Cooper v. Dix

1989 OK 55, 771 P.2d 614, 1989 Okla. LEXIS 54, 1989 WL 33191
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedApril 7, 1989
Docket72750
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 1989 OK 55 (Cooper v. Dix) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cooper v. Dix, 1989 OK 55, 771 P.2d 614, 1989 Okla. LEXIS 54, 1989 WL 33191 (Okla. 1989).

Opinion

KAUGER, Justice.

This election dispute concerns whether 26 O.S.Supp. 1983 § 8-120 1 permits a “cross-petition” alleging irregularities to be filed at the time of an election contest hearing. We answer in the negative because § 8-120 is specifically applica *616 ble to petitions alleging election contest irregularities — it does not contain a provision for filing a “cross-petition”.

On January 24, 1989, an election was held for the Board of Education Office No. 4 of the Stigler School District. The only candidates were the petitioner, Martha Cooper, and the respondent, Sherman Dix. After the vote was counted, Dix received 618 votes and Cooper received 614 votes. Pursuant to 26 O.S. 1981 § 8-109, 2 Cooper filed a petition seeking a recount and a petition alleging irregularities in the election contest on January 27, 1989. On February 6, 1989, the trial court ordered a recount which was held in open court. The recount reflected 617 votes for Cooper and 613 votes for Dix. During the recount, Dix filed a cross-petition with the Election Board Secretary alleging irregularities in the election process. After the results were announced, and the cross-petition was presented, Cooper moved to dismiss her petition. The trial court took the motion to dismiss under advisement. On February 9, 1989, the court held that Cooper could not dismiss her claim, substituted Dix for Cooper as the contestant, and determined that the “cross-petition” was an amendment to the original petition. Thereafter the trial court heard evidence, it decided that a winner could not be determined with mathe-matieal certainty. On March 3, 1989, the petitioner requested we assume original jurisdiction and issue a writ of prohibition and mandamus. An order was issued on March 30, 1989 granting the writs and notifying the parties that a formal opinion would follow.

A CROSS-PETITION MAY NOT BE FILED AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION CONTEST HEARING IN THE ABSENCE OF ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD.

Cooper contends that the “cross-petition” was filed untimely. Although neither party alleged fraud, Dix argues that his counter claim should be handled according to 26 O.S. 1981 § 8-119, 3 the procedure for cross-petitions alleging fraud in election contests. His assertion is based on language from § 8-120 which provides that if the petition is filed in accordance with the statute, the trial court shall hear and determine the issue in the same manner as provided in § 8-119. 4 Title 26 O.S. 1981 § 8-120 states that after the petition is properly filed, the hearing procedures outlined in § 8-119 are to be followed, not the pleading procedures. The right to contest an election is a statutory right. 5 In Duggan v. Bailey, 317 P.2d 200, 202 (Okla.1957) *617 we held that the filing deadline is a limitation on the right itself and not merely a limitation upon the remedy. Courts do not have the power to hear contests untimely filed. 6 Thus, the trial court lacked the authority to hear the matters raised by the untimely cross-petition.

Title 26 O.S. 1981 § 8-119 is inapplicable. If the petitions asserting irregularities and fraud were to be treated the same, it was unnecessary and redundant for the Legislature to enact two separate statutes. The Legislature is never presumed to have done a vain and useless thing. 7 It is the duty of the court to give effect to legislative acts, and it may not ignore the plain words of a statute. 8 Because of its very nature, 9 actions involving fraud usually receive special procedural considerations. For example, statute of limitations do not begin to run until discovery of the fraud 10 and judgments may be modified or vacated if obtained by fraud. 11 In the absence of allegations of fraud, the Legislature did not intend to allow the filing of “cross-petitions” on the day of the election contest hearing.

CONCLUSION

As a matter of public policy, the Court usually indulges every presumption in favor of the validity of an election. 12 Where possible, the validity of an election will be sustained, and an election which is not clearly illegal will be upheld. 13 Generally, in the absence of fraud or corruption, and in the presence of merely statutory informalities, the results of the election will not be invalidated. 14 This rationale is premised on the interest the electorate has in having its votes count, and the expense involved in conducting a second election. 15

We find that the cross-petition was filed untimely. A writ of mandamus is issued ordering the trial court to certify the results of the recount as the official results of the election for the Board of Education and ordering the Haskell County Election Board to issue a Certificate of Election to Martha Cooper. A Writ of Prohibition is issued to prevent the Election Board from conducting a special election April 11, 1989. 16 The time for filing a petition for *618 rehearing in this cause is shortened to three days from the date of this opinion.

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ASSUMED; WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND WRIT OF PROHIBITION GRANTED.

HARGRAVE, C.J., and SIMMS, DOOLIN, WILSON and SUMMERS, JJ., concur. OPALA, V.C.J., and HODGES and LAVENDER, JJ., dissent.
1

. The procedure for petitions alleging irregularities, 26 O.S.Supp. 1983 § 8-120, provides:

“When a petition alleging irregularities other than fraud is filed, said petition must allege a sufficient number of irregularities and of such nature as to:
1. Prove that the contestant is lawfully entitled to be certified the party’s nominee or to be issued a certificate of election, or to have his name appear on the Runoff Primary Election ballot; or
2. Prove that it is impossible to determine with mathematical certainty which candidate is entitled to be certified as the party’s nominee or to be issued a certificate of election, or to have his name appear on the Runoff Primary Election ballot.
Additional irregularities may be presented at the hearing if not known to the contestant at the time the petition is filed.

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Bluebook (online)
1989 OK 55, 771 P.2d 614, 1989 Okla. LEXIS 54, 1989 WL 33191, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cooper-v-dix-okla-1989.