Cooper v. Department of Correction NYC

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedJuly 7, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-04885
StatusUnknown

This text of Cooper v. Department of Correction NYC (Cooper v. Department of Correction NYC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cooper v. Department of Correction NYC, (S.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK TYRONE COOPER, Plaintiff, -against- 23-CV-4885 (LTS) DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION NYC; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION AMKC; ORDER TO AMEND DEPARTMENT; DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION NYC HEADQUARTERS; NEW YORK CITY, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who is incarcerated at the Anna M. Kross Center (“AMKC”) on Rikers Island, filed this complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. By order dated June 12, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.1 The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint for the reasons set forth below. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this complaint naming as Defendants: (1) the City of New York; (2) the “Department of Correction NYC”; (3) the “Department of Correction AMKC”; and (4) the “Department of Correction NYC Headquarters.” Plaintiff alleges that AMKC correction officers have violated his rights with respect to the mental health care he has received; “blocked” his mail; “taken all evidence” and other property from him, and subjected him to retaliation and assault for assisting another detainee, Andre Antrobus, with his “legal work.” (ECF 1 ¶ III.) Plaintiff further alleges that Antrobus has had experiences similar to his. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks money damages. DISCUSSION A. Claims on behalf of Andre Antrobus The statutory provision governing appearances in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, allows two types of representation: “that by an attorney admitted to the practice of law by a

governmental regulatory body, and that by a person representing himself.” Eagle Assocs. v. Bank of Montreal, 926 F.2d 1305, 1308 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[B]ecause pro se means to appear for one’s self, a person may not appear on another person’s behalf in the other’s cause. A person must be litigating an interest personal to him.” Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2d Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that he is an attorney. He cannot, therefore, assert any claims on behalf of Antrobus, and the Court dismisses any claims Plaintiff asserts on behalf of that individual. B. Claims on Plaintiff’s own behalf Interference with mail The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as asserting a claim of mail tampering. To

state a claim based on general mail tampering, a plaintiff must allege that the incidents: (1) suggest an ongoing practice of censorship unjustified by a substantial government interest, or (2) have unjustifiably chilled the prisoner’s right of access to the court or impaired his legal representation. Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (relying on Heimerle v. Attorney General, 753 F.2d 10, 12–13 (2d Cir.1985)). “[A]n isolated incident of mail tampering is usually insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 351-52. But as few as two incidents of mail tampering may constitute a First Amendment violation if indicative of “regular” and “unjustifiable” interference with a prisoner’s mail. Id. at 351; see Washington v. James, 782 F.2d 1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1986). Plaintiff does not allege enough facts to suggest that Defendants interfered with his mail in a manner that rises to the level of a constitutional violation. He does not state that Defendants

subjected him to regular and unjustifiable interference with his mail or that any inference affected his ability to access the courts or impaired his legal representation. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint to provide facts in support of this claim. Property claim A claim for deprivation of property is not recognized in federal court if the state courts provide a remedy for the deprivation of that property. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Marino v. Ameruso, 837 F.2d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

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Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Hudson v. Palmer
468 U.S. 517 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Heimerle v. Attorney General
753 F.2d 10 (Second Circuit, 1985)
Salahuddin v. Cuomo
861 F.2d 40 (Second Circuit, 1988)
Eagle Associates v. Bank of Montreal
926 F.2d 1305 (Second Circuit, 1991)
Hill v. Curcione
657 F.3d 116 (Second Circuit, 2011)
Davis v. Goord
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Jenkins v. City Of New York
478 F.3d 76 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)

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Cooper v. Department of Correction NYC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cooper-v-department-of-correction-nyc-nysd-2023.