Copeland v. Boots Pharmaceuticals

1996 OK CIV APP 8, 916 P.2d 277, 67 O.B.A.J. 1609, 1996 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 14, 1996 WL 234288
CourtCourt of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma
DecidedFebruary 20, 1996
Docket86544
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 1996 OK CIV APP 8 (Copeland v. Boots Pharmaceuticals) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Copeland v. Boots Pharmaceuticals, 1996 OK CIV APP 8, 916 P.2d 277, 67 O.B.A.J. 1609, 1996 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 14, 1996 WL 234288 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GARRETT, Judge:

Petitioner, Joyce Copeland (Claimant), filed a Form 3 in the Workers’ Compensation Court on May 31, 1994, alleging she sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with Respondent, Boots Pharmaceuticals (Employer), on November 11, 1992. She alleged she was bitten by a recluse spider and injured her left leg, gastrointestinal system, ulcers, mouth, eyes, nose and psychological overlay. She filed a Form 9 requesting temporary disability and medical treatment. Employer filed a Form 10, objected she was not temporarily totally disabled due to the spider bite and the medical treatment was not related to it. It filed an amended Form 10, raising the defense Claimant’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment.

On July 19,1995, the trial court entered its order and found Claimant sustained an accidental injury to her left leg, right hand and gastrointestinal system arising out of and in the course of her employment. She was awarded compensation for temporary total disability from May 8, 1994 and continuing. The issues of overpayment and/or underpayment of temporary total disability, injury to other body parts, additional medical treatment and permanent disability, if any, were reserved for future hearing.

Employer filed a timely Request for Review with the Workers’ Compensation Court En Banc. On November 1, 1995, a three judge panel entered its order, ruling the trial court’s order was contrary to law and against the clear weight of the evidence. It vacated the order of the trial court’s order and entered the following in lieu thereof:

-1.-
THAT the claimant’s injuries, while same occurred in the course of her employment, did not arise out of her employment with the respondent as same did not occur as a result of an employer imposed risk or hazard. American Management Systems, Inc. And Pacific Indemnity Company v. Sheila Mae Bums and the Workers’ Compensation Court, 903 P.2d 288 (OMa.1995). 1
-2.-
THAT it is therefore ordered that claimant’s claim for compensation be and the same hereby is denied.

In this review proceeding, Claimant contends:

1. The Bums decision should not have been applied to this case because its facts are distinguishable and it did not address the dual mission or indirect benefit doctrine.
*279 2. When a claimant is forced to stay at an unclean facility, thus increasing her risk of harm due to venomous spider bites, then there exists a causal nexus between that harm and the risk of claimant’s employment.

Claimant testified she worked in sales for Employer and was required to travel. When staying in Muskogee, Oklahoma, she customarily stayed at a Best Western hotel. However, on this particular trip to Muskogee, where her injury occurred, the Best Western was full, and she stayed at the Days Inn, which she described as an inferior quality hotel. She said it was necessary to have a room on the first floor to be able to watch her car where she kept pharmaceutical samples. Someone at the Best Western told her the Ramada was probably full and suggested the Days Inn. She did not attempt to call other hotels in Muskogee.

Claimant testified that a stinging sensation in her leg awoke her around 3:00 a.m. She threw off the covers and saw a brown spot on the sheet, not the body of a spider. She said:

A. I said that I could not tell you exactly that it was a spider, because I threw all the covers off the bed and all that remained was the brown spot on the sheet.
Q. And, again, you don’t know if that was a spot that was there before you laid down or not?
A. It was not an old spot. It looked like something that had just been squashed.

In American Management Systems, Inc. v. Burns, 903 P.2d 288 (Okl.1995), the Supreme Court held the death of a worker, who was robbed and murdered in a motel while on a business trip, occurred in the course of his employment. However, the Court held the worker’s widow did not prove the death arose out of his employment. The Court discussed the well settled law distinguishing these two required elements of a compensa-ble claim. They are not synonymous terms, and they must both be found to exist. See 85 O.S. 1991 § 3(7). “In the course of employment” relates to the time, place or circumstances under which the injury is sustained. American Management Systems, Inc. v. Burns, 903 P.2d at 290, n. 3, citing Thomas v. Keith Hensel Optical Labs, 653 P.2d 201, 203 (Okl.1982); R.J. Allison, Inc. v. Boling, 192 Okl. 213, 134 P.2d 980, 982 (1943). The term “arise out of employment”, on the other hand, “contemplates the causal connection between the injury and the risks incident to employment.” American Management Systems, Inc. v. Burns, 903 P.2d at 290, n. 4, citing Hensel, supra note 3 at 202; Richey v. Commander Mills, Inc., 521 P.2d 805, 808 (Okl.1974); Graham v. Graham, 390 P.2d 892, 893 (Okl.1964); Stanolind Pipe Line Co. v. Davis, 173 Okl. 190, 47 P.2d 163, 164 (1935). In the instant case, the three judge panel made the finding Claimant’s injury occurred in the course of her employment. This finding is not at issue, as no one disputes the fact she was traveling and had to stay overnight because of her employment. Employer has questioned whether staying at the Days Inn, as opposed to other alternatives, was necessary, however.

The requirement that the injury “arise out of the employment” is a more difficult issue. The “causal nexus” between Claimant’s injury and the risks of her employment is the determinative question. American Management Systems v. Bums, 903 P.2d at 291. The Bums Court further defined this element:

The ‘arising-out-of-employment’ element of the claim requires that an injury be employment-related, as opposed to one stemming from a purely personal risk. In short, the record must show that Bums’ death was causally related to the risks incident to his mission for the employer. (Emphasis in original) (Footnotes omitted).

In discussing the “arising out of employment” element, the Bums Court reexamined pre-1986 workers’ compensation law with regard to a claimant’s burden of proof that an injury was employment-related. In 1986, § 3(7) was amended to require “the source of a compensable injury to be employment-related — i.e., one that does not stem from a purely personal risk_” Id. at 292.

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Bluebook (online)
1996 OK CIV APP 8, 916 P.2d 277, 67 O.B.A.J. 1609, 1996 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 14, 1996 WL 234288, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/copeland-v-boots-pharmaceuticals-oklacivapp-1996.