Corvallis Hospitality, LLC v. Wilmington Trust, National Association

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedJune 6, 2022
Docket6:22-cv-00024
StatusUnknown

This text of Corvallis Hospitality, LLC v. Wilmington Trust, National Association (Corvallis Hospitality, LLC v. Wilmington Trust, National Association) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Corvallis Hospitality, LLC v. Wilmington Trust, National Association, (D. Or. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

CORVALLIS HOSPITALITY, LLC, Case No. 6:22-cv-00024-MC an Oregon limited liability company, OPINION & ORDER

Plaintiff,

v.

WILMINGTON TRUST, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, as TRUSTEE FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE HOLDERS OF LCCM 2017-LC26 MORTGAGE TRUST COMMERICAL MORTGAGE PASS- THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2017-LC26; MIDLAND LOAN SEVICES, INC., a Delaware corporation; and BEACON DEFAULT MANAGEMENT, INC., a California corporation,

Defendants. _______________________________

MCSHANE, District Judge: Plaintiff Corvallis Hospitality originally brought this suit in Benton County Circuit Court, alleging that Defendants Wilmington Trust, Midland Loan Services, and Beacon Default Management violated Oregon House Bill 4204 (“HB 4204”).1 See Defs.’ Notice Removal, Ex. 1, ECF No. 1. Defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.

1 HB 4204 was passed in June 2020 in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and offered certain protections for borrowers during the “emergency period” (March 8, 2020 to December 31, 2020), including deferred payments and dismissal of foreclosure proceedings. H.B. 4204, 80th Legis. Assemb., 2020 First Spec. Sess. (Or. 2020). 1 – OPINION & ORDER Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, ECF No. 7. Because there are no grounds for abstention, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. LEGAL STANDARD A defendant who is not a resident of the forum state may remove from state court to federal court any civil action that could have been originally filed in federal court. 28 U.S.C. §

1441(a); Lincoln Prop. Co. v. Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 89–90 (2005); Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 2013). Original jurisdiction exists when either complete diversity exists, or when plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of federal law or is otherwise permitted by federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. Federal courts are of limited jurisdiction, but they have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). “[U]nless certain exceptional circumstances are present, a district court has little or no discretion to abstain.” Almodovar v. Reiner, 832 F.2d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION Plaintiff does not assert that the Court lacks jurisdiction,2 but rather argues that the Court should abstain from its obligation to adjudicate claims within its jurisdiction so that the state court can interpret HB 4204. Pl.’s Mot. Remand 10. Plaintiff cites four abstention doctrines: Burford, Brillhart/Wilton, Younger, and Colorado River. The Court addresses each in turn.

2 The Court wants to be clear that subject matter jurisdiction in this case is based on diversity of citizenship. Contrary to Defendants’ Notice of Removal, there is no federal question jurisdiction here. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges only state law claims and does not raise any federal issues. The fact that Defendants raise preemption as an affirmative defense is insufficient for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.”). However, Defendants have pled sufficient facts to show diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Defs.’ Notice Removal, ECF No 1. 2 – OPINION & ORDER Burford abstention Under Burford abstention, a federal court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a case that “involve[s] an essentially local issue arising out of a complicated state regulatory scheme.” Tucker v. First Maryland Sav. & Loan, Inc., 942 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1991). However, “[w]hile Burford is concerned with protecting state administrative processes from undue federal

interference, it does not require abstention whenever there exists such a process, or even in all cases where there is a ‘potential for conflict’ with state regulatory law or policy.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989) (citing Colorado River Water Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. at 815–16). In the Ninth Circuit, courts may only abstain from exercising jurisdiction when “(1) . . . the state has concentrated suits involving the local issue in a particular court; (2) the federal issues are not easily separable from complicated state law issues with which the state courts may have special competence; and (3) . . . federal review might disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent policy.” Tucker, 942 F.2d at 1405. Plaintiff argues that “Oregon has chosen to concentrate suits for HB 4204 violations in

the circuit courts.” Pl.’s Mot. Remand 13. However, Oregon’s circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, not a specialized court system. Cf. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 326 (1943) (relying on the fact that “the [Texas] legislature provided for concentration of all direct review of the Commission’s orders in the State district courts of Travis County”); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 348–50 (1951) (applying Burford when Alabama concentrated appeals of the Public Service Commission in the Montgomery County Circuit Court). Oregon has not designated a particular court to hear HB 4204 cases. Plaintiff also argues that Oregon state courts have “special competence in analyzing HB 4204 claims” because of their experience adjudicating Oregon Trust Deed Act claims. Pl.’s Mot.

3 – OPINION & ORDER Remand 14. However, federal courts routinely apply state law in diversity cases. City of Tucson v. U.S. West Commc’ns, Inc., 284 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002). Further, the central question at issue appears to be whether HB 4204 is preempted by federal law. “[W]hether state law conflicts with federal law . . . is plainly not an issue ‘with respect to which state courts might have special competence.’” United States v. Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 705 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting

Knudsen Corp. v. Nevada State Dairy Comm’n, 676 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir. 1982)). Plaintiff argues that the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction “would disrupt Oregon’s effort to establish a coherent policy of lender practices associated with . . . HB 4204.” Pl.’s Mot. Remand 13. However, Plaintiff has not shown any state efforts to implement a coherent state-wide policy regarding HB 4204.

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Related

Burford v. Sun Oil Co.
319 U.S. 315 (Supreme Court, 1943)
Younger v. Harris
401 U.S. 37 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.
420 U.S. 592 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams
482 U.S. 386 (Supreme Court, 1987)
Nebraska v. Wyoming
515 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1995)
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Nichols
885 F.2d 633 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
Dennis Ex Rel. PICO Holdings, Inc. v. Hart
724 F.3d 1249 (Ninth Circuit, 2013)
Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche
546 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Almodovar v. Reiner
832 F.2d 1138 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)

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