Cooper v. Nevin

13 S.W. 841, 90 Ky. 85, 1890 Ky. LEXIS 69
Court of Appeals of Kentucky·Decided April 3, 1890·Published·Cited by 12 cases

Opinion

JUDGE PRYOR

delivered the opinion oe the court.

The ordinance in question was passed in accordance with the provisions of the city charter, and the only trouble arises from the manner in which the burden [88] of payment was imposed on the property bordering on the improvement. Each subdivision of territory, bounded on all sides by principal streets, is ordinarily .deemed a square, and such is the provision of the city charter; still the territory between the streets may be of such dimensions, covering a large area, as would show not only the necessity but • the certainty that such an area must at some time be subdivided into squares for public convenience, and, therefore, the city council, in ordering the improvement, .will only extend the taxing district as far into the territory that is liable to this subdivision as that taxed on the-opposite side of the improvement, where the territory has" already been defined by squares surrounded by principal streets as contemplated by the charter. The charter provides that “when the territory contiguous to any public way is not defined into squares by principal streets, the ordinance providing for the improvement of such public way shall state the depths on both sides fronting said improvement to be assessed for the cost of making the same, according to the number of square feet owned by the parties, respectively, within the depth as set out in the ordinance.”

The improvement in this case was the construction-of a carriage way on Bank street thirty-six feet in width, from the centre of Twenty-fourth street to the east line of Twenty-sixth street. The work was completed by the appellee and accepted by the city.

The court below gave a judgment against the appellant for his proportion of the cost of the entire improvement, ascertaining the contract price, and making each property-holder pay to the extent of the-property owned that bordered on the improvement. This was error, if the appellant is right in his contention that the property taxed was included within squares as defined by the charter, and not susceptible of subdivision. Bank street is bounded on the-[89] north by Portland avenue; on the south by St. Xavier street; on the west by Twenty-fourth street, and on the east by Twenty-sixth street. Twenty-fifth street divides the territory between Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth, making two well-defined squares; and for a better illustration of the location of the property a diagram of the territory is hereto appended:

[90] It will be seen from this map that the territory between Bank street and Portland avenue, extending from Twenty-sixth street to Twenty-first street, embraces thirty-two acres of land, and this area being surrounded by principal streets, but not subdivided, the question presented is, does the charter in such a case determine the territory to be taxed and the mode of assessment after the passage of a valid ordinance ordering the improvement, or is the entire question left to the city council? When not defined into squares by principal streets, the charter requires that the ordinance providing for the improvement “shall state the depths on both sides fronting said improvement, to be assessed for the cost of making the same ■according to the number of square feet owned by the parties, respectively, within the depth as set out in the ordinance.”

The city council, regarding the territory north of Bank street, and between that street and Portland avenue, as not being within a square, fixed the depth ■on each side of the improvement to be assessed at a distance of two hundred and ten feet, thus taxing the area within the two defined squares bordering on the improvement, and south of Bank street, as directed or required by the charter, and running the same distance with the territory that had not been .subdivided by the extension of Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth streets. The distance from Bank street to Portland avenue is six hundred and forty feet, and the distance from Twenty-sixth street on the east to Twenty-first street on the west exceeds .two thousand feet; from Bank street south to St. [91] Xavier street is a distance of about four hundred and twenty feet, and this territory is divided by Twenty-fifth street, leaving a square between Twenty-fifth and Twenty-fourth streets on the west, and a square between Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth streets on the east, and these two squares bordering on Bank street, the contiguous area is assessed to the depth of two hundred and ten feet on each square. The appellant’s lot lies within the square between Twenty - fith and Twenty-sixth streets, and the testimony, uncontradicted, shows that the surface of the street bordering on his lot is almost level with the adjoining land, with scarcely any excavation or cut required, while on the square between Twenty-fourth and Twenty-fifth streets there is an average cut of three and one-half feet, or nearly so, and the cost of the excavation is fixed by the engineer at one thousand eight hundred dollars, when but little, if any, was required fronting the square where .appellant’s property is located ; still the latter was taxed to pay for this excavation, or the work done on a square entirely distinct from his lot. This mode of assessment could not have been contemplated by the charter in a case where the area on the one side of the improvement to be made is surrounded by principal streets, and a mere extension of intersecting streets from the opposite side, where the territory is already defined into squares, would produce that equality of burden sought to be obtained by the provisions of the charter. If, therefore, Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth and. Twenty-sixth streets are extended as the dotted lines on the map show, from Bank street to Portland avenue, you have [92] the territory that must be taxed in order to produce-equality in taxation, and at the same time carry out the plain meaning and spirit of the charter. The charter itself fixes the mode of assessment and the-extent of the area to be taxed in a case like this.

In Caldwell v. Rupert, 10 Bush, 179, the territory was so large and so located as to render it certain that a subdivision would subsequently be made, so-as to form squares approximating those already laid off in the city. In such a case the council is to determine the extent of the area to be taxed, having the same depth on each side of the improvement.

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Cooper v. Nevin, 13 S.W. 841, 90 Ky. 85, 1890 Ky. LEXIS 69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1890).

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