung helped her with physical tasks. At the time
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of trial, plaintiff still had bar staff stock inventory “because she ha[d] pain in her shoulder and she
c[ould]n’t lift her arm.” Plaintiff took “a lot of ibuprofen” for pain at work.
¶ 40 5. Efterpi “Debbie” Ress
¶ 41 Efterpi “Debbie” Ress testified that she is plaintiff’s best friend of approximately 40 years.
Ress typically saw plaintiff once or twice a week. Before the accident, plaintiff was “active” and,
at work, there was “nothing she d[idn’t] do from cleaning the urinals, the toilets, mopping,
sweeping, picking up beer cases.” After surgery, plaintiff “would ask everybody to help her. She
c[ould]n’t lift a case of beer. She couldn’t mop. She couldn’t sweep every night until 3:00 in the
morning.” Overall, plaintiff changed from being “self-sufficient to needing help constantly”
because she could not lift her left arm. Ress and plaintiff visited Greece together “a few weeks”
before trial. They occasionally took weekend trips to destinations such as the Texas State Fair.
¶ 42 6. Joseph Cosentino
¶ 43 Joseph Cosentino is plaintiff’s father. He testified that before the accident, plaintiff was
“vibrant” and “tough.” After the accident, she “was not herself” and “couldn’t hardly move around
too much and she was in a lot of pain,” which lasted years. Plaintiff could only do mental tasks at
work and “was incapacitated to a certain extent” physically.
¶ 44 7. Anthony Cosentino
¶ 45 Anthony Cosentino is plaintiff’s nephew. He testified that he moved in with plaintiff to
help her after the accident and again after surgery. Plaintiff “couldn’t really move” in the mornings,
so Anthony handled tasks such as making coffee, doing laundry, picking up prescriptions, and
changing clothes, including helping plaintiff put on her bra. Plaintiff and Anthony stopped living
together in early 2022.
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¶ 46 8. Toni Cosentino
¶ 47 Plaintiff’s sister Toni Cosentino testified by video-recorded evidence deposition. However,
the record does not contain reports of proceedings, the video recording, a deposition transcript, or
a bystander’s report reflecting Toni’s testimony. Therefore, we have no basis for setting out her
testimony.
¶ 48 9. Dr. Klaud Miller
¶ 49 Defendant retained orthopedic surgeon Dr. Miller as an expert witness and presented his
testimony by evidence deposition. The record includes a transcript of Dr. Miller’s evidence
deposition, marked with green highlights that may indicate designations of testimony the jury
heard. But because the record does not include the trial court’s rulings on evidence deposition
designations and objections, we cannot determine with certainty which portions of Dr. Miller’s
evidence deposition the jury heard. We must resolve this uncertainty against defendant as the
appellant. See id. Therefore, we set out only the portions of Dr. Miller’s testimony the parties agree
the jury heard. Dr. Miller opined that any ongoing pain plaintiff experienced after her recovery
from surgery is permanent but is due to preexisting arthritis in her left shoulder, not the March 31,
2021, accident.
¶ 50 10. Closing Arguments and Verdict
¶ 51 The verdict form listed three categories of damages the jury could award: (1) “Loss of a
normal life experienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future,” (2) “The pain and
suffering experienced and reasonably certain to be experienced in the future as a result of the
injuries,” and (3) “The reasonable expense[s] of necessary medical care, treatment, and services
received.” The parties stipulated that plaintiff’s medical expenses were $62,608.96, so the jury
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decided only damages for pain and suffering and loss of a normal life. Defendant did not object to
this verdict form or propose an alternate.
¶ 52 In closing argument, plaintiff did not request a specific amount of damages. However, she
argued that the damages awarded needed to “last” for 29 years because plaintiff, who was 53 years
old at the time of trial, expected to live for another 29 years. This figure came from “government
life tables” of which the trial court took judicial notice without objection from defendant.
¶ 53 Defendant “admit[ted] damages up until February 16, 2022,” when Dr. Tu discharged
plaintiff from his care and from physical therapy, because plaintiff was pain-free and had full range
of motion on that date. Defendant argued that the jury should not award plaintiff damages for the
rest of her life because she was still able to work long shifts at the bar, showing that her injuries
were not permanent. Defendant contended that plaintiff did not seek medical treatment between
February 2022 and November 2023 because she was not in pain during that time. Rather, she began
seeing her doctors again in 2023 and 2024 because the trial of this case was approaching.
Defendant argued that the jury should award no more than $10,000 each for pain and suffering and
loss of a normal life, for a total damages award of $82,608.96 including medical expenses.
¶ 54 The jury awarded $2,562,417.92 in damages, consisting of $1,614,808.96 for pain and
suffering, $885,000 for loss of a normal life, and $62,608.96 for medical expenses.
¶ 55 D. Posttrial Motion
¶ 56 On October 18, 2024, defendant filed a motion for remittitur or a new trial. Relevant here,
defendant argued that the jury’s $1,614,808.96 award for pain and suffering was almost 26 times
her medical expenses and the $885,000 award for loss of a normal life was more than 12 times her
medical expenses. Defendant also contended the evidence established that (1) plaintiff’s left
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shoulder had preexisting “arthritic and degenerative issues” the automobile accident did not cause,
(2) plaintiff would not require any further medical treatment and would experience only
“intermittent” shoulder pain, and (3) plaintiff was able to function normally aside from lifting
heavy objects and even enjoyed a vacation in Greece just before trial. Finally, defendant argued
that “the jury may likely have been prejudiced by the numerous lay witnesses testifying to
Plaintiff’s pain and suffering, and the emotional aspects of these witnesses and Plaintiff’s counsel
during closing.”
¶ 57 On October 24 or 25, 2024, plaintiff “responded” to defendant’s posttrial motion by filing
screenshots from the doctors’ evidence depositions and a copy of this court’s opinion in Aguilar-
Santos v. Briner, 2017 IL App (1st) 153593. In that case, this court affirmed a jury’s award of
$835,500 for pain and suffering and loss of a normal life arising out of an automobile accident. Id.
¶¶ 2, 40, 78.
¶ 58 On October 25, 2024, the court entered and continued defendant’s posttrial motion. The
record does not include reports of proceedings or a bystander’s report for that hearing. However,
the court’s written order reflects that it required defendant to file some type of supplemental
briefing by December 16, 2024.
¶ 59 On December 16, 2024, defendant filed a “reply” in support of her posttrial motion.
Defendant distinguished Aguilar-Santos, arguing that the plaintiff in that case underwent more
medical treatment, was never pain-free, and was taking pain medication up to the time of trial. By
contrast, in this case, there was a “distinct cutoff point in the pain Plaintiff experienced;” namely,
February 16, 2022. Defendant contended that the jury improperly awarded damages for pain that
plaintiff’s preexisting arthritis caused. Defendant argued that “a more logical award amount would
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be the [sic] ‘three times the sum of medical expenses,’ ” quoting Dale v. Luhr Brothers, Inc., 158
Ill. App. 3d 402, 410 (1987).
¶ 60 On January 6, 2025, plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant’s posttrial
motion. Plaintiff’s memorandum included an excerpt from the October 25, 2024, hearing,
reflecting that the court had ordered defendant to file a supplemental brief identifying “an amount
that [defendant] thinks would be reasonable, or that the evidence supported.” Plaintiff argued that
defendant failed to do so. In addition, plaintiff contended that the jury had already heard and
rejected defendant’s theory that plaintiff’s ongoing pain was due to preexisting arthritis and not
the automobile accident.
¶ 61 The court held oral argument on defendant’s posttrial motion on January 28, 2025.
Defendant acknowledged that the court had ordered her to “suggest[ ] a remittitur amount” but
explained she could not do so because her insurer had not given her such authority. Defendant
argued there was no expert medical testimony establishing that plaintiff’s “permanent” pain was
due to the injuries she sustained in the automobile accident. Defendant contended that plaintiff’s
lay witnesses—her friends and family—swayed the jury’s emotions. Plaintiff reiterated the
arguments she made in her memorandum and highlighted that defendant never objected to the
verdict form. The court asked whether plaintiff ever requested the jury to award a specific amount.
Plaintiff responded that she requested “millions of dollars” in her opening statement but never
requested a specific amount.
¶ 62 The court denied defendant’s posttrial motion. The court reasoned as follows:
“I agree with the defense in that the verdict, to me, seemed high. But as the judge
in a jury trial, it’s not—I’m not the trier of fact. I’m not the person who decides. And I also
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see the arguments that defense made. The fact is, however, that the jury heard those
arguments and while those arguments might have swayed me, it did not sway the jury. And
I have no evidence, saw any evidence that the jury was motivated by prejudice or motivated
by sympathy or something unfair.
The jury was presented with this case and I believe presented this case well from
both sides and the jury made a decision. And I do not believe that that decision rises to the
level that would justify the Court either reducing the damages or giving defendant a new
trial. I think that the jury’s verdict has to be respected by this Court, so I’m going to
respectfully deny defendant’s motion for remittitur or any alternative motion for new trial.”
¶ 63 Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 64 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 65 Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her posttrial motion
seeking remittitur or a new trial.
¶ 66 A. Incomplete Record
¶ 67 Before we turn to defendant’s arguments, we address plaintiff’s contention that we should
affirm pursuant to Foutch because defendant has not presented a complete record of the trial.
Foutch holds that the
“appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at
trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record on appeal, it will be
presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a
sufficient factual basis. Any doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record
will be resolved against the appellant.” Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.
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¶ 68 There is no question the record on appeal is incomplete. Defendant, the appellant, did not
provide reports of proceedings or a bystander’s report for the entire first day of trial, including the
trial court’s pretrial evidentiary rulings and the parties’ opening statements. Defendant has not
provided any of the exhibits the parties moved into evidence, including a video of the automobile
accident that gave rise to this case. In addition, defendant did not provide any record of Toni
Cosentino’s testimony, which may have affected the jury’s damages award as Toni was the first
witness to see plaintiff at the hospital after the accident.
¶ 69 Defendant’s submission of an incomplete record makes it more difficult to review her
requests for remittitur or a new trial. The remittitur analysis requires us to “carefully examine the
particular evidence and circumstances of the case.” Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill.
2d 217, 234 (2010). But defendant has not provided a complete record of the evidence and
circumstances of trial. Similarly, the new trial analysis requires us to determine whether the jury’s
verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Aguilar-Santos, 2017 IL App (1st)
153593, ¶ 76. We do not have a complete picture of the evidence in this case, so it is more difficult
to assess the evidence’s weight. And ultimately, we are deciding whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying defendant’s posttrial motion. Id. The court’s exercise of discretion was based
on what it observed at trial, but we do not have a complete record of what the court observed during
trial.
¶ 70 By submitting an incomplete record, defendant risks dismissal of her appeal. See Hassard
v. DS Retail, LLC, 2023 IL App (4th) 220687, ¶ 33. But, we will not take that drastic measure here.
First, plaintiff does not request dismissal based on the incomplete record; rather, she requests that
we “affirm[ ] in toto.” Although the record is incomplete, it is sufficient for us to determine the
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overall weight of the evidence, whether that evidence supported the jury’s verdict and, in turn,
whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s posttrial motion. As explained
above, we resolve any doubts arising from the incomplete record against defendant. See Foutch,
99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.
¶ 71 B. Remittitur or New Trial
¶ 72 Defendant makes essentially the same arguments in support of remittitur and a new trial.
As she puts it, “[m]any of the reasons, if not all, cited by [defendant] in seeking a remittitur apply
with equal force to [her] sought after relief of a new trial on the issue of damages.” Therefore, we
address remittitur and a new trial together.
¶ 73 A court must give great deference to a jury’s damages award. Young v. Alden Gardens of
Waterford, LLC, 2015 IL App (1st) 131887, ¶ 90 (citing, inter alia, Richardson v. Chapman, 175
Ill. 2d 98, 113 (1997)). When the jury’s award falls within a flexible range of conclusions that the
evidence reasonably supports, a court will not grant remittitur. Aguilar-Santos, 2017 IL App (1st)
153593, ¶ 76. A court will grant remittitur only if the jury’s damages award “is so excessive that
it indicates that the jury was moved by passion or prejudice or unless it exceeds the necessarily
flexible limits of fair and reasonable compensation or is so large that it shocks the judicial
conscience.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 74 “A trial court should order a new trial if, after weighing the evidence, the court determines
that the jury’s verdict is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. (citing Maple v.
Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454 (1992)). “A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence
where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the jury’s findings are unreasonable,
arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” Id. (citing Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill. 2d 622, 651 (2005)).
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¶ 75 We review a trial court’s rulings on a motion for remittitur and a motion for a new trial for
an abuse of discretion. Id. “In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, the
reviewing court should consider whether the jury’s verdict was supported by the evidence and
whether the losing party was denied a fair trial.” Young, 2015 IL App (1st) 131887, ¶ 46 (quoting
Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 455). A trial court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person would
adopt the trial court’s view. Gomez v. The Finishing Co., Inc., 369 Ill. App. 3d 711, 718 (2006).
¶ 76 1. Pain and Suffering
¶ 77 The jury awarded $1,614,808.96 for the pain and suffering plaintiff experienced and is
reasonably certain to experience in the future.
¶ 78 Pain and suffering are compensable damages. Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, 30.05
(2000). “Damages for pain and suffering are proper where there is evidence of a physical injury.”
Rheinheimer v. Village of Crestwood, 291 Ill. App. 3d 462, 475 (1997) (citing Haudrich v.
Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill. 2d 525, 546 (1996)). “Evidence of future pain and suffering may be
rendered by an expert, elicited from the plaintiff, or inferred from the nature of an injury.” (Internal
citations omitted.) Neyzelman by Neyzelman v. Treitman, 273 Ill. App. 3d 511, 518 (1995).
¶ 79 There is no dispute plaintiff suffered physical injuries in the March 31, 2021, accident, so
damages for pain and suffering were appropriate. See Rheinheimer, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 475.
Plaintiff properly presented evidence of her pain and suffering through her own testimony and the
testimony of two treating experts, Dr. Sokolowski and Dr. Tu. See Neyzelman, 273 Ill. App. 3d at
518. Dr. Sokolowski and Dr. Tu agreed that plaintiff suffered an impingement injury, a torn bicep,
and a torn supraspinatus in her left arm and shoulder.
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¶ 80 The evidence established that plaintiff experienced almost constant pain during the three
and a half years between the accident on March 31, 2021, and trial in late September 2024. Plaintiff
testified that she suffered “pinching” left shoulder pain, “pressure” and “pinching” in her neck that
never improved despite treatment, and pain when trying to raise her left arm. Dr. Sokolowski
testified that plaintiff was still experiencing pain radiating from her neck to her left arm in August
2024, a month before trial.
¶ 81 Plaintiff’s reprieves from pain were few and brief. Plaintiff was pain-free for approximately
one month after Dr. Tu gave her the first cortisone injection, from June 16, 2021, to mid-July 2021.
Plaintiff’s pain also improved following surgery on January 14, 2022, and that improvement lasted
until at least February 16, 2022, when Dr. Tu discharged her. So, in the three and a half years
between the accident and trial, plaintiff was fully pain-free for approximately two months, or less
than 5% of the time.
¶ 82 Furthermore, the evidence established that plaintiff’s pain will persist into the future. Dr.
Tu testified that plaintiff has reached “maximum medical improvement,” so the pain she
experiences now will likely be permanent. Even defense expert Dr. Miller agreed that plaintiff’s
pain is permanent. The jury heard, and there appears to be no dispute, that plaintiff’s life
expectancy is approximately 29 years. The jury’s award does not strike us as shocking considering
plaintiff’s demanding service industry job.
¶ 83 To that point, the jury heard evidence about the daily context in which plaintiff has
experienced and will continue to experience pain. Plaintiff works in a bar, in a position that requires
physical labor as well as long shifts that can exceed 10 hours a day, seven days a week, late at
night and into the early morning hours. Service industry jobs can be physically taxing even for
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young and healthy people, to say nothing of a middle-aged person with permanent shoulder
injuries. Plaintiff testified that she was sore at work every day. Bartender Lilian Leung confirmed
that plaintiff suffered “a lot of pain” at work and frequently took ibuprofen for it. The jury could
have properly considered plaintiff’s demanding job in compensating her for past and future pain
and suffering.
¶ 84 Defendant argues that “the case was close” regarding the cause of plaintiff’s pain.
Defendant points out that while Dr. Sokolowski opined that plaintiff’s pain arose from the injuries
the accident caused, Dr. Miller opined that plaintiff’s pain was due to preexisting arthritis.
Defendant contends that because the evidence of causation was equal, the jury must have based its
award on “passion.” We disagree. First, this issue was not a one-on-one battle of the experts. In
addition to Dr. Sokolowski, Dr. Tu testified that the pain plaintiff experienced as of 2024 was
related to the accident. He also highlighted that plaintiff did not experience any arthritis pain before
the accident. Regardless of how many experts testified, the jury was responsible for evaluating
their competing opinions as to causation. See Snelson v. Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 27 (2003)
(“the weight to be assigned to an expert opinion is for the jury to determine in light of
the expert’s credentials and the factual basis of his opinion.”); Bowman v. University of Chicago
Hospitals, 366 Ill. App. 3d 577, 584 (2006) (“It is the jury’s role to assess the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence, including the credibility of the experts’ testimony, and to resolve the
factual question of proximate cause.”). We do not reweigh the experts’ competing testimony as to
the cause of plaintiff’s pain after February 16, 2022. 2 “Reviewing courts are required to scrutinize
2 We do note defendant’s somewhat contradictory position here. On the one hand, defendant claims that plaintiff experienced no pain on or after February 16, 2022. On the other hand, defendant concedes that plaintiff did experience pain after that date but claims that pain was due to preexisting arthritis in her shoulder.
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the evidence but will not sit as a second jury and reweigh the evidence or reevaluate the credibility
of witnesses, especially where conflicting expert testimony is introduced at trial, which is within
the province of the jury as the trier of fact.” Hajian v. Holy Family Hospital, 273 Ill. App. 3d 932,
940 (1995). As the factfinder, the jury was in the best position to resolve conflicts between the
experts’ testimony. See Flynn v. Cohn, 154 Ill. 2d 160, 169 (1992).
¶ 85 Defendant highlights the “gap” between plaintiff’s discharge from Dr. Tu’s care on
February 16, 2022, and when she next sought medical treatment on November 15, 2023. The jury
heard and rejected defendant’s theory that plaintiff was not actually in pain during that “gap” and
only returned to her doctors because trial was approaching. The evidence supported the jury’s
decision to reject defendant’s theory. Plaintiff testified that she was in pain between February 2022
and November 2023. Her neck pain never subsided and her shoulder pain “started creeping back
in” after Dr. Tu discharged her on February 16, 2022. That was why she sought treatment from
Dr. Tu again on November 15, 2023.
¶ 86 Defendant contends that the verdict form did not distinguish between past and future pain
and suffering, thereby creating “ambiguity” in the damages award. But defendant did not object to
the verdict form or propose an alternate. “On appeal, a litigant waives the right to object to ***
verdict forms that are given to a jury when the party fails to make a specific objection during the
jury-instruction conference or when the form is read to the jury.” Compton v. Ubilluz, 353 Ill. App.
3d 863, 869 (2004). “Even if the litigant properly objects to [the] verdict form, the litigant must
still submit a remedial *** verdict form to the trial court.” Id. Defendant did neither, so she has
forfeited this issue on appeal. See id. Accordingly, we affirm the jury’s award for pain and
suffering.
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¶ 87 2. Loss of a Normal Life
¶ 88 The jury awarded $885,000 for loss of a normal life plaintiff experienced and was
¶ 89 Loss of a normal life is “the temporary or permanent diminished ability to enjoy life” and
“includes a person’s inability to pursue the pleasurable aspects of life.” Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions, Civil, 30.04.02 (2008); Smith v. City of Evanston, 260 Ill. App. 3d 925, 936-38 (1994).
Loss of a normal life often focuses on the plaintiff’s “recreation or hobbies” (Smith, 260 Ill. App.
3d at 936-38), but it is a broad category that compensates a plaintiff for a change in her lifestyle
(Jones v. Chicago Osteopathic Hospital, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1135 (2000)). Loss of a normal
life can include a reduction in physical activity after an accident. Shaheen v. Advantage Moving
and Storage, Inc., 369 Ill. App. 3d 535, 546 (2006).
¶ 90 For some people, their work is their life. That appears to be the case here. The evidence
established that plaintiff places great value on her work ethic and self-sufficiency. She views
managing the All Inn bar as her duty to her father, sees herself as personally responsible for
everything at the bar, rarely takes days off, and devotes most of her waking hours to the bar’s
operation. Plaintiff, Leung, and Ress all testified that plaintiff’s injuries and pain have forced her
to limit her activities at work and to frequently ask bar staff for help. As plaintiff’s best friend Ress
put it, plaintiff went from being “self-sufficient to needing help constantly.” A reasonable jury
could conclude that plaintiff’s diminished ability to run the family business, to which she devotes
much of her life and her identity, warranted significant compensation for loss of a normal life.
¶ 91 Plaintiff’s injuries have also affected her ability to take care of herself and her father.
Plaintiff struggled with physical chores such as carrying her father’s laundry and groceries. Her
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ability to exercise diminished and she gained weight. Plaintiff had difficulty grooming and
dressing herself, to the point that her nephew Anthony had to help her put on a bra. Plaintiff
described herself as “not the same” and “a little bit depressed.” A reasonable jury could find that
these disruptions to plaintiff’s personal life, while relatively minor individually, were significant
in the aggregate and supported substantial compensation for loss of a normal life. See Aguilar-
Santos, 2017 IL App (1st) 153593, ¶ 78 (the jury properly compensated the plaintiff for loss of a
normal life where the plaintiff “testified that although she is able to perform household chores, she
does so with difficulty because of the pain symptoms.”).
¶ 92 To be clear, the award for loss of a normal life was not compensation for lost wages, an
inability to work, or even physical pain plaintiff experiences at work. Rather, the award recognized
that plaintiff’s work ethic and self-sufficiency are central to her identity, and her injuries have
forced significant and frustrating changes to her lifestyle at work and home. Accordingly, the
jury’s award for loss of a normal life does not warrant remittitur or a new trial, and the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s posttrial motion.
¶ 93 3. Defendant’s Arguments
¶ 94 We now address defendant’s remaining arguments, which are not specific to either
category of damages.
¶ 95 Defendant argues that Dr. Sokolowski improperly “advocated” for plaintiff by discussing
“last minute pathology such as carpal tunnel and cubital [tunnel] pathology which is not tied to the
shoulder injury and the neck sprain suffered by [plaintiff].” During trial, defendant objected to Dr.
Sokolowski’s testimony that plaintiff would require surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome in her left
arm. The trial court sustained that objection in the jury’s presence. Defendant now complains that
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the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury to “disregard” that testimony. But defendant
never asked the court to issue such an instruction and there is no indication that the lack of one
deprived defendant of a fair trial. See Bosel v. Marriott Corp., 65 Ill. App. 3d 649, 657 (1978). Put
differently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not doing something defendant never
asked it to do.
¶ 96 Defendant complains that the jury “repeatedly” viewed a video of the March 31, 2021,
automobile accident. We see nothing inherently improper about the jury viewing of a video of the
accident that gave rise to this incident. In any event, defendant did not include that video in the
record on appeal, so we have no basis for finding that the jury “repeatedly” viewing it was
somehow unduly prejudicial to defendant.
¶ 97 Defendant argues that plaintiff never suggested a specific amount of damages the jury
should award; therefore, “the jury’s verdict was based on nothing more than its passion.” We are
surprised that a defendant is complaining that a plaintiff did not suggest a specific damages award.
Regardless, it “is permissible for trial counsel to suggest a lump sum amount for pain and suffering
damages” ((emphasis added.) Ramirez v. City of Chicago, 318 Ill. App. 3d 18, 28 (2000)), but
defendant cites no authority for the proposition that a plaintiff must suggest a specific amount of
damages.
¶ 98 Defendant also complains about certain terms plaintiff’s counsel used during trial. For
example, she objects to plaintiff’s counsel characterizing supraspinatus surgery as an
“amputation.” Plaintiff’s counsel did not actually compare plaintiff’s surgery to an amputation.
During Dr. Tu’s evidence deposition, plaintiff’s counsel used amputation as an example of how a
surgery can be medically “successful,” i.e., without complications, while not restoring the patient
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to their condition before the surgery. Defendant also complains about plaintiff’s counsel calling
Dr. Miller a “jukebox witness.” Plaintiff’s counsel did use that term, which apparently refers to
expert witnesses who “play whatever tune you want” when you pay them. But defendant never
objected to either of these terms, so she has forfeited these complaints. See Snelson, 204 Ill. 2d at
25.
¶ 99 Finally, the cases defendant cites are distinguishable and do not compel remittitur or a new
trial. Maple, 151 Ill. 2d at 456-60 (upholding a defense verdict where there was conflicting
evidence as to whether the plaintiffs suffered any injuries in an automobile accident); Lee v.
Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. 2d 432, 470-72 (1992) (upholding a $3 million verdict reduced
by 50% due to the decedent’s contributory negligence in trespassing on electrified tracks);
Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co., 369 Ill. App. 3d 78, 105-108 (2006) (finding a $25 million award
for loss of society excessive).
¶ 100 In this case, the jury heard from three expert witnesses, including a defense expert, as well
as six fact witnesses. We are confident the jury received a complete picture of plaintiff’s injuries,
the pain they caused, and their impact on her life. Notably, the jury did not ask a single question
during their deliberations, nor did they express any doubt or division. We agree with the trial
court’s analysis: The jury’s damages award is high, perhaps even surprisingly so, but it does not
shock the judicial conscience. See Aguilar-Santos, 2017 IL App (1st) 153593, ¶ 76. There is
nothing in the record upon which we could base a conclusion that the jury’s verdict was the product
of passion or prejudice. Id. On the contrary, the record suggests that the jury based its verdict on a
robust presentation of evidence. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
defendant’s motion for remittitur or a new trial.
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¶ 101 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 102 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
¶ 103 Affirmed.
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