Cooke v. Berryhill

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedJuly 29, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-00004
StatusUnknown

This text of Cooke v. Berryhill (Cooke v. Berryhill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cooke v. Berryhill, (W.D. Va. 2020).

Opinion

FIONR T THHEE U WNIETSETDE RSTNA DTIESST RDIICSTTR OIFC TV ICROGUINRITA BIG STONE GAP DIVISION

FERLIN L. COOKE, ) Plaintiff ) ) Civil Action No. 2:19cv00004 v. ) ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ANDREW SAUL,1 ) Commissioner of Social Security, ) By: PAMELA MEADE SARGENT Defendant ) United States Magistrate Judge

I. Background and Standard of Review

Plaintiff, Ferlin L. Cooke, (“Cooke”), filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, (“Commissioner”), denying his claim for disability insurance benefits, (“DIB”), under the Social Security Act, as amended, (“Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 423 et seq. Jurisdiction of this court is pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This case is before the undersigned magistrate judge by transfer by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). Neither party has requested oral argument; therefore, this case is ripe for decision.

The court’s review in this case is limited to determining if the factual findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and were reached through application of the correct legal standards. See Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence has been defined as “evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but may

1 Andrew Saul became the Commissioner of Social Security on June 17, 2019; therefore, he is automatically substituted as the defendant in this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 25(d). be somewhat less than a preponderance.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966). ‘“If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is “‘substantial evidence.’”” Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Laws, 368 F.2d at 642).

The record shows that Cooke protectively filed his application for DIB on June 17, 2015, alleging disability as of March 14, 2015, based on back, neck and bilateral knee, shoulder and hand problems; tension headaches; scoliosis and herniated discs; balance problems; bone spurs in the back; high cholesterol; anxiety attacks; depression; and bipolar disorder. (Record, (“R.”), at 12, 166-67, 187, 206, 216.) The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. at 81-83, 87-89, 93-96, 98-100.) Cooke then requested a hearing before an administrative law judge, (“ALJ”). (R. at 101-02.) The ALJ held a hearing on January 17, 2018, at which Cooke was represented by counsel. (R. at 28-53.)

By decision dated April 9, 2018, the ALJ denied Cooke’s claim. (R. at 12- 22.) The ALJ found that Cooke met the nondisability insured status requirements of the Act for DIB purposes through December 31, 2020. (R. at 14.) The ALJ found that Cooke had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 14, 2015, the alleged onset date.2 (R. at 14.) The ALJ determined that Cooke had severe impairments, namely degenerative disc disease and spine disorder, but he found that Cooke did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 14-16.) The ALJ found that Cooke had the residual functional capacity to perform light3 work that required no more than frequent

2 Therefore, Cooke must show that he was disabled between March 14, 2015, the alleged onset date, and April 9, 2018, the date of the ALJ’s decision, in order to be eligible for benefits.

3 Light work involves lifting items weighing up to 20 pounds at a time with frequent balancing and that required no more than occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling and climbing. (R. at 16.) The ALJ found that Cooke was unable to perform his past relevant work. (R. at 20.) Based on Cooke’s age, education, work history and residual functional capacity and the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that a significant number of jobs existed in the national economy that Cooke could perform, including the jobs of a routing clerk, a photocopy machine operator and a product assembler. (R. at 21-22.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that Cooke was not under a disability as defined by the Act and was not eligible for DIB benefits. (R. at 22.) See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g) (2019).

After the ALJ issued his decision, Cooke pursued his administrative appeals, (R. at 160, 248-51), but the Appeals Council denied his request for review. (R. at 1- 5.) Cooke then filed this action seeking review of the ALJ’s unfavorable decision, which now stands as the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.981 (2019). This case is before this court on Cooke’s motion for summary judgment filed July 3, 2019, and the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment filed August 26, 2019.

II. Facts4

Cooke was born in 1963, (R. at 31, 166), which, at the time of the ALJ’s decision, classified him as a “person closely approaching advanced age” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(d). He has an eleventh-grade education and past work experience as a truck driver and a front-end loader operator. (R. at 32, 48, 188-89.)

lifting or carrying of items weighing up to 10 pounds. If someone can perform light work, he also can perform sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (2019).

4 Based on the court’s findings regarding Cooke’s argument that the ALJ erred by failing to find that he suffered from a severe mental impairment, the court will focus on the facts related to Cooke’s mental impairments and accompanying limitations. Cooke stated that he stayed depressed, that he was easily aggravated and that he had difficulty being around crowds. (R. at 44.) He stated that he was being treated for depression by Dr. Uzma Ehtesham, but he stopped seeing her because he did not feel comfortable talking to her about his problems. (R. at 44.) Cooke stated that his medications made him drowsy and made it difficult for him to stay focused. (R. at 46.)

David Vandergoot, a vocational expert, also was present and testified at Cooke’s hearing. (R. at 47-51, 237.) Vandergoot testified that a hypothetical individual of Cooke’s age, education and work history, who had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, who could occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl and frequently balance, could not perform Cooke’s past work. (R. at 49.) He stated that such an individual could perform work that existed in significant numbers, including jobs as a routing clerk, a photocopy machine operator and a production assembler. (R. at 49.) Vandergoot then was asked to consider the same hypothetical individual, but who would be limited to sedentary5 work and who would be absent from work more than twice a month. (R.

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Cooke v. Berryhill, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cooke-v-berryhill-vawd-2020.