Corvera v Ritz 2026 NY Slip Op 30755(U) February 27, 2026 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 805067/2025 Judge: John J. Kelley Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.
file:///LRB-ALB-FS1/Vol1/ecourts/Process/covers/NYSUP.8050672025.NEW_YORK.001.LBLX000_TO.html[03/11/2026 3:45:55 PM] INDEX NO. 805067/2025 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 57 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/27/2026
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. JOHN J. KELLEY PART 56M Justice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 805067/2025 LUIS CORVERA, MOTION DATE 02/20/2026 Plaintiff, MOTION SEQ. NO. 003 -v- DAVID RITZ, D.O., OMAR WAIN, D.O., SOUTH NASSAU COMMUNITIES HOSPITAL, doing business as MOUNT SINAI SOUTH NASSAU, ICAHN SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, DECISION + ORDER ON MOUNT SINAI HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., and LONG MOTION ISLAND SURGICAL, PLLC,
Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - DEFAULT .
In this action to recover damages for medical malpractice based on alleged departures
from good and accepted practice, the plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a
default judgment against the defendant Mount Sinai Health Systems, Inc. (MSHS), on the issue
of liability, and to schedule an inquest to assess damages against MSHS. Although MSHS
does not oppose the motion, the motion nonetheless is denied.
Where a plaintiff moves for leave to enter a default judgment, he or she must submit
proof of service of the summons and complaint upon the defaulting defendants, proof of the
defendant’s default, and proof of the facts constituting the claim or claims (see CPLR 3215[f];
Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 70-71 [2003]; Bigio v Gooding, 213 AD3d
480, 481 [1st Dept 2023]; Gray v Doyle, 170 AD3d 969, 971 [2d Dept 2019]; Gantt v North
Shore-LIJ Health Sys., 140 AD3d 418, 418 [1st Dept 2016]; Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v RJNJ
Services, Inc. 89 AD3d 649, 651 [2d Dept 2011]; see also Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v H & A
Locksmith, Inc., 21 NY3d 200, 202 [2013]).
805067/2025 CORVERA, LUIS vs. RITZ DO, DAVID ET AL Page 1 of 6 Motion No. 003
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According to the relevant affidavit of service that was executed by the plaintiff’s process
server, two copies of the summons and complaint in this action were served upon MSHS on
March 21, 2025 by personally delivering those papers to the New York State Secretary of State
and paying the statutory fee. Inasmuch as a process server’s affidavit of service is prima facie
evidence of proper service (see Johnson v Deas, 32 AD3d 253, 254 [1st Dept 2006]), and
MSHS did not oppose this motion, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that MSHS was
properly served with the summons and complaint in accordance with CPLR 311(a) and
Business Corporation Law § 306. Since service upon MSHS was not made by personal
delivery to an appropriate officer, director, or employee of that corporation, that defendant thus
was required to answer, appear, or move with respect to the complaint no later than the first
business date 30 days subsequent to March 21, 2025 (see CPLR 3012[c]; Wu v Uber Tech.,
Inc., 43 NY3d 288, 292 [2024]), that is, by April 21, 2025 (see General Construction Law §§ 20,
25-a). The affirmation of the plaintiffs’ attorney established that MSHS did not answer, appear,
or move with respect to the complaint by April 21, 2025, and, hence, that it was in default as of
April 22, 2025. Moreover, the plaintiffs made the instant motion within one year of that default
(see CPLR 3215[c]) and, thus, the motion is timely.
With respect to the proof of the facts constituting the claim, however,
“CPLR 3215 does not contemplate that default judgments are to be rubber- stamped once jurisdiction and a failure to appear have been shown. Some proof of liability is also required to satisfy the court as to the prima facie validity of the uncontested cause of action (see, 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac paras. 3215.22-3215.27). The standard of proof is not stringent, amounting only to some firsthand confirmation of the facts”
(Joosten v Gale, 129 AD2d 531, 535 [1st Dept 1987]; see Martinez v Reiner, 104 AD3d 477,
478 [1st Dept 2013]; Beltre v Babu, 32 AD3d 722, 723 [1st Dept 2006]). Stated another way,
while the “quantum of proof necessary to support an application for a default judgment is not
exacting . . . some firsthand confirmation of the facts forming the basis of the claim must be
proffered” (Guzetti v City of New York, 32 AD3d 234, 236 [1st Dept 2006]). In other words, the
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proof submitted must establish a prima facie case (see id.; Silberstein v Presbyterian Hosp., 95
AD2d 773 [2d Dept 1983]). “Where a valid cause of action is not stated, the party moving for
judgment is not entitled to the requested relief, even on default” (Green v Dolphy Constr. Co.,
187 AD2d 635, 636 [2d Dept 1992]; see Walley v Leatherstocking Healthcare, LLC, 79 AD3d
1236, 1238 [3d Dept 2010]). In moving for leave to enter a default judgment, the plaintiff must
“state a viable cause of action” (Fappiano v City of New York, 5 AD3d 627, 628 [2d Dept
2004]). In evaluating whether the plaintiff has fulfilled this obligation, the defendant, as the
defaulting party, is “deemed to have admitted all factual allegations contained in the complaint
and all reasonable inferences that flow from them” (Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100
NY2d 62, 71 [2003]). The court, however, must still reach the legal conclusion that those factual
allegations establish a prima facie case (see Matter of Dyno v Rose, 260 AD2d 694, 698 [3d
Dept 1999]).
Proof that a plaintiff has submitted “enough facts to enable [the] court to determine that a
viable” cause of action exists (Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d at 71; see Gray v
Doyle, 170 AD3d at 971) may be established by an affidavit of a party or someone with
knowledge, authenticated documentary proof, or by a complaint verified by the plaintiff that
sufficiently details the facts and the basis for the defendant’s liability (see CPLR 105[u];
Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d at 71; Gray v Doyle, 170 AD3d at 971; Voelker v
Bodum USA, Inc., 149 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2017]; Al Fayed v Barak, 39 AD3d 371, 371
[1st Dept 2007]; see also Michael v Atlas Restoration Corp., 159 AD3d 980, 982 [2d Dept 2018];
Zino v Joab Taxi, Inc., 20 AD3d 521, 522 [2d Dept 2005]; see generally Mitrani Plasterers Co.,
Inc. v SCG Contr. Corp., 97 AD3d 552, 553 [2d Dept 2012]). For purposes of CPLR 3215, a
complaint verified by a party may be employed as proof of the facts constituting the claim (see
CPLR 105[u]), but only where it sets forth sufficient, detailed evidentiary facts, rather than mere
conclusions (see Celnick v Freitag, 242 AD2d 436, 437 [1st Dept 1997]). A verified complaint
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Corvera v Ritz 2026 NY Slip Op 30755(U) February 27, 2026 Supreme Court, New York County Docket Number: Index No. 805067/2025 Judge: John J. Kelley Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York State and local government sources, including the New York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service. This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official publication.
file:///LRB-ALB-FS1/Vol1/ecourts/Process/covers/NYSUP.8050672025.NEW_YORK.001.LBLX000_TO.html[03/11/2026 3:45:55 PM] INDEX NO. 805067/2025 NYSCEF DOC. NO. 57 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 02/27/2026
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK NEW YORK COUNTY PRESENT: HON. JOHN J. KELLEY PART 56M Justice ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 805067/2025 LUIS CORVERA, MOTION DATE 02/20/2026 Plaintiff, MOTION SEQ. NO. 003 -v- DAVID RITZ, D.O., OMAR WAIN, D.O., SOUTH NASSAU COMMUNITIES HOSPITAL, doing business as MOUNT SINAI SOUTH NASSAU, ICAHN SCHOOL OF MEDICINE, DECISION + ORDER ON MOUNT SINAI HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC., and LONG MOTION ISLAND SURGICAL, PLLC,
Defendants. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 were read on this motion to/for JUDGMENT - DEFAULT .
In this action to recover damages for medical malpractice based on alleged departures
from good and accepted practice, the plaintiff moves pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a
default judgment against the defendant Mount Sinai Health Systems, Inc. (MSHS), on the issue
of liability, and to schedule an inquest to assess damages against MSHS. Although MSHS
does not oppose the motion, the motion nonetheless is denied.
Where a plaintiff moves for leave to enter a default judgment, he or she must submit
proof of service of the summons and complaint upon the defaulting defendants, proof of the
defendant’s default, and proof of the facts constituting the claim or claims (see CPLR 3215[f];
Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d 62, 70-71 [2003]; Bigio v Gooding, 213 AD3d
480, 481 [1st Dept 2023]; Gray v Doyle, 170 AD3d 969, 971 [2d Dept 2019]; Gantt v North
Shore-LIJ Health Sys., 140 AD3d 418, 418 [1st Dept 2016]; Atlantic Cas. Ins. Co. v RJNJ
Services, Inc. 89 AD3d 649, 651 [2d Dept 2011]; see also Manhattan Telecom. Corp. v H & A
Locksmith, Inc., 21 NY3d 200, 202 [2013]).
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According to the relevant affidavit of service that was executed by the plaintiff’s process
server, two copies of the summons and complaint in this action were served upon MSHS on
March 21, 2025 by personally delivering those papers to the New York State Secretary of State
and paying the statutory fee. Inasmuch as a process server’s affidavit of service is prima facie
evidence of proper service (see Johnson v Deas, 32 AD3d 253, 254 [1st Dept 2006]), and
MSHS did not oppose this motion, the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that MSHS was
properly served with the summons and complaint in accordance with CPLR 311(a) and
Business Corporation Law § 306. Since service upon MSHS was not made by personal
delivery to an appropriate officer, director, or employee of that corporation, that defendant thus
was required to answer, appear, or move with respect to the complaint no later than the first
business date 30 days subsequent to March 21, 2025 (see CPLR 3012[c]; Wu v Uber Tech.,
Inc., 43 NY3d 288, 292 [2024]), that is, by April 21, 2025 (see General Construction Law §§ 20,
25-a). The affirmation of the plaintiffs’ attorney established that MSHS did not answer, appear,
or move with respect to the complaint by April 21, 2025, and, hence, that it was in default as of
April 22, 2025. Moreover, the plaintiffs made the instant motion within one year of that default
(see CPLR 3215[c]) and, thus, the motion is timely.
With respect to the proof of the facts constituting the claim, however,
“CPLR 3215 does not contemplate that default judgments are to be rubber- stamped once jurisdiction and a failure to appear have been shown. Some proof of liability is also required to satisfy the court as to the prima facie validity of the uncontested cause of action (see, 4 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, NY Civ Prac paras. 3215.22-3215.27). The standard of proof is not stringent, amounting only to some firsthand confirmation of the facts”
(Joosten v Gale, 129 AD2d 531, 535 [1st Dept 1987]; see Martinez v Reiner, 104 AD3d 477,
478 [1st Dept 2013]; Beltre v Babu, 32 AD3d 722, 723 [1st Dept 2006]). Stated another way,
while the “quantum of proof necessary to support an application for a default judgment is not
exacting . . . some firsthand confirmation of the facts forming the basis of the claim must be
proffered” (Guzetti v City of New York, 32 AD3d 234, 236 [1st Dept 2006]). In other words, the
805067/2025 CORVERA, LUIS vs. RITZ DO, DAVID ET AL Page 2 of 6 Motion No. 003
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proof submitted must establish a prima facie case (see id.; Silberstein v Presbyterian Hosp., 95
AD2d 773 [2d Dept 1983]). “Where a valid cause of action is not stated, the party moving for
judgment is not entitled to the requested relief, even on default” (Green v Dolphy Constr. Co.,
187 AD2d 635, 636 [2d Dept 1992]; see Walley v Leatherstocking Healthcare, LLC, 79 AD3d
1236, 1238 [3d Dept 2010]). In moving for leave to enter a default judgment, the plaintiff must
“state a viable cause of action” (Fappiano v City of New York, 5 AD3d 627, 628 [2d Dept
2004]). In evaluating whether the plaintiff has fulfilled this obligation, the defendant, as the
defaulting party, is “deemed to have admitted all factual allegations contained in the complaint
and all reasonable inferences that flow from them” (Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100
NY2d 62, 71 [2003]). The court, however, must still reach the legal conclusion that those factual
allegations establish a prima facie case (see Matter of Dyno v Rose, 260 AD2d 694, 698 [3d
Dept 1999]).
Proof that a plaintiff has submitted “enough facts to enable [the] court to determine that a
viable” cause of action exists (Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d at 71; see Gray v
Doyle, 170 AD3d at 971) may be established by an affidavit of a party or someone with
knowledge, authenticated documentary proof, or by a complaint verified by the plaintiff that
sufficiently details the facts and the basis for the defendant’s liability (see CPLR 105[u];
Woodson v Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 NY2d at 71; Gray v Doyle, 170 AD3d at 971; Voelker v
Bodum USA, Inc., 149 AD3d 587, 587 [1st Dept 2017]; Al Fayed v Barak, 39 AD3d 371, 371
[1st Dept 2007]; see also Michael v Atlas Restoration Corp., 159 AD3d 980, 982 [2d Dept 2018];
Zino v Joab Taxi, Inc., 20 AD3d 521, 522 [2d Dept 2005]; see generally Mitrani Plasterers Co.,
Inc. v SCG Contr. Corp., 97 AD3d 552, 553 [2d Dept 2012]). For purposes of CPLR 3215, a
complaint verified by a party may be employed as proof of the facts constituting the claim (see
CPLR 105[u]), but only where it sets forth sufficient, detailed evidentiary facts, rather than mere
conclusions (see Celnick v Freitag, 242 AD2d 436, 437 [1st Dept 1997]). A verified complaint
that is conclusory in nature and devoid of factual allegations constituting the claim is insufficient 805067/2025 CORVERA, LUIS vs. RITZ DO, DAVID ET AL Page 3 of 6 Motion No. 003
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to demonstrate the requisite proof (see Cohen v Schupler, 51 AD3d 706, 707 [2d Dept 2008];
Luna v Luna, 263 AD2d 470 [2d Dept 1999]). In other words, the verified complaint must “set
forth the facts constituting the alleged negligence” (Beaton v Transit Facility Corp., 14 AD3d
637, 637 [2d Dept 2005]) or wrongdoing.
The complaint in this action, however, was verified only by the plaintiffs’ attorney.
Moreover, while the plaintiff submitted his own affidavit, he did not attest to any actual facts
underlying the treatment and care that any of the defendants rendered to him, except for vague
and general allegations that MSHS committed malpractice, and that he was thus caused to
sustain a perforation of the right common iliac artery, necessitating an exploratory laparotomy
and a vascular repair, with a bovine patch angioplasty and other sequellae. He essentially
incorporated by reference the similar allegations that he set forth in the complaint that had been
verified by his attorney.
The plaintiff, however, was not qualified to provide full proof of such facts as they apply
to the malpractice cause of action insofar as asserted against MSHS. Crucially, in the context
of a medical malpractice action, an affidavit or affirmation of merit from an expert is required to
support a CPLR 3215 motion, unless the matters alleged are within the ordinary experience and
knowledge of a lay person (see Fiore v Galang, 64 NY2d 999, 1000-1001 [1985]; Bollinger v
Mark Mordechai Liechtung, DMD, P.C., 2023 NY Slip Op 31537[U], *5, 2023 NY Misc LEXIS
2231, *6 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, May 5, 2023] [Kelley, J.]; Checo v Mwando, 2022 NY Slip Op
31223[U], *4, 2022 NY Misc LEXIS 1865, *5 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Apr. 7, 2022] [Kelley, J.];
Garcia v Solomon, 2020 NY Misc LEXIS 17635, *2 [Sup Ct, Bronx County, Jun. 19, 2020];
Charles v Wolfson, 62 Misc 3d 1224[A], 2019 NY Slip Op 50251[U], *1, 2019 NY Misc LEXIS
866, *3 [Sup Ct, Bronx County, Mar 6, 2019]).
Here, the quality and propriety of the medical services rendered to the plaintiff, and
whether any MSHS employee comported with the applicable standards of care in rendering
them, are not within the ordinary experience and knowledge of a lay person, but can only be 805067/2025 CORVERA, LUIS vs. RITZ DO, DAVID ET AL Page 4 of 6 Motion No. 003
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assessed by a physician. This is so because the primary allegations made by the plaintiff here
are that MSHS’s liability arose from the malpractice of its purported medical employees in
rendering treatment to him. The court notes that the plaintiff made no specific allegations as to
the nature and extent of that treatment, the examinations and diagnostic testing that any of
MSHS’s employees performed, the evaluations of any test results that they conducted, the
procedures that they performed, and the medications that they administered, or any medical
basis for the claim that any departures in these respects caused or contributed to the plaintiff’s
perforated right common iliac artery. Even had the plaintiff made such allegations, a physician’s
affirmation or affidavit nonetheless is required to establish the facts underlying the medical
malpractice cause of action.
Moreover, as this court has held on several occasions, MSHS is a corporation that does
not provide medical care or treatment to any patients, including the plaintiff here, and employs
no one for the purpose of providing medical care or treatment. Rather, it merely provides
business and management oversight and coordination to the several hospitals and entities
operating under the Mount Sinai umbrella that do, in fact, provide medical care and treatment
(see Waheed v Barar, 2025 NY Slip Op 33477[U], *7, 2025 NY Misc LEXIS 7633, *11 [Sup Ct,
N.Y. County, Sep. 15, 2025] [Kelley, J.]; Koller v Kolev, 2025 NY Slip Op 32869[U], *27, 2025
NY Misc LEXIS 6776, *50-51 [Sup Ct, N.Y. County, Jul. 18, 2025] [Kelley, J.]; Vallone v
Vulcano, 2022 NY Slip Op 32099[U], *16, 2022 NY Misc LEXIS 11310, *29-30 [Sup Ct, N.Y.
County, Jun. 30, 2022] [Kelley, J.]; see also Garcia v Global Prop. Servs., Inc., 2018 NY Slip Op
30957[U], *7-8, 23, 2018 NY Misc LEXIS 1870, *9-10, 34 [Sup Ct, Bronx County, Apr. 3, 2018]).
The plaintiff failed to submit proof of any fact that MSHS can be held liable for malpractice and,
hence, that it was a proper party to this action in the first instance. For this reason, and also
because the plaintiff did not submit an expert affirmation or affidavit to establish that the
services rendered by any individual employed by MSHS deviated from an established standard
of care, the plaintiff has failed to establish his entitlement to a default judgment against MSHS. 805067/2025 CORVERA, LUIS vs. RITZ DO, DAVID ET AL Page 5 of 6 Motion No. 003
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Accordingly, it is,
ORDERED that the plaintiff’s motion is denied.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the court.
2/27/2026 $SIG$ DATE JOHN J. KELLEY, J.S.C.
CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION
□ GRANTED X DENIED GRANTED IN PART OTHER
APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER
□ CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE
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