Cooper v. Unknown Party

CourtDistrict Court, D. Arizona
DecidedApril 15, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00231
StatusUnknown

This text of Cooper v. Unknown Party (Cooper v. Unknown Party) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Arizona primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cooper v. Unknown Party, (D. Ariz. 2022).

Opinion

1 WO KM 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Morris Cooper, No. CV 22-00231-PHX-JAT (ESW) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 John Doe Officer #1, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 On February 11, 2022, Plaintiff Morris Cooper, who is confined in the Atlantic 16 County Justice Facility in Mays Landing, New Jersey, filed a pro se civil rights Complaint 17 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a March 18 7, 2022 Order, the Court denied the Application to Proceed with leave to refile and 19 dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend. On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff filed a new 20 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 7) and a First Amended 21 Complaint (Doc. 9). The Court will grant the Application to Proceed and dismiss the First 22 Amended Complaint with leave to amend. 23 I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 24 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s March 25 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 26 § 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $18.66. The remainder 27 of the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income 28 credited to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate 2 government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 3 II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 5 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 6 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 7 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 8 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 9 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 10 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 11 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 12 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 13 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 14 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 15 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 16 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 17 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 18 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 19 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 20 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 21 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 22 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 23 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 24 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 25 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 26 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 27 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 28 1 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 2 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 3 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 4 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 5 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 6 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but 7 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave 8 to amend. 9 III. First Amended Complaint 10 Plaintiff names Phoenix Police Officers John Doe Officer #1 and John Doe 11 Officer #2 as Defendants in his two-count Complaint and seeks money damages. 12 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights 13 when, on December 27, 2020, they falsely arrested him for arson in connection with a fire 14 in his child’s mother’s residence. Plaintiff claims his child’s mother falsely reported that 15 he tried to burn down the house from the outside, while she was inside the home. Plaintiff 16 asserts the fire department investigator responded to the scene on the day of the fire and 17 notified police officers that the fire started inside of the residence. 18 Plaintiff’s child’s mother informed Defendants of Plaintiff’s location and 19 Defendants “took [Plaintiff] into custody (miles from the incident).” Plaintiff contends 20 Defendants had reviewed surveillance camera footage from outside of the home and “did 21 not observe Plaintiff committing any crime, yet still decided to take [him] into custody or 22 arrest [him] even though [his] child’s mother claimed [he] started the fire from the outside 23 of the home.” Plaintiff states he was “taken into custody for the incident and released a 24 week and some days later” and “all the criminal charges in connection with the incident 25 were dismissed.” 26 Plaintiff contends Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him because they 27 were in possession of “conclusive evidence” that disproved his child’s mother’s statements 28 and “showed that probable cause did not exist to arrest the Plaintiff.” 1 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated his Fourth and Fourteenth 2 Amendment rights when they maliciously prosecuted him by initiating his prosecution 3 without probable cause, “which caused the Plaintiff to be confined for a week then released 4 without any pending charges.” Plaintiff claims Defendants acted with malice “because[,] 5 at the time they took the Plaintiff into custody[,] the footage of the incident did not show 6 the Plaintiff committing any crime and what the victim alleged was implausible because it 7 was scientifically impossible.” 8 IV. Failure to State a Claim 9 A. False Arrest 10 “False arrest, a species of false imprisonment, is the detention of a person without 11 his consent and without lawful authority.” Donahoe v. Arpaio, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1064 12 (D. Ariz. 2012) (quoting Reams v. City of Tucson, 701 P.2d 598, 601 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)), 13 aff’d sub nom. Stapley v. Pestalozzi, 733 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2013). Under Arizona law, 14 false imprisonment and false arrest consist of non-consensual detention of a person 15 “without lawful authority.” Slade v. City of Phx., 541 P.2d 550, 552 (Ariz. 1975).

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Cooper v. Unknown Party, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cooper-v-unknown-party-azd-2022.