Cortez Robinson v. Tami J. Schult

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedDecember 8, 2025
Docket2:24-cv-00789
StatusUnknown

This text of Cortez Robinson v. Tami J. Schult (Cortez Robinson v. Tami J. Schult) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cortez Robinson v. Tami J. Schult, (E.D. Wis. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ CORTEZ ROBINSON,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 24-cv-789-pp Appeal No. 25-2718

TAMI J. SCHULT,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 36) AND DECLINING TO RULE ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL (DKT. NO. 38) ______________________________________________________________________________

On August 26, 2025, the court issued an order dismissing this case. Dkt. No. 29. Judgment was entered on the same day. Dkt. No. 30. On September 29, 2025, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, dkt. no. 31, and he subsequently filed a motion for leave to appeal without prepaying the appellate filing fee, dkt. no. 36. This order grants the plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. This order also declines to rule on the plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel. Dkt. No. 38. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, an incarcerated person must pay the applicable filing fees in full for a civil case. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b). If the incarcerated person does not have the money to pay the $605 filing fee in advance for an appeal, he can request the court for permission to proceed without prepayment. For the court to consider such a request, the incarcerated person must complete a petition and affidavit and return it to the court, along with a certified copy of his trust account statement showing transactions for the prior six months. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). The court must assess an initial partial filing fee of twenty percent of the average monthly deposits to the plaintiff’s prison account or average monthly balance in the plaintiff's prison

account for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of the notice of appeal, whichever is greater. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). After the incarcerated person pays the initial fee, he must make monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income until he pays the filing fee in full. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). The agency that has custody of the person (the institution in which he is incarcerated) will collect the money and send payments to the court. There are three grounds for denying an incarcerated appellant’s request

to proceed without prepaying the filing fee: the incarcerated person has not shown that he is indigent, he has filed the appeal in bad faith or he has three strikes. See 28 U.S.C. §§1915(a)(2)-(3), (g). The court finds that the plaintiff has established that he is indigent and that he has not accrued three strikes. That leaves only the question of whether the plaintiff filed this appeal in good faith. If the district court allowed a party to proceed without prepaying the filing fee in the district court, that party may proceed without prepaying the

filing fee on appeal without further authorization, unless the district court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith or determines that the party is otherwise not entitled to proceed without prepaying the fee. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a). See also Celske v. Edwards, 164 F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999) (“. . . a plaintiff who . . . was allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in the district court retains his IFP status in the court of appeals unless there is a certification of bad faith.”). A district court should not apply an inappropriately high standard when

making a good faith determination. Pate v. Stevens, 163 F.3d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1998). An appeal taken in “good faith” is one that seeks review of any issue that is not frivolous, meaning that it involves “legal points arguable on their merits.” Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)); see also Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). On the other hand, an appeal taken in bad faith is one that is based on a frivolous claim, that is, a claim that no reasonable person could suppose has any merit. Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir.

2000). The court sees no indication that the plaintiff did not take this appeal in good faith. The court will grant his motion to proceed on appeal without prepaying the filing fee. The plaintiff has filed a certified copy of his prison trust account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing of his notice of appeal. A review of this information reveals that the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee of $59.33, and then additional payments under 28

U.S.C. §1915(b)(2). Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1997), rev’d on other grounds by, Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000) and Lee v. Clinton, 209 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 2000). If the plaintiff does not have enough money in his regular trust account to pay the initial partial fee but does have enough money in his release account, the plaintiff is responsible for making arrangements with the authorities at the jail or prison to pay the balance of the initial partial filing fee

from the release account. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1) suggests, however, that an incarcerated person may use release account funds to pay an initial partial filing fee only if he does not have enough money in his regular trust account. See Carter v. Bennett, 399 F. Supp. 2d 936, 936-37 (W.D. Wis. 2005). The plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. Dkt. No. 38. But this case is now on appeal and the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel. The court declines to rule on the motion. The plaintiff must file his motion, and all future motions regarding his appeal of

this case, with the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court GRANTS the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed on appeal without prepaying the filing fee. Dkt. No. 36. The court DECLINES TO RULE on the plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel. Dkt. No. 38. The court ORDERS that by the end of the day on January 7, 2026, the plaintiff shall forward to the Clerk of Court the sum of $59.33 as the initial

partial filing fee for this appeal.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Anders v. California
386 U.S. 738 (Supreme Court, 1967)
Howard v. King
707 F.2d 215 (Fifth Circuit, 1983)
Timothy T. Pate v. Sergeant Thomas Stevens, Star 2051
163 F.3d 437 (Seventh Circuit, 1998)
Curtis J. Celske v. Thomas Edwards
164 F.3d 396 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
Minghao Lee v. William J. Clinton
209 F.3d 1025 (Seventh Circuit, 2000)
Carter v. Bennett
399 F. Supp. 2d 936 (W.D. Wisconsin, 2005)

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