Coon, et al. v. Springfield, et al.

2000 DNH 035

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: February 8, 2000
• Docket: CV-99-369-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Coon, et a l . v. Springfield, et a l . CV-99-369-M 02/08/00 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Donald J. Coon, et al.. Plaintiffs

v. Civil No. 99-369-M Opinion No. 2000 DNH 035 Town of Springfield, Vermont, et a l ., Defendants

O R D E R

Plaintiffs bring this action seeking damages for alleged

violations of their civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Their

complaint also arguably sets forth various state law causes of

action. Defendants move to dismiss, claiming that the court

lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Plaintiffs object.

Discussion

Pro se plaintiff Donald Coon and the family members he seeks

to represent in this action appear to have been residents of

Vermont during most, if not all, of the period of time during

which the events forming the basis of their complaint occurred. At some subsequent point, however, it appears that they lost

their apartment and then lived in several different New Hampshire

communities. The record suggests that they now live in

Claremont, New Hampshire. Consequently, it appears that subject

matter jurisdiction over their federal claims is premised on

federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331), while subject

matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state law claims is based

upon diversity of citizenship (28 U.S.C. § 1332) or supplemental

jurisdiction.

The substance of plaintiffs' complaint appears to focus on

an allegedly illegal drug investigation in which Coon was a

suspect. He says that on numerous occasions during his residency

in Springfield and elsewhere, he was subjected to police

harassment, unlawful searches and seizures, wrongful prosecution,

and various other injuries. The details of plaintiffs' claims

are set forth with greater particularity in the Report and

Recommendation submitted by the Magistrate Judge on December 21,

1999 (document no. 9).

2 Defendants claim that they lack sufficient "minimum

contacts" with New Hampshire for this court to exercise personal

jurisdiction over them. In fact, they say that the record is

devoid of any evidence that they have had any contacts whatsoever

with this forum. Unfortunately, defendants' motion to dismiss

(and the precedent upon which they rely) focuses exclusively on

the issue of personal jurisdiction over defendants in diversity

cases. This is a federal question case and the scope of this

court's personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in a

federal question case is not addressed. See, e.g.. United

Electrical Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d 1080,

1085 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Inasmuch as the federalism concerns which

hover over the jurisdictional equation in a diversity case are

absent in a federal question case, a federal court's power to

assert personal jurisdiction is geographically expanded. In such

circumstances, the Constitution requires only that the defendant

have the requisite ''minimum contacts' with the United States,

rather than with the particular forum state (as would be required

in a diversity case) .") .

3 So, defendants' motion is not well grounded. What is clear

from the record, however, is that all (or certainly the vast

majority) of the relevant events underlying plaintiffs' causes of

action occurred in the District of Vermont. Similarly, all of

the defendants and most of the witnesses likely to be called at

trial reside in Vermont. Even plaintiffs live closer to Vermont

than the courthouse in Concord, and it will no doubt be easier

for them to proceed in Vermont. Accordingly, it would appear

that the most appropriate venue for plaintiffs' claims is in that

district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) ("A civil action wherein

jurisdiction is not founded solely on diversity of citizenship

may . . . be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any

defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events

or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . ..").

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion to dismiss for

lack of personal jurisdiction (document no. 17) is denied.

4 Nevertheless, in the interest of justice and for the convenience

of the parties and witnesses, this matter shall be transferred to

the United States District Court for the District of Vermont,

unless, within 30 days of the date of this order either party

shows sufficient cause why it should not be transferred. See 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses,

in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any

civil action to any other district or division where it might

have been brought."); F.A.I. Electronics Corp. v. Chambers, 944

F.Supp. 77, 80-81 (D.Mass. 1996) (holding that although no single

factor is dispositive, a court should consider: "(1) the

convenience of the parties, (2) the convenience of the witnesses,

(3) the relative ease of access to sources of proof, (4) the

availability of process to compel attendance of unwilling

witnesses, (5) [the] cost of obtaining willing witnesses, and (6)

any practical problems associated with trying the case most

expeditiously and inexpensively.") (citation omitted).

5 The Clerk of Court shall take the steps necessary and

appropriate to transfer this matter to the United States District

Court for the District of Vermont.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge February 8, 2000

cc: Donald J. Coon John P. Sherman, Esq. James C. Wheat, Esq.