Corprew v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Corprew v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America

428 A.2d 1003, 286 Pa. Super. 302, 1981 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2520

CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedApril 20, 1981

Docket906

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 428 A.2d 1003 (Corprew v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Corprew v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 428 A.2d 1003, 286 Pa. Super. 302, 1981 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2520 (Pa. Ct. App. 1981).

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VAN der VOORT, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order of the lower court opening a default judgment. Appellant, Elizabeth Corprew filed a [304]*304complaint on October 16, 1978; count one was in assumpsit against the Prudential Insurance Company (hereafter referred to as the company); and a second count in trespass named as defendant the City of Philadelphia (hereafter referred to as the city). It was alleged that the city negligently advised appellant, and failed to take the proper action concerning life insurance proceeds payable under a policy on a deceased city employee. Appellant claims to be a beneficiary under the policy. The city was served with notice to defend on October 19, 1978. The city did not file an answer nor did it have its attorney enter an appearance. On December 21, 1978 (63 days after the city had been served) appellant moved for judgment by default for failure to plead; appellant’s motion was granted. The city received notice of the default judgment on December 27, 1978, and petitioned to open judgment on January 17, 1979. The city argued that due to conflicting claimants of the pension and insurance proceeds of the deceased employee, the employee’s personnel file was in intra-departmental circulation. The city claimed the file was essential, to its determination of the validity of appellant’s claim and to respond to the complaint. The city concluded that its failure to answer was a clerical inadvertence due to the confusion over who was entitled to the proceeds. The court opened judgment on March 29, 1979 finding the failure to answer was due to a “reasonable excuse”. The court filed a supplemental opinion on October 2, 1979. In its supplemental opinion the court noted that appellant had waited some four years and eight months to institute the suit and that she had pointed to no prejudice incurred as a result of the city’s delay. Appellant here appeals the order opening judgment.

Appellant’s argument is simply that the excuse given by the city for its failure to answer was not adequate. The city argues to the contrary, suggesting its reasons demonstrated a legitimate excuse for its failure to answer. The company which did file an answer, is not directly involved in the present controversy; however the company would like to have the controversy over the entitlement of the proceeds [305]*305litigated, instead of determined by a default judgment. The company argues the city’s failure to answer is excusable and not prejudicial to the appellant.

“This court will not reverse a lower court ruling, either opening or refusing to open a default judgment, unless an error of law or a clear, manifest abuse of discretion is shown. Kraynick v. Hertz, 443 Pa. 105, 277 A.2d 144 (1971); Epstein v. Continental Bank & Trust Company, [260] Pa.Super. [522], 394 A.2d 1049 (1978); Nevils v. Chernitsky, 244 Pa.Super. 501, 368 A.2d 1297 (1976).” Shainline v. Alberti Builders, Inc., 266 Pa.Super. 129, 403 A.2d 577 (1979).

In a trespass action, a defendant in order to have a default judgment opened need only show the petition to open was promptly filed and there was a reasonable excuse for the default; a meritorious defense need not be demonstrated if the equities are otherwise clear. Kraynick v. Hertz, supra; Beam v. Carletti, 229 Pa.Super. 168, 323 A.2d 180 (1974); and Bethlehem Apparatus Company v. H. N. Crowder, Jr. Company, 242 Pa.Super. 451, 364 A.2d 358 (1976).

There is only one issue before this court; did the lower court abuse its discretion in finding the city’s failure to answer was reasonably excused. We believe the court did err and accordingly reverse.

A brief discussion of two previous cases will explain our holding here. In Jenkins v. Murray, 250 Pa.Super. 519, 378 A.2d 1269 (1977), the defendant failed to answer a complaint, even after an extension of time had been granted. Counsel’s excuse was that investigation and legal research were required; such review had not been completed before the extension expired and “through inadvertence of counsel, and a clerical breakdown of the diary system” no further extension was requested. This court found such excuse insufficient and reversed the order opening the judgment. The defendant in Van Horn v. Alper, 253 Pa.Super. 524, 385 A.2d 462 (1978), ignored a complaint believing it pertained to other legal matters which his attorney was already engaged in. Only after a default judgment had been taken did he [306]*306forward the documents to his counsel. This court held such conduct did not reasonably explain the default.

The present excuse is even less satisfactory than the ones given in Jenkins and Van Horn. Counsel here, like in Jenkins claimed more time was needed to review the case. But, unlike Jenkins, counsel here does not argue that failure to seek an extension was justified. Appellee here, like the defendant in Van Horn chose to ignore the complaint until notice of a default judgment had been received. But here, unlike Van Horn, the complaint remained in the hands of the legal department of a large city and not in the hands of a defendant who lacked legal training. Accordingly, we find that appellee’s excuse was insufficient to allow the lower court to open judgment. Such order to open, based on such a legally flimsy excuse, amounts to an abuse of discretion.

We vacate the order of the lower court and direct that the judgment by default be reinstated.

Order vacated.

BROSKY, J., files a dissenting opinion.

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VAN der VOORT, Judge:

This is an appeal from an order of the lower court opening a default judgment. Appellant, Elizabeth Corprew filed a [304]*304complaint on October 16, 1978; count one was in assumpsit against the Prudential Insurance Company (hereafter referred to as the company); and a second count in trespass named as defendant the City of Philadelphia (hereafter referred to as the city). It was alleged that the city negligently advised appellant, and failed to take the proper action concerning life insurance proceeds payable under a policy on a deceased city employee. Appellant claims to be a beneficiary under the policy. The city was served with notice to defend on October 19, 1978. The city did not file an answer nor did it have its attorney enter an appearance. On December 21, 1978 (63 days after the city had been served) appellant moved for judgment by default for failure to plead; appellant’s motion was granted. The city received notice of the default judgment on December 27, 1978, and petitioned to open judgment on January 17, 1979. The city argued that due to conflicting claimants of the pension and insurance proceeds of the deceased employee, the employee’s personnel file was in intra-departmental circulation. The city claimed the file was essential, to its determination of the validity of appellant’s claim and to respond to the complaint. The city concluded that its failure to answer was a clerical inadvertence due to the confusion over who was entitled to the proceeds. The court opened judgment on March 29, 1979 finding the failure to answer was due to a “reasonable excuse”. The court filed a supplemental opinion on October 2, 1979. In its supplemental opinion the court noted that appellant had waited some four years and eight months to institute the suit and that she had pointed to no prejudice incurred as a result of the city’s delay. Appellant here appeals the order opening judgment.

Appellant’s argument is simply that the excuse given by the city for its failure to answer was not adequate. The city argues to the contrary, suggesting its reasons demonstrated a legitimate excuse for its failure to answer. The company which did file an answer, is not directly involved in the present controversy; however the company would like to have the controversy over the entitlement of the proceeds [305]*305litigated, instead of determined by a default judgment. The company argues the city’s failure to answer is excusable and not prejudicial to the appellant.

“This court will not reverse a lower court ruling, either opening or refusing to open a default judgment, unless an error of law or a clear, manifest abuse of discretion is shown. Kraynick v. Hertz, 443 Pa. 105, 277 A.2d 144 (1971); Epstein v. Continental Bank & Trust Company, [260] Pa.Super. [522], 394 A.2d 1049 (1978); Nevils v. Chernitsky, 244 Pa.Super. 501, 368 A.2d 1297 (1976).” Shainline v. Alberti Builders, Inc., 266 Pa.Super. 129, 403 A.2d 577 (1979).

In a trespass action, a defendant in order to have a default judgment opened need only show the petition to open was promptly filed and there was a reasonable excuse for the default; a meritorious defense need not be demonstrated if the equities are otherwise clear. Kraynick v. Hertz, supra; Beam v. Carletti, 229 Pa.Super. 168, 323 A.2d 180 (1974); and Bethlehem Apparatus Company v. H. N. Crowder, Jr. Company, 242 Pa.Super. 451, 364 A.2d 358 (1976).

There is only one issue before this court; did the lower court abuse its discretion in finding the city’s failure to answer was reasonably excused. We believe the court did err and accordingly reverse.

A brief discussion of two previous cases will explain our holding here. In Jenkins v. Murray, 250 Pa.Super. 519, 378 A.2d 1269 (1977), the defendant failed to answer a complaint, even after an extension of time had been granted. Counsel’s excuse was that investigation and legal research were required; such review had not been completed before the extension expired and “through inadvertence of counsel, and a clerical breakdown of the diary system” no further extension was requested. This court found such excuse insufficient and reversed the order opening the judgment. The defendant in Van Horn v. Alper, 253 Pa.Super. 524, 385 A.2d 462 (1978), ignored a complaint believing it pertained to other legal matters which his attorney was already engaged in. Only after a default judgment had been taken did he [306]*306forward the documents to his counsel. This court held such conduct did not reasonably explain the default.

The present excuse is even less satisfactory than the ones given in Jenkins and Van Horn. Counsel here, like in Jenkins claimed more time was needed to review the case. But, unlike Jenkins, counsel here does not argue that failure to seek an extension was justified. Appellee here, like the defendant in Van Horn chose to ignore the complaint until notice of a default judgment had been received. But here, unlike Van Horn, the complaint remained in the hands of the legal department of a large city and not in the hands of a defendant who lacked legal training. Accordingly, we find that appellee’s excuse was insufficient to allow the lower court to open judgment. Such order to open, based on such a legally flimsy excuse, amounts to an abuse of discretion.

We vacate the order of the lower court and direct that the judgment by default be reinstated.

Order vacated.

BROSKY, J., files a dissenting opinion.

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428 A.2d 1003, 286 Pa. Super. 302, 1981 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2520, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/corprew-v-prudential-insurance-co-of-america-pasuperct-1981.

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