Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda v. Commissioner

44 B.T.A. 393, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1334
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedMay 6, 1941
DocketDocket No. 97315.
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 44 B.T.A. 393 (Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 393, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1334 (bta 1941).

Opinion

[401]*401OPINION.

Van Fossan :

The basic issue in the case at bar is whether or not the petitioner realized a gain or profit from the purchase of its own debentures at less than their face value. A negative decision of this question would automatically dispose of the case.

The petitioner contends primarily that it realized no income because it did not gain by the entire transaction, but only paid to debenture holders a part of its earnings. It fortifies its contention by three arguments:

1. The petitioner received no money or property upon the issue of its 5 percent debentures and hence the retirement of the debentures at a discount produced no gain.
2. The purchase of the debentures at a discount freed no assets because the petitioner’s liability for payment was limited and conditioned.
3. The petitioner was insolvent both before and after the purchase. Thus no gain was realized.

If the petitioner’s primary contention should not be sustained, it argues further that its income should not be taxed since it was not derived from sources within the United States and that the interest it paid on its American issue of debentures should be allowed as a deduction from any income realized by it from the purchase of its debentures at a discount.

The respondent controverts all of the petitioner’s contentions.

The detailed historical facts and circumstances relating to the formation of the petitioner and to the specific issue of this case are set forth in our findings of fact. The facts essential to an understanding of the issue may be briefly summarized as follows:

On January 2, 1933, by presidential decree, Cosach was ordered liquidated. A liquidating commission proceeded to liquidate its affairs by returning the Lautaro and Anglo-Chilena stock to their former owners and by transferring the nitrate lands and plants to [402]*402Antofagasta. The only remaining assets of Cosach were stocks of nitrate and iodine on hand. Their .value was offset by Cosach obligations equal to or exceeding it.

The petitioner was organized January 8, 1934, under Law 5350, whose peculiar features will be discussed later. Pursuant to that law a monopoly of the exportation of and trade in nitrate and iodine was granted to the petitioner, and the liquidating commissioner transferred the Cosach stocks of nitrate and iodine on hand to the petitioner, which assumed the obligations above mentioned. Law 5350 also required the petitioner to assume the service and amortization of Cosach 7 percent bonds for the account of the producers, but only of those bonds whose holders accepted the modifications established by the law and by future contracts with the trustees.

On. October 31, 1934, the petitioner executed a trust indenture (a “future contract” contemplated by article 24 of Law 5350) securing its 5 percent debentures, to be exchanged for the Cosach 7 percent bonds and the temporary debentures. The terms of the indenture conformed to the limitations contained in Law 5350. The indenture permitted the petitioner to purchase its own 5 percent debentures out of a redemption fund authorized by that instrument. The 5 percent debentures were issued and all but $492,000 thereof were exchanged for Cosach 7 percent bonds.

During the taxable year the petitioner purchased its 5 percent debentures of the par value of $189,000 for $102,881.25 and was reimbursed therefor by the trustee out of the redemption fund.

The facts of the case at bar are unusual in many respects. Although the obligations purchased by the petitioner have been denominated “debentures” and are regarded as bonds, they possess peculiar features which, as to the petitioner, may impute a relationship wholly unlike that of the obligor of an instrument customarily considered a bond or indenture.

In the promissory clause of the debenture the petitioner promises to pay to the bearer or registered owner the principal sum of $1,000 and interest thereon at 5 percent. However, this promise is conditioned and limited later in the document to the proportion of the petitioner’s consolidated net earnings available for debenture service, as defined in Law 5350. Thus the petitioner is under no obligation whatever to pay either the interest or the principal unless it has net earnings sufficient for that purpose. But the “adhering” companies are charged with the unconditional liability for such payment, upon default of the .petitioner, its dissolution or the maturity of the debentures. Therefore, those companies are virtually the primary obligors of the debentures as to both principal and interest.

The obligation may be regarded as a joint and several one assumed [403]*403by the petitioner and the adhering companies but greatly restricted as to the petitioner. If may have been somewhat difficult to determine the precise amount of the petitioner’s liability to pay the principal and interest of its debentures, yet the liability was real and monetarily measurable.

So also the monopoly granted by the Government of Chile was of great value. While the 25 percent of the net consolidated earnings was fixed as the current price of its enjoyment, it does not follow that it had no capital value. Many intangibles such as good will, contractual rights, equitable interests, etc., are valuable assets and are includible in their owner’s financial statements. The omission of both of these items, the debentures and the monopoly, from the petitioner’s balance sheets does not prove their nonexistence. They should have been included therein in order to arrive at the petitioner’s true net worth. In view of their exclusion we can not say that the petitioner had no assets other than current stocks, etc., nor that it was insolvent.

The character of the petitioner itself is also anomalous. It was created as a selling agency for the producers, to control the production and to secure the sale of nitrate and iodine, to provide revenue for the Government, and to establish an orderly and healthy condition of the industry. Although given a corporate form and entity by Law 5350, it had no stockholders as such. No provision was made for the distribution of its assets upon liquidation.

If we should assume that the net liquidated assets, if any, would follow the 25-75 percent division of its net earnings, we would doubtless he met with the argument of the producers that the 25 percent was payable to the Chilean Government for nitrate and iodine currently produced and that, therefore, they would be entitled to any enhancement of capital value. But, regardless of the manner of the ultimate adjustment of that problem, it is obvious that the producers are the principal beneficiaries of the petitioners profits. For practical purposes they correspond to stockholders of the petitioner corporation.

The petitioner was engaged in a highly profitable business. While its structure prevented its own enjoyment of its gains, yet they inured to the ultimate benefit of the adhering companies which used the petitioner as a means of deriving profit from the production of the commodities. Therefore, any tax upon the petitioner will fall upon the adhering companies where it properly belongs.

With these facts in mind we may proceed to a discussion of the petitioner’s contentions.

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Corporacion de Ventas de Salitre y Yoda v. Commissioner
44 B.T.A. 393 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1941)

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Bluebook (online)
44 B.T.A. 393, 1941 BTA LEXIS 1334, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/corporacion-de-ventas-de-salitre-y-yoda-v-commissioner-bta-1941.