Cooke v. Graham's Administrator.
Opinion
3 Cranch 229
2 L.Ed. 420
COOKE
v.
GRAHAM'S ADMINISTRATOR.*
February Term, 1805
ERROR to the circuit court of the district of Columbia, sitting at Alexandria.
The declaration was in debt on a bond dated the 3d of October, 1799, in the penalty of 5,000 dollars. On oyer, the bond appeared to be dated the 3d of January, 1799, and the condition was as follows: 'Whereas, the said Stephen Cooke did lend to Josiah Watson, of the town of Alexandria, twenty-five hundred dollars of the said William Graham's money; and the said Josiah Watson having failed, but before he failed paid five hundred dollars; and whereas, the said Stephen Cooke hath instituted a suit against the said Josiah Watson, for the recovery of the said money—Now the condition of the above obligation is such, that if the said Stephen Cooke shall well and truly pay the whole sum so lent, if it can be recovered from the said Josiah Watson, or his indorsor; or in case it cannot be wholly recovered, will lose the one half of that sum which cannot be recovered, then the above obligation shall be void, otherwise to remain in full force and virtue.'
After oyer granted, the defendant had leave to imparle, but not pleading at the rule day, judgment was rendered at the rules for want of a plea.
At the next term, the defendant set aside the office-judgment, by demurring generally to the declaration, which demurrer was joined by the plaintiff.
Afterwards, on motion, the defendant had leave to withdraw his demurrer, and pleaded general performance of the condition of the bond. To which the plaintiff replied, and assigned a breach in this, that the defendant has not paid the sum of money mentioned in the condition, or any part thereof. The defendant rejoined, that the sum of money in the condition mentioned, lent by him to Watson, could not be recovered from the latter, or his indorsor.
To this rejoinder the plaintiff demurred specially; 1st. Because the defendant doth not state, in his rejoinder, that he used all legal means for the recovery of the said 2,500 dollars of Watson, and his indorsor.
2d. Because the defendant does not state that he has not recovered any part of the said 2,500 dollars of the said Watson, or his indorsor, or how much of the 2,500 dollars remains unrecovered of the said Watson, or his indorsor.
3d. Because the defendant is bound to pay one half of the sum that is not recovered of the said Watson, or his indorsor; and if the defendant has not received any part of the 2,500 dollars of the said Watson, or his indorsor, then he is bound, by the condition of the said bond, to pay one half of the sum of 2,500 dollars to the plaintiff.
4th. Because the defendant does not give any answer as to the sum of 500 dollars, stated in the condition of the said bond to have been received by him of the said Watson, before the execution of the said bond.
5th. Because the rejoinder is a departure from the plea of conditions performed.
Upon this demurrer, the judgment of the court being in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant, upon motion, had leave to file an additional plea, whereupon he pleaded, that the whole sum lent to Watson could not be recovered of him or his indorsor, nor could any part thereof be recovered, except the sum of 500 dollars, mentioned in the condition of the bond; by means whereof the defendant became liable and bound to pay to the plaintiff only one half of the said sum which could not be so recovered, and that the defendant paid to the plaintiff's intestate the said one half of the said sum of money which he was liable and bound to pay as aforesaid. To which plea there was a general replication and issue, and verdict for the plaintiff for 2,032 dollars and 75 cents.
On the trial of this issue a bill of exceptions was taken by the defendant below to the opinion of the court, that the plaintiff was entitled, by the said bond, to recover of the defendant the sum of 500 dollars at all events; and that he was also thereby entitled to recover of the defendant the residue of the said 2,500 dollars, if the jury should be of opinion that the defendant could have recovered the same of the said Watson, or his indorsor. And if they should be of opinion that no part of the said residue could have been so recovered, then the plaintiff is thereby entitled to recover of the defendant one half of the said residue, in addition to the said sum of 500 dollars.
Other exceptions were taken at the trial, but were abandoned by the plaintiff in error in this court.
Simms, for plaintiff in error, contended,
1st. That the judgment of the court below, upon the demurrer, ought to have been for the defendant, inasmuch as there was a material variance between the bond produced on oyer, and that stated in the declaration; the former bearing date on the 3d day of January, 1799, and the latter being alleged to bear date on the 3d day of October, in the same year.
2d. That the court erred in their construction of the condition of the bond, in supposing that the sum of 500 dollars, mentioned to have been received from Watson, was covered by the penalty, and in instructing the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to recover that sum at all events; and, in addition thereto, a moiety of the balance, if the whole balance could not be recovered by the defendant of Watson, or his indorsor.
1st. On a demurrer, the court must go to the first error in the pleadings. In this case, although the rejoinder is bad, yet the declaration is bad also. If the plaintiff declares on a bond of different date from that produced on oyer, advantage may be taken of the variance on demurrer. The plaintiff need not wait till it is produced in evidence. The variance may also be pleaded in abatement. 2 Salk. 658, Holman v. Borough. In the case of Hole v. Finch, 2 Wils. 394, the court said, 'that formerly, when the whole original writ was spread in the same roll with the court thereupon, if a variance appeared between the writ and count, the defendant might have taken advantage thereof, either by motion in arrest of judgment, writ of error, plea in abatement, or demurrer. But afterwards it was determined, that if the defendant will take advantage of a variance between the writ and count, he must demand oyer of the writ, and show it to the court. By the act of jeofails of Virginia, Revised Code, p. 118, § 26, no judgment after verdict shall be staid for the omission of the day, month or year, in the declaration or pleading, (the name, sum, quantity or time, being right in any part of the record or proceeding.) This shows, that before that act, such omission might have been taken advantage of by motion in arrest of judgment.
WASHINGTON, J. Will the principle of going up to the first error, apply to a special demurrer by the adverse party?
Simms. Certainly.
MARSHALL, Ch. J. Can the variance be taken advantage of on a general demurrer?
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