Copeland v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.

162 B.R. 743, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17425, 1993 WL 557862
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Louisiana
DecidedDecember 7, 1993
DocketCiv. A. 92-570, 92-3961
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 162 B.R. 743 (Copeland v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Copeland v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 162 B.R. 743, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17425, 1993 WL 557862 (E.D. La. 1993).

Opinion

McNAMARA, District Judge.

Before the court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff, Alvin C. Copeland, in Civil Action No. 92-3961, one of the three actions constituting this consolidated matter. Defendant, America’s Favorite Chicken Company (“AFCC”) filed a memorandum in opposition, which both Defendant Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (“Merrill Lynch”) and Defendant Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (“CIBC”) adopted. The Motion, set for hearing on October 24,1993, is before the court on written briefs, without oral argument.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

CIBC, as agent for a syndicate of lenders, and Merrill Lynch each agreed, subject to specified conditions, to provide certain financing to fund ACE’s tender offer for the purchase of the outstanding shares of common stock of Church’s Finest Chicken, Inc. The CIBC syndicate loaned ACE $285 million under a Merger Loan Agreement and Merrill Lynch loaned ACE $173 million under a Bridge Financing Agreement.

At the time of these loans, Plaintiff was the sole common shareholder, Chief Executive Officer and President of ACE. Because of Plaintiffs position of control and because Plaintiff was not to be personally liable for *745 repayment of the Merger Loan and the Bridge Loan, the lenders required certain protective measures, including the Recipe Royalty Agreement, as conditions for their loans to ACE. The Recipe Royalty Agreement provided that Copeland and New Orleans Spice Company, Inc. (“Spice”) would receive no royalty payments from any franchised or company-owned store opened after March 21,1989. This provision ended on the “Termination Date” defined in the Recipe Royalty Agreement as:

the date (i) on which [ACE] has repaid in full all loans under the Bridge Financing Agreement, (ii) on which [ACE] has reduced the amounts outstanding under the Merger Loan Agreement to $75,000,000 and (in) on which the Fixed Charged Coverage Ratio (as defined in the Indenture attached as an Exhibit to the Bridge Financing Agreement) (the “Fixed Charged Coverage Ratio”) first exceeds 2 to 1 for four consecutive fiscal quarters, (emphasis added)

The sole parties to the Recipe Royalty Agreement were Copeland, Spice, and ACE. Neither CIBC nor Merrill Lynch was a party to the Agreement.

ACE eventually defaulted on its obligations under its Merger Loan and Bridge Loan, owing CIBC approximately $279 million and Merrill Lynch approximately $155 million. CIBC and Merrill filed an involuntary Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition against ACE in the Western District of Texas, Austin Division. Shortly thereafter, ACE filed a voluntary Chapter 11 Petition and the matter was converted to a voluntary proceeding.

Ultimately, the Bankruptcy Court confirmed the fourth reorganization plan proposed by CIBC. Pursuant to this confirmed plan, the CIBC syndicate lenders were to exchange $50 million of their existing loans for preferred stock in the company, with the remaining loan to be repaid pursuant to a Second Amended and Restated Merger Loan Agreement with ACE’s successor-in-interest. The Second Amended Merger Loan Agreement expressly provided that New Amended and Restated Tranche A Notes would replace the First Amended Merger Loan Agreement notes and would

be restatements of the Original Obligations [outstanding under the First Amended Merger Loan Agreement] (reduced in amount, however, by the amount of the Original Obligations exchanged into New Preferred Stock pursuant to the reorganization plan ...), and the delivery thereof shall constitute, and shall be treated for all purposes as, an amendment to the Original Notes [outstanding under the First Amended Merger Loan Agreement] without the occurrence of a novation or the satisfaction of the Original Notes (except to the extent of the amount of the Original Obligation so exchanged), (emphasis added)

See AFCC Exhibit No. 4, p. 18.

Further, the New Amended and Restated Tranche A Note issued under the Second Amended Merger Loan Agreement similarly stated:

This Note is a restatement of the Original Obligations (reduced in amount, however, by the amount of the Original Obligations exchanged into New Preferred Stock pursuant to the Reorganization Plan ...), and the delivery hereof constitutes, and is for all purposes, an amendment to the Original Note of the bank without the occurrence of a novation or the satisfaction of such Original Note (except to the extent of the amount of the original obligation so exchanged). (emphasis added)

See AFCC Exhibit No. 5.

With respect to Merrill Lynch, the confirmed reorganization plan provided for Merrill Lynch to receive 18% of the common stock of the reorganized entity and preferred stock of AFCC with a face value of $6 million and market value of approximately $4.2 million. Therefore, Merrill Lynch’s total recovery would be approximately $8 million since its outstanding claim was worth approximately $155 million. The remaining Bridge Loan was to be discharged.

The confirmed reorganization plan further authorized ACE to merge into AFCC and to assume various pre-petition contracts of ACE, including the Recipe Royalty Agreement. The plan also discharged ACE from *746 all pre-petition debts as provided under Section 1141(d) of the Bankruptcy Code.

Plaintiff now seeks a judgment declaring that his obligations to AFCC under the Recipe Royalty Agreement have terminated as a result of the reorganization plan confirmed by the Bankruptcy Court in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings of A1 Copeland Enterprises, Inc. (“ACE”). Having considered the memoranda of counsel and the applicable law, the court finds that: (1) there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the Termination Date of the Recipe Royalty Agreement has occurred through novation; and (2) as a matter of law, Plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment declaring that the Termination Date has occurred due to impossibility of performing its resolutory conditions.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. There are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Termination Date has occurred through novation.

Plaintiff argues that obligations set forth in both the Merger Loan and the Bridge Loan have been “novated” by the Bankruptcy reorganization plan because: (1) the obligations owed to CIBC under the Merger Loan were marked canceled and new notes were substituted in their place; and (2) the amount owed to Merrill Lynch under the Bridge Loan was extinguished when Merrill Lynch subordinated its claim. Under Louisiana law, 1 novation is defined as “the extin-guishment of an existing obligation by the substitution of a new one.” La.Civ.Code Art. 1879.

The most important factor in determining whether novation has been effected is the intent of the parties to effect a novation. Scott v. Bank of Coushatta, 512 So.2d 356, 360 (La.1987). Further, “the intention to extinguish the original obligation must be clear and unequivocal. Novation may not be presumed.” La.Civ.Code Art. 1880.

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Bluebook (online)
162 B.R. 743, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17425, 1993 WL 557862, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/copeland-v-merrill-lynch-co-inc-laed-1993.