Filed 9/4/26 Coppola v. Variety Media CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
FRANCIS FORD COPPOLA, B345022
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STCV23459)
VARIETY MEDIA, LLC et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Reversed.
Davis Wright Tremaine, Kelli L. Sager, Dan Laidman, and Sarah Burns for Defendants and Appellants.
Sauer & Wagner, Robert S. Chapman, and Amir A.
Torkamani for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Plaintiff Francis Ford Coppola (Coppola) filed a complaint for libel against defendants Variety Media, LLC (Variety), Brent Lang (Lang), and Tatiana Siegel (Siegel) (collectively, defendants) based on an article defendants published concerning Coppola’s conduct on the Megalopolis film set. Defendants responded with an anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 425.16), which the trial court denied. There is no question that Coppola’s complaint arises from anti-SLAPP protected activity. The only question we decide is whether the trial court incorrectly found Coppola proved his libel claim possesses the requisite “minimal merit” to survive an anti-SLAPP motion. That question principally turns on whether Coppola made an adequate showing that the allegedly libelous statements are false statements of fact.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Variety Article In July 2024, Variety published an article with the headline, “Video of Francis Ford Coppola Kissing ‘Megalopolis’ Extras Surfaces as Crew Members Detail Unprofessional Behavior on Set (EXCLUSIVE).” The byline identifies Lang and Siegel as the article’s authors.
The article introduces two embedded videos by stating:
“Video has surfaced of director Francis Ford Coppola that shows the legendary director trying to kiss young female extras on the set of his ambitious sci-fi epic. Variety has obtained two videos (posted below) that were taken by a crewmember last year during the filming of a bacchanalian nightclub scene.” The article
1 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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suggests “[t]he videos would appear to corroborate a bombshell report in the Guardian that claimed the 85-year-old director ‘tried to kiss some of the topless and scantily clad female extras’ and told them ‘he was “trying to get them in the mood.”’” The Variety piece linked to an article in the Guardian entitled “‘Has this guy ever made a movie before?’ Francis Ford Coppola’s 40- year battle to film Megalopolis.”2 Both videos referenced in the article (and included in the appellate record) appear to feature Coppola (mostly from the back) walking through a crowded dance floor. There is loud music and no audible speech. One video, about six seconds long, begins with Coppola holding a woman’s arm as his head bobs near the side of her face. She is standing on one foot and Coppola moves with her as she steps to the side. She steps back, and the video ends as Coppola walks away. The other video, about 32 second long, shows Coppola interacting with three women in succession, appearing to briefly press his face to the side of each woman’s face. None of the women Coppola visibly interacts with in the videos are topless.
The Variety article also reports statements by anonymous sources present on set. One of the sources stated Coppola, during filming of the nightclub scene, “kept leaping up to hug and kiss
2 The Guardian article includes a paragraph discussing statements by “[s]everal sources” who “felt that Coppola could be ‘old school’ in his behaviour around women. He allegedly pulled women to sit on his lap, for example. And during one bacchanalian nightclub scene being shot for the film, . . . Coppola came on to the set and tried to kiss some of the topless and scantily clad female extras. He apparently claimed he was ‘trying to get them in the mood[ ].[’]”
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several women, often inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and ruining it, which the source said was unusual.” The article quotes the source as explaining: “‘I’ve worked with really important directors and that behavior is uncommon—the most I’ve ever seen any director do is say something like “high energy, guys[ ]”’ . . . . ‘I’ve never seen anyone on set, and this extends to a camera operator, so much as touch an actor.’” The source added “that after multiple takes, Coppola got on a microphone and announced in earshot of everyone in the room, ‘Sorry, if I come up to you and kiss you. Just know it’s solely for my pleasure.’”
The article also reported sources “told Variety that Coppola appeared to act with impunity on set. And unlike traditional movies, Coppola financed the entire $120 million budget himself, so there were none of the traditional checks and balances in place.” Sources said “crew members looked at each other uncomfortably as Coppola kissed and embraced the background actors, but one source sa[id] no one publicly objected to his behavior or tried to stop it. That may have something to do with how much control Coppola was able to exert since there wasn’t an outside studio or streamer with its own HR department involved with the production. [¶] ‘Because Coppola funded it there was no HR department to keep things in check,’ sa[id] a second source. ‘Who were they supposed to talk to? Complain to Coppola and report Coppola to himself?’”
The Variety article also quotes “[v]eteran intimacy coordinator Yarit Dor, who was not involved with the film,” as opining that “‘it is recommended that scenes [with nudity involving extras] have more than one intimacy coordinator on set. . . .’” One of the two intimacy coordinators that was working on Megalopolis, Samantha McDonald, told Variety neither she
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nor her colleague were present when the nightclub scene was filmed, though she “‘[could not] really speak to the reason why they chose to bring [them] in when they did and not when they didn’t[.]’” The article reported “[a] source close to Coppola said there was an intimacy coordinator on set during relevant shooting dates and scenes.”
The Variety article additionally mentions that “[a]
spokesperson for Coppola declined to comment on the videos or the claims about Coppola’s behavior. However, a source close to the filmmaker noted that despite the death of Coppola’s wife, Eleanor Coppola, in April, [ ]‘Megalopolis’ came in on time, on budget.” The article also reports “Coppola’s team provided two on the record statements from people involved with the production. Darren Demetre, an executive producer of ‘Megalopolis,’ noted that ‘there were two days when we shot a celebratory Studio 54- esque club scene where [Coppola] walked around the set to establish the spirit of the scene by giving kind hugs and kisses on the cheek to the cast and background players. It was his way to help inspire and establish the club atmosphere, which was so important to the film. I was never aware of any complaints of harassment or ill behavior during the course of the project.’” First assistant director Mariela Comitini told Variety it was “‘an honor’” to work on the film and she “‘watched as [Coppola] created a vibrant, professional, and positive environment on set[.] . . . As one of the industry’s most well-respected master filmmakers, [Coppola] was undaunted by the enormity of this undertaking.’”
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B. The Complaint After publication of the Variety article, Coppola filed a complaint for libel in September 2024. The complaint opens by touting Coppola’s “creative genius” and positing that “[s]ome people are jealous and resentful of genius” and “therefore denigrate and tell knowing and reckless falsehoods about those of whom they are jealous.” The complaint goes on to catalog three categories of allegedly defamatory statements in the article: those suggesting Coppola inadvertently ruined shots, those concerning Coppola kissing extras, and those concerning the lack of a human resources department. The complaint seeks general and special damages of “not less than fifteen million dollars,” plus punitive and exemplary damages.
1. Category one: ruining shots Paragraphs 14 through 16 of Coppola’s complaint concerns the first of these three categories, i.e., the Variety article’s statement that “while directing a scene for Megalopolis, Coppola was ‘. . . often inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and ruining it . . . .’” The complaint alleges “[t]he average reader would understand this statement to mean that Coppola, as a director, was so incompetent that he no longer understood where cameras were located on the set and no longer understood camera angles.” The complaint further alleges that, in combination with details concerning the number of people on set, the average reader would understand “Coppola was wasting money because the whole scene, with hundreds of people involved, would have to be shot again.” Further, the “gratuitous[ ]” statement “that Coppola is an ‘85-year[-]old director’ whose ‘behavior was unprofessional’” would cause the average reader to “understand
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that Coppola was so aged and infirm that he no longer knew how to direct a motion picture professionally or efficiently.”
The complaint alleges defendants made the “ruining shots”
statement in the article with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth because it was “anticipated” that Coppola and crew members would appear in certain shots. According to the complaint, “there were four cameras shooting during the above-referenced scene and three of the cameras were mobile, with the crew often changing positions. . . . That is one reason why shots are edited.” Additionally, the complaint alleges “it was planned for Coppola to appear in the referenced scene” and defendants, who “claimed to have ‘sources’ on the set[,] . . . knew the true facts and the falsity of their defamatory statement . . . .”
2. Categories two and three: kissing and lack of HR oversight
Paragraph 17 of Coppola’s complaint concerns both the kissing and the HR department statement in the Variety article. It alleges defendants “falsely accused Coppola of running a motion picture production that had ‘none of the traditional checks and balances in place’ and of not having ‘. . . its own HR department involved with the production.’ These statements were combined with the false claims that a video attached to the [a]rticle showed that Coppola ‘. . . “tried to kiss some of the topless . . . female extras” . . . .’” Coppola alleges the videos “showed no such thing.” Coppola suggests the HR claim is false because “Megalopolis was an independently financed production” and “independent productions do not have separate HR departments as does a motion picture studio production.” There
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were, nonetheless, “‘checks and balances’ in place on the production concerning any claim of sexual harassment.” Coppola alleges these statements “are libelous on their face because they accuse Coppola of criminal conduct within the context of a production scheme he created that did not provide his alleged victims with any protections from sexual harassment.”
The complaint alleges defendants knew their purported sources were “unreliable” because “[d]efendants knew that all cast and crew members on Megalopolis signed an NDA in which they promised to keep confidential any information about Megalopolis and its production (among other things).” Moreover, Coppola alleged, an actor call sheet that was referenced in the Variety article “reminded all the cast and crew that all private photography was prohibited on the set.”
C. The Anti-SLAPP Proceedings 1. Defendants’ motion
Defendants moved to strike the complaint under section 425.16. Defendants argued the libel claim against them arises from protected speech made in a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest. Specifically, the article was published on Variety’s website and addresses the conduct of a famous director, the production of a film that was already the subject of public discussion, and touches upon “workplace sexual harassment” in general and “the treatment of women in the film industry” in particular. Defendants further argued Coppola could not demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits of his claims both because the allegedly libelous statements are not actionable and because Coppola, a public figure, failed to plead
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defendants acted with “actual malice” as defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254.
With respect to whether the complaint identified any actionable libelous statements, defendants maintained the article did not imply anything about Coppola’s competence as a director but rather presented (opposing) views regarding his professionalism on set. Further, defendants argued, even if the article implied anything about Coppola’s competence as a director, any conclusion based on disclosed, undisputed facts was not actionable. Insofar as the complaint was specifically concerned with the suggestion Coppola “‘inadvertently insert[ed]’” himself into shots, defendants argued this was a subjective characterization by on-set sources and, even if construed as a factual statement, it was substantially true. As to the statements concerning the lack of an HR department, defendants argued their reporting is undisputed and includes all necessary context. As to the statement concerning Coppola kissing topless actresses, defendants argued that they offered only a qualified suggestion that the embedded videos “‘would appear to corroborate’” the Guardian’s reporting to that effect, that they disclosed all facts on which the statement is based, and that the statement is substantially true.
With respect to the New York Times “actual malice”
standard, defendants argued Coppola was required to allege specific facts showing defendants published statements with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard to whether they were true or false. Defendants argued conclusory allegations that merely recite the standard are insufficient and Coppola’s suggestion defendants knew their sources were unreliable because they violated non-disclosure agreements was
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“untenable.” Alternatively, even if defendants’ statements were actionable and Coppola adequately pled malice, defendants argued the complaint still must be stricken because Coppola failed to plead special damages. Defendants argued Coppola was required to do so under the circumstances because any alleged defamatory meaning required explanatory matter.
2. Coppola’s motion for leave to conduct discovery Before opposing the anti-SLAPP motion, Coppola filed his own motion to lift the discovery stay automatically put in place by the filing of defendants’ motion. Among other things, Coppola sought to depose defendants and identify their anonymous sources. Defendants opposed lifting the discovery stay, arguing their anti-SLAPP motion “raise[d] purely legal issues that challenge the legal sufficiency of [Coppola’s] [c]omplaint, and [did] not involve any disputed factual issues.”
At the hearing on Coppola’s motion to lift the discovery stay, defendants’ attorney explained they were arguing Coppola had not “pled facts in the complaint to show actual malice, but [they] [we]re not challenging any evidentiary burden.” Coppola’s attorney responded, “If that’s the concession, your honor, then we can go forward with the anti-SLAPP motion, and they have conceded knowledge of falsity. And we just deal with the other issues.” Defendants’ attorney then clarified, “the evidentiary portion of the actual malice, if the court finds it’s been sufficiently pled, then, yes, it’s done.” Coppola’s attorney indicated “with that” he did “not need this discovery right now,” and the trial court denied Coppola’s motion to lift the stay as moot.
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3. Coppola’s opposition to defendants’ motion In his opposition to defendants’ motion, Coppola suggested defendants’ “stipulat[ion] to acting with actual malice . . . included, by definition, a stipulation of falsity.” In any case, Coppola argued, defendants’ statements were false.
With respect to the article’s statement that Coppola was “‘often inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and ruining it[,]’” Coppola submitted a declaration from Eric Jager (Jager), a professor of English at UCLA, opining that an average reader would understand Coppola was “so old or infirm that he is incompetent as a director to film a scene in a major motion picture, to the point that he fails to recognize the difference between film and real life.” Coppola also filed his own declaration in which he suggested his conduct was intentional and did not ruin shots. He explained that he “used four cameras simultaneously,” with three hand-held cameras “mov[ing] around the action to obtain a variety of perspectives. Because of the number of cameras and the length of the shots . . . , at various times [Coppola] or some members of the camera crews and assistant directors appeared in some of the shots. That was to be expected and unavoidable. Those appearances most certainly did not ‘ruin’ the shots.” Moreover, Coppola declared, his appearance in the relevant scene was “intentional.” “The scene was based on the famed Studio 54 in New York, where celebrities were a main attraction and regularly a feature in the crowd.” Coppola suggested “[t]rust is an important part of any motion picture production. The cast and crew need to trust that the director knows what he or she is doing and trust the director’s vision.”
With respect to the article’s statements concerning Coppola kissing actresses, Coppola stated in his declaration that “[a]t no
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time on the set of Megalopolis did [he] ever hug or kiss an actress who was topless.” Coppola maintained “the video embedded in the [a]rticle affirmatively establishes the falsity of the assertion that [he] tried to kiss ‘topless’ female extras.” Coppola also cited Jager’s declaration to argue the average reader would “overlook or not even notice” the article’s inclusion of the phrase “‘would appear to corroborate.’”
With respect to the complaint’s challenge to statements concerning the lack of an HR department and “‘“traditional checks and balances,”’” Coppola argued “[i]ndependently financed movie productions, like Megalopolis, do not traditionally have separate HR departments,” but “Megalopolis in fact did have ‘checks and balances’ in place.” Coppola submitted a declaration bfromy Jennifer Rose Locke (Locke), who worked as the extras casting director on Megalopolis. Among other things, Locke indicated she gave each extra a “written guide” directing them to “contact casting right away” if “approached in any manner that ma[de] [them] feel uncomfortable.” The guide states “we take sexual harassment issues seriously. We will begin investigating any claims immediately. When production determines that an allegation of sexual harassment is credible, it will take prompt and appropriate corrective action.”
As to the adequacy of his pleading with respect to actual malice, Coppola argued it is sufficient for a public figure plaintiff to recite the New York Times actual malice standard, which he had done. Finally, Coppola argued there was no need to plead special damages because defendants’ statements tend to injure him in his profession and therefore constitute libel per se.
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4. Defendants’ objections and reply Defendants objected to portions of Coppola and Locke’s declarations, and to Jager’s declaration in its entirety. In their reply in support of the anti-SLAPP motion, defendants argued none of the challenged statements is defamatory in the context of the article and, in any case, their statements are based on disclosed and undisputed facts. They reiterated their view that Coppola’s failure to plead facts showing actual malice is fatal to his complaint. And they again argued Coppola was required to plead special damages because he relied on extrinsic evidence to show the article is defamatory.
5. The trial court’s ruling The trial court issued a written order denying defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion, albeit with unusual caveats, described post, that Coppola should be permitted to amend the complaint to address certain deficiencies.
On evidentiary issues, the trial court sustained defendants’
objection to Jager’s declaration, explaining “Jager’s opinion does not impact how a reasonable reader would construe the article” and, “[t]o the extent Jager is opining on a question of law, i.e., whether the statements are capable of defamatory meanings of falsity, that is a question for the court to decide.” The trial court also sustained defendants’ objections to portions of Locke’s declaration, including those in which she discussed the guide she gave to extras directing them to report any sexual harassment to her.
With these evidentiary issues resolved, the trial court found the first step of anti-SLAPP analysis (whether a claim arises from conduct in furtherance of First Amendment rights)
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was satisfied because Variety’s website is a public forum and the article discussed a matter of public interest, “i.e., a major motion picture directed by a renowned director.” On the second step of anti-SLAPP analysis (whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing on claims arising from anti-SLAPP protected activity), the trial court found Coppola had met the minimal merit standard because the Variety article includes several statements “susceptible to a defamatory meaning.”
The trial court believed the statement that Coppola was “‘often inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and ruining it’” suggested “incompetence as a director.” In the trial court’s view, Coppola’s explanation that his appearance in certain shots was intentional and did not “ruin[ ]” them demonstrated a probability of prevailing on the claim that the statement was libelous.
The trial court additionally believed the “statement in the article that [Coppola] ‘tried to kiss some of the topless extras’” could also be taken to “imply a provably false assertion.” The fact that defendants framed the videos as appearing to corroborate the Guardian’s reporting did not insulate them from liability because, in the court’s view, “‘[c]orroborate’ could mean lends credence to the claim, or it could mean that it actually depicted[ ] [Coppola] approaching topless female extras.” The court then concluded that Coppola’s denial that he kissed topless extras (even if construed as a tacit admission that he kissed clothed extras) combined with videos that the court said “may not clearly show kissing (as opposed to maybe leaning in and whispering)” demonstrated a probability that Coppola would prove the statement libelous. The trial court then went further, asserting that Coppola had shown a probability of prevailing even if it were
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undisputed that he did kiss female actors because the court could not be sure whether they wanted it: “[E]ven if [Coppola] did kiss the women, whether or not they were uncomfortable and thus did not welcome hugging and/or kissing—a defamatory implication that [Coppola] was committing unwanted touching (battery)—is something that can only be ascertained through witness statements, and thus presents a question of fact.”
The trial court’s ruling also found even aspects of the Variety article that were not quoted in the complaint as a basis for libel to be potentially libelous: recounting Coppola’s purported apology announcement to the cast and crew (“‘Sorry, if I come up to you and kiss you. Just know it’s solely for my pleasure’”) and the article’s statement that crew members exchanged uncomfortable looks with one another when Coppola hugged and kissed extras. The court did find, however, that “the lack of an HR department/traditional checks and balances aspect of the article” was not “defamatory [ ]or false.”3 On the question of malice, the trial court determined Coppola is a public figure required to plead and prove actual malice as defined in New York Times, but the court did not decide whether the standard has to be pled with specificity. Instead, the trial court found Coppola’s complaint went “beyond simple recitation of the legal standard of actual malice” because Coppola
3 Although the trial court so found, and although it was uncontested that all the pertinent allegations in Coppola’s complaint arose from anti-SLAPP protected activity, the trial court did not grant defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the pertinent HR department/traditional checks and balances allegations. It instead denied the anti-SLAPP motion, which sought to strike the complaint in its entirety.
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alleged his appearance in the nightclub scene was intentional and defendants therefore (somehow) “either knew their [on-set sources’] description of the scene was false, or acted recklessly with regard to the truth or falsity of their account of the scene’s filming.” Because defendants had conceded for purposes of their motion that Coppola could support allegations of actual malice with evidence, the court believed it would be appropriate to grant Coppola leave to amend the complaint “to plead additional facts regarding actual malice . . . because such amendment goes to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis and would not have the effect of removing the allegations from the scope of [section] 425.16[.]” The trial court also determined Coppola did not plead special damages but concluded he was not required to do so because he alleged defamation per se. The trial court emphasized, however, that “leave to amend to allege any special damages which [Coppola] sees fit is also proper.”
II. DISCUSSION
The trial court’s anti-SLAPP analysis is flawed and requires reversal. As we first summarize and then explain in greater detail, Coppola did not carry his burden to establish his libel allegations possess the requisite minimal merit; some of the statements he attacks do not include a provably false assertion of fact, and for those that do, he did not make an adequate prima facie showing of falsity.4
4 Because we so hold, we need not consider any of defendants’ other arguments for reversal, including the argument that actual malice was insufficiently alleged.
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Coppola does not dispute he kissed some female extras while filming the nightclub scene, and defendants’ suggestion that their videos appear to corroborate the Guardian’s reporting is a statement of opinion that is not actionable as libel. The statement that Coppola often inadvertently inserted himself into shots and ruined them is a combination of non-actionable opinion and a factual statement for which Coppola has provided no evidence of falsity: the idea that Coppola ruined the shots is obviously a matter of non-actionable opinion (as Coppola’s own declaration confirms), and although Coppola maintains his appearance in shots from the nightclub scene was unavoidable in some instances and intentional in others, he has not shown his appearance was not at times both avoidable and unintentional. The HR and “checks and balances” statements in the article are not false because it is uncontroverted that Coppola’s independently-financed film did not have the same compliance infrastructure as a studio film.
A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review “Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’ [Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has ‘at least “minimal merit.’” [Citation.] If the plaintiff cannot make this showing, the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.) An order denying an anti-SLAPP motion is reviewed de novo. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)
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Coppola bears the burden of proof at the second step of anti-SLAPP analysis, but the burden “is a limited one.” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891.) A plaintiff “need not prove her case to the court [citation]; the bar sits lower, at a demonstration of ‘minimal merit’ [citation]. At this stage, ‘“[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.”’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Libel is publication of defamatory matter by written or printed words. (Civ. Code, §§ 44, 45.) “The tort of defamation ‘involves (a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that causes special damage.’ [Citation.]” (Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 720.) Additionally, “a plaintiff who is a public figure must prove the defendant intentionally published a false statement of fact with actual malice.” (OneTaste Inc. v. Netflix (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 174, 188.) This standard, which the high court established in New York Times, requires a public figure plaintiff to prove the statement was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” (New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 279-280; accord Reader’s Digest Assn. v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 256.)
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B. Coppola Failed to Show His Libel Claim Has Minimal Merit
“‘“The sine qua non of recovery for defamation . . . is the existence of a falsehood.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Brodeur v. Atlas Entertainment, Inc. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 665, 678.) “Because defamation requires a falsehood, it is sometimes said that an opinion, which is neither true nor false, is not actionable. This is an oversimplification. Statements of opinion do not enjoy blanket protection. [Citation.] The issue is whether the statement of opinion implies a statement of fact. ‘Statements of opinion that imply a false assertion of fact are actionable. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Dickinson v. Cosby (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 655, 685; accord GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 141, 156 [“where an expression of opinion implies a false assertion of fact, the opinion can constitute actionable defamation”].)
“‘The “crucial question of whether challenged statements convey the requisite factual imputation is ordinarily a question of law for the court. [Citation.]” [Citation.] “Only once the court has determined that a statement is reasonably susceptible to such a defamatory interpretation does it become a question for the trier of fact whether or not it was so understood. [Citations.]” [Citation.] The question is “‘whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude the published statement declares or implies a provably false assertion of fact. . . .’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]”5 (Dickinson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 686; accord GetFugu, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 155-156.)
5 Even if the trial court erred in declining to consider the Jager declaration, there is no merit to Coppola’s contention that Jager’s view is dispositive as to whether the challenged
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When determining whether a statement makes a provably false assertion of fact, courts look to the totality of the circumstances. (Dickinson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 686; GetFugu, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at 156.) The court “‘must put itself in the place of an average reader and determine the natural and probable effect of the statement . . . .’ [Citation.] Thus, a court considers both the language of the statement and the context in which it is made. [Citations.]” (Bently Reserve LP v. Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 427.)
Among other things, “[i]n considering the language of the statement itself, we look at whether the purported opinion discloses all of the facts on which it is based and does not imply that there are other, unstated facts which support the opinion. If that is the case, the statement is defamatory only if the disclosed facts themselves are false and defamatory. [Citation.] We also consider whether the statement was cautiously phrased in terms of the author’s impression. [Citation.]” (Dickinson, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at 686.) “In considering the context of the statement, we look at facts including the audience to whom the statement was directed [citation], the forum in which the statement was
statements constitute false statements of fact. Expert testimony may be admissible to aid a jury in determining how an average reader would construe the challenged statements (Weller v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 991, 1007-1009), but courts do not defer to experts in the initial assessment of whether a statement is reasonably susceptible to a defamatory interpretation. (Janney v. CSAA Ins. Exchange (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 374, 391 [“‘There are limits to expert testimony, not the least of which is the prohibition against admission of an expert’s opinion on a question of law’”].)
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made [citation], and the author of the statement [citation].” (Ibid.)
In addition to identifying statements that include factual assertions, a public figure plaintiff “who seeks to recover damages for a defamatory statement bears the burden of proving that the challenged statement was false. [Citation.] The plaintiff cannot be said to have carried this burden so long as the statement appears substantially true. To bar liability, ‘“it is sufficient if the substance of the charge be proved true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy in the details.” [Citations.] . . . [Citation.] . . . Minor inaccuracies do not amount to falsity so long as “the substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be justified.” [Citations.] Put another way, the statement is not considered false unless it “would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]”6 (Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1021, fn. and italics omitted.)
1. Statements concerning Coppola kissing extras As we have discussed, defendants’ headline refers to “Video of Francis Ford Coppola Kissing ‘Megalopolis’ Extras,” and the article introduces the videos as “show[ing] the legendary director
6 Coppola suggests in the introduction to his respondent’s brief that defendants’ concession as to evidence of actual malice also amounts to a concession as to falsity. The trial court did not read the concession that way, and neither do we. Defendants conceded only that if Coppola made a sufficient showing of falsity—and his pleading of actual malice was adequate—he would not have to make a prima facie evidentiary showing of actual malice.
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trying to kiss young female extras on the set of his ambitious sci- fi epic.” The article then states “[t]he videos would appear to corroborate a bombshell report in the Guardian that claimed the 85-year-old director ‘tried to kiss some of the topless and scantily clad female extras’ and told them ‘he was “trying to get them in the mood.”’”
Coppola alleges defendants falsely claimed he “‘tried to kiss some of the topless . . . female extras’” because “[t]he video showed no such thing . . . .” Coppola states in his declaration that “[a]t no time on the set of Megalopolis did [he] ever hug or kiss an actress who was topless,” and the video embedded in defendants’ article “confirms that.”
Of course, Coppola does not deny that he kissed extras during filming of the nightclub scene, or even that the videos show him doing so. The only proposition relevant to kissing extras he alleges is false is that the women were topless at the time. Defendants’ article, however, did not state they were. Rather, the carefully worded statement in the article is that the videos appear to corroborate other reporting by the Guardian concerning kissing of other topless women and, so phrased, the Variety article’s statement is non-actionable opinion about the videos’ content.
The words “would appear” signal that an interpretation or opinion follows.7 (Baker v. Los Angeles Herald Examiner (1986)
7 Indeed, Jager acknowledged as much in his declaration—
“the phrase ‘would appear’ undercuts” the suggestion that the Guardian’s reporting is true because “‘would’ is conditional and ‘appear’ is hypothetical compared to ‘is’ or other forms of the verb ‘to be’”—but he suggested “the average reader w[ould] overlook or not even notice these nuances.”
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42 Cal.3d 254, 260-261 [“Where the language of the statement is ‘cautiously phrased in terms of apparency,’ the statement is less likely to be reasonably understood as a statement of fact rather than opinion”], fn. omitted.) Coppola’s counterarument is that defendants characterized the Guardian’s article as a “bombshell,” which commands attention. But language that signals an author is expressing an opinion is no less effective simply because the subject matter is provocative or “commands attention.”
Moreover, even if we assume the impact of “appears” on the average reader may be diluted by the subject matter, the framing that the videos appear “to corroborate” the Guardian’s reporting also signals the videos do not independently prove Coppola tried to kiss topless extras. Merriam-Webster defines “corroborate” to mean “to support or help prove with evidence or authority” or to “make more certain.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/corroborate> [as of Apr. 8, 2026].) Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary defines the word to mean “5. To strengthen (an opinion, statement, argument, etc.) by concurrent or agreeing statements or evidence; to make more sure or certain; to support, confirm . . . .” (Oxford English Dict. Online (2025) <https://www.oed.com/dictionary/ corroborate_v?tab=meaning_and_use#8212936> [as of Apr. 8, 2026].) Black’s Law Dictionary is in accord. (Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) [“corroborate” means “[t]o strengthen or confirm; to make more certain”].)
Read as a whole, defendants’ description of the videos conveys defendants’ impression that they lend support to the Guardian’s reporting.8 The implied factual assertion is that the
8 This construction of defendants’ language is reinforced by the broader context of the article. Defendants do not include the
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videos may depict conduct supporting the claim that Coppola tried to kiss topless extras. Insofar as Coppola does not dispute that the videos show him kissing several extras during a shoot at which at least some extras were topless, he has not made a prima facie showing that defendants’ assessment of the evidentiary value of the videos—an issue distinct from the ultimate truth of the Guardian’s reporting—is false. The uncontested assertion that Coppola kissed some of the extras in the scene lends support to the claim that he tried to kiss other specific extras in the scene.9 Coppola’s quarrel on this score—if he has one—is with the Guardian, not Variety.10
word “topless” in their initial summary of the videos: “Video has surfaced of director Francis Ford Coppola that shows the legendary director trying to kiss young female extras . . . .” The reference to the Guardian article appears in a subsequent paragraph. 9 Coppola’s suggestion that the videos “confirm” he did not kiss topless extras during filming of the nightclub scene lacks merit. The videos, totaling less than one minute, are not a complete record of the shoot. According to Coppola, the nightclub scene required multiple takes lasting up to 13 minutes each.
Insofar as Coppola alleges liability based on defendants’
statements characterizing his conduct as “unprofessional,” this is also non-actionable opinion. There is no implication that this characterization is based on undisclosed facts, and professional norms are highly subjective. (See Reed v. Gallagher (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 841, 857 [statement characterizing attorney as “unscrupulous” constituted non-actionable opinion because “[s]uch subjective judgments are incapable of being proved true or false”].) 10 Coppola’s assertion that defendants’ reference to the Guardian’s reporting “does not insulate [them] from liability”
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2. Statements concerning Coppola’s appearance in shots
Coppola believes the article’s statement that he was “‘often inadvertently inserting himself into the shot and ruining it’” suggests he “was so incompetent that he no longer understood where cameras were located on the set and no longer understood camera angles” and he “was wasting money because the whole scene, with hundreds of people involved, would have to be shot again.” Because it is undisputed that Coppola was filmed on the dance floor, the key elements of this statement for our purposes
because they may also be liable for “repeating the false claim that the videos showed Coppola kissing topless actresses” lacks merit. It is not settled in California whether a “neutral reportage privilege” applies to the republication of defamatory statements concerning public figures. (Khawar v. Globe Intern., Inc. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 271.) But Coppola’s complaint does not allege defendants are liable for republishing the Guardian’s reporting. To the contrary, the complaint alleges defendants “false[ly] claim[ed] that a video attached to the [a]rticle showed that Coppola ‘. . . “tried to kiss some of the topless . . . female extras” . . . .’” In other words, Coppola premises defendants’ liability on their assessment of the videos’ contents—not on their repetition of the Guardian’s reporting. In this context, we assess defendants’ reference to the Guardian’s reporting as part of the totality of the circumstances concerning their statements about the videos. (Vogel, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at 1017, fn. 3 [“‘The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint’”]; Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1263 [“On review of a special motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16, we must take the complaint as it is”].)
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are that this was “‘often inadvertent[ ]’” and that he was “‘ruining’” shots.
Whether Coppola often inadvertently walked into shots is a matter of fact. But Coppola has failed to make a prima facie showing that it is false. Coppola’s claim that he was to have a cameo in the scene is not inconsistent with the claim that he inadvertently appeared in shots at other times. Coppola’s alternative explanation that it was inevitable he and other crew members would appear in certain shots—with multiple cameras “mov[ing] around the action to obtain a variety of perspectives”— suffers from the same defect. Evidence that Coppola sometimes intentionally or unavoidably appeared in shots does not amount to a prima facie showing that he did not also walk into shots inadvertently.
The assertion that Coppola was “‘ruining’” shots suffers from the opposite problem: it is not, in context, provably false. Coppola’s own declaration underscores the subjective judgment involved in determining whether a shot is good or usable. For example, he avers that, “[o]ver the years, [he] ha[s] often used what others consider ‘mistakes’ in filming to achieve success artistically.” In a similar vein, Coppola emphasizes that a “motion picture director is the creative force behind a film,” who “must have a vision of the completed project” that is “carried on through the editing process.” Moreover, “[i]t is not until the editing process that a director makes the final decision about which scenes work, which do not, what is creative, and what is mundane.” Coppola further stresses the need for “[t]he cast and crew . . . to trust that the director knows what he or she is doing and trust the director’s vision.” In other words, a crew member who lacks trust in Coppola’s undisclosed (or at least difficult-to-
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communicate) vision is not provably wrong—at most, their aesthetic judgment is different than Coppola’s.
Coppola attempts to cast the statement that he was “‘ruining’” shots as a factual proposition by arguing it implies the scene had to be shot again. Coppola does not, however, dispute that he shot multiple takes of the nightclub scene, and he does not discuss why it was necessary to do so. The issue, therefore, is whether the anonymous source’s opinion regarding the reason for the multiple takes implies a false statement of fact. And that brings us back to the (non-factual) question of whether the source had insufficient trust in Coppola’s vision. Coppola offers no evidence that his inadvertent appearance in shots filmed for the nightclub scene was not part of the reason that multiple takes were needed.
3. Statements concerning the lack of traditional checks and balances
Coppola alleges “[t]he [a]rticle . . . falsely accused [him] of running a motion picture production that had ‘none of the traditional checks and balances in place’ and of not having ‘[ ]its own HR department involved with the production.’”11 He has failed, however, to make a prima facie showing that defendants’ statements are false.
Even if Locke’s declaration establishes there were some “checks and balances” in place, this is not inconsistent with
11 The complaint misquotes defendants’ article. The article does not assert Coppola’s production lacked “its own HR department”—it states “there wasn’t an outside studio or streamer with its own HR department involved with the production.” (Emphasis added.)
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defendants’ qualified statement that the production lacked “traditional” checks and balances. In context, defendants juxtaposed a self-financed, independent production with a major studio production, with the latter embodying a “traditional” compliance infrastructure.12 Coppola effectively concedes the validity of this dichotomy in his declaration, explaining that “[w]hen a motion picture is financed by a major studio, the studio provides its infrastructure in connection with the production, including, among others, . . . Human Resources departments[ ] and legal support. An independently financed motion picture does not come with that same infrastructure.”
The thrust of defendants’ statement, which Coppola does not dispute, is that Coppola’s financing of the project meant he did not answer to anyone else. This is true regardless of whether there were channels through which extras could complain about Coppola’s conduct—as Locke described in her declaration.
12 As the article puts it, “[U]nlike traditional movies, Coppola financed the entire $120 million budget himself, so there were none of the traditional checks and balances in place.”
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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendants’ motion to strike is reversed.
The trial court is directed to enter a new and different order granting the motion and striking the complaint in its entirety. Defendants are awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.