NEWMAN, Chief Judge:
Appellants sought to have an initiative placed on the ballot, pursuant to the Initiative, Referendum and Recall Charter Amendments Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-46, codified at D.C. Code 1979 Supp., §§ 1-181 to -195 (hereinafter, the Charter Amendments Act), which would prohibit the Mayor and the District of Columbia Council (the Council) from providing any further public funds or incurring any debt for the completion of the Washington Convention Center.1 The Board of Elections and Ethics (the Board) refused to place the proposed initiative on the ballot on two separate occasions, stating that it was an inappropriate subject for the initiative. Appellants challenged both decisions of the Board in the Superior Court, where summary judgment was awarded in favor of the appellees. Appellants’ motions for summary judgment and a preliminary injunction were denied.
Appellants bring these consolidated appeals. While numerous issues have been presented for our consideration, we need only decide whether the petition here in question presents on the one hand, a legislative matter, or on the other hand, an executive or administrative matter; and, if an executive or administrative matter is presented, whether this is a “proper subject for initiative ... under the terms of title IV of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Pub.L.No. 93-198), as amended ... ”, Initiative, Referendum and Recall Procedures Act of 1979, D.C. Act 3-18, 25 D.C. Reg. 9454, 9467 (April 20, 1979), D.C. Law 3-1, 25 D.C. Reg.' 10874 (June 22, 1979), amending D.C. Code 1973 and 1978 Supp., §§ 1-1102 et seq. (hereinafter, the Initiative Procedures Act).
In Part I of this opinion we set forth a detailed recitation of the facts and history of these proceedings. In Part II, we discuss the general rule that initiative and referendum provisions are only applicable to acts which are legislative in character, and not to those dealing with executive or administrative matters. In Part III, we analyze the structure of the District government as consisting of three separate, and equal, coordinate branches, each of which has been vested with certain exclusive powers by Act of Congress; find that the power of the electorate through the initiative is coextensive with the legislative, or lawmaking power of the Council; and examine the particularized meaning of the language of the proposed initiative. We conclude that the Board properly rejected appellants’ petition as being an improper subject for the initiative, since it presents a matter exclusively of an executive/administrative nature, which under the Charter is the exclusive province of the Mayor. We affirm.
I
The Charter Amendments Act became law on March 10, 1978. The right of initiative, however, was not to be made available until the Council adopted implementing legislation; the Council was directed to complete such legislation by September 6, 1978.
The Council failed to meet the statutory deadline and, when implementing legislation still had not been adopted by October of 1978, the proposed initiative here in question was circulated to the voters in petition form by appellants, the Convention Center Referendum Committee (CCRC). Appel[873]*873lants filed suit in the Superior Court in December 1978, seeking a declaration that the Charter Amendments were self-executing. On February 28, 1979, this court, in Convention Center Referendum Committee v. Board of Elections and Ethics, D.C.App., 399 A.2d 550 (1979), held that the Charter Amendments were not self-executing.
Shortly thereafter, the Council adopted the requisite implementing legislation and, on June 7, 1979, the Initiative Procedures Act came into effect. Three amendments had been made to the original language of the bill. The amendment of particular concern in the case sub judice, the so-called “Dixon” Amendment, provided that the Board must refuse to accept any petition that was not a “proper subject for initiative ... under title IV of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (Pub.L.No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973)), codified at D.C. Code 1978 Supp., §§ 1-121 to -171 [the Self-Government, or Home Rule, Act]” or that would “negate or limit an act of the Council ... pursuant to § 446 of [the Self-Government Act],”2 Initiative Procedures Act, § 16(k)(7), at 25 D.C. Reg. 9467, 9468 (April 20, 1979), codified at D.C. Code 1980 Supp., § 1 — 1116(k)(7).
Appellants submitted their proposed Convention Center Initiative to the Board on June 13,1979. On July 11, 1979, the Board rejected the petition on the grounds that was an improper subject for the initiative within the terms of the Initiative Procedures Act, § 16(k). Appellants brought suit challenging the decision of the Board. The primary argument concerned the validity of the “Dixon” Amendment. They recognized that Congress had previously appropriated the first $27 million for the Convention Center. D.C. Appropriations Act for FY 1978, Pub.L. 95-288,92 Stat. 281 (1978), and that the proposed initiative, which sought to prohibit the District from using those funds, was prohibited by the “Dixon” Amendment. However, appellants argued that the “Dixon” Amendment, being mere ordinary legislation, had improperly abrogated rights granted by the Charter Amendments Act. In particular, they contended that, whereas the Charter Amendments withheld use of the initiative with respect to the positive act of “appropriating” funds, it granted the right of initiative with respect to proposals that would bar or limit the expenditure of previously appropriated funds. Appellees, on the other hand, contended that § 16(k)(7) was simply a proper clarification of the meaning of the Charter Amendment.
On July 31, 1979, the trial court, after hearing oral argument rendered its opinion in Convention Center Referendum Committee v. The Board of Elections and Ethics and The District of Columbia, D.C.Super.Ct. (Civ. No. 8368-79, July 31,1979) (Ugast, J.). Judge Ugast granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment, while rejecting appellants’ contention that the “Dixon” Amendment was invalid. He noted that, while the definition of “initiative” in the Charter Amendment itself did not explicitly preclude proposals seeking to prohibit the expenditure of funds presently appropriated for capital projects, such an exception was implicit in the structure of the Charter Amendments as a whole. The court stated that the initial Convention Center appropriation request could have been blocked earlier through use of the referendum, which would have suspended the District’s budget request before Congress had appropriated the money. Once Congress had acted by authorizing the first installment of funds, the court reasoned, the electorate could no longer use the initiative to stop the District from spending the appropriated monies. The court did suggest, in dictum, that an initiative which sought to prevent the Council from making future appropriations requests might be valid.
Relying on this dictum, appellants made a third submission to the Board, in which they asked that their initiative petition be [874]*874construed so as only to bar the Council from making future appropriations requests for the Convention Center. On August 3,1979, the CCRC filed a third suit in the Superior Court, seeking a declaration that their new submission was a proper subject for the initiative, and also seeking a preliminary injunction ordering the Board to immediately begin verifying their petition in order to qualify for the November 6 election. The Board, on August 6, rejected appellants’ request that their petition, in its slightly revised form, be interpreted in a manner consistent with the dictum contained in the July 31 opinion of Judge Ugast.
The trial court held a hearing that same afternoon, and rejected the request for a preliminary injunction in Convention Center Referendum v. Board of Elections and Ethics, D.C.Super.Ct. (Civ.No. 9875-79, August 6, 1979) (Ugast, J.) holding that the petition, on its face, sought to prohibit the city from further expending or in any way obligating funds for the Convention Center and that such a broad initiative conflicted with the Charter Amendments Act. These appeals followed.
II
“Although initiative and referendum provisions widely differ in their terminology, it is the general rule that they are applicable only to acts which are legislative in character, and not to those dealing with administrative or executive matters.” Seaton v. Lackey, 298 Ky. 188, 192, 182 S.W.2d 336, 338 (1944); Whitehead v. H and C Development Corp., 204 Va. 144, 129 S.E.2d 691 (1963). See also Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 104 Cal.Rptr. 793 (1972) (city council’s decision to own and operate a golf course was a legislative, not an administrative, decision and therefore was subject to the initiative); Cuprowski v. City of Jersey City, 101 N.J.Super. 15, 23, 242 A.2d 873, 877, aff’d, 103 N.J.Super. 217, 247 A.2d 28 (1968) (“An act purely executive or administrative in character is not an exercise of legislative power and therefore is not subject to recall by referendum.”) (proposed referendum, if passed, would have repealed the city’s budget for fiscal year 1968); Denman v. Quin, 116 S.W.2d 783, 786 (Tex.Civ.App.1938) (“It is obvious that ordinances intended by the electorate to be subject to referendum are those which are legislative in character, as distinguished from those of an administrative or executive nature ....”) (proposed referendum, if passed, would have negated act of San Antonio’s Board of City Commissioners levying an ad valorem property tax). “While an administrative decision is not subject to reversal by the initiative (or referendum), the people nevertheless have the right to propose legislation amending or repealing the previously established legislative policy, the same as the council can do if it so desires.” Duran v. Cassidy, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d at 582, 104 Cal.Rptr. at 799.
“The test of what is a legislative and what is an administrative proposition, with respect to the initiative or referendum, has . .. been said to be whether the proposition is one to make new law or to execute law already in existence. The power to be exercised is legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself, or some power superior to it.” 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 16.55, at 213-14 (3d rev. ed. 1969) (footnotes omitted); Monahan v. Funk, 137 Or. 580, 3 P.2d 778 (1931). “Acts which are classified as administrative are those which result from governmental powers properly assigned to the executive department and necessary to carry out legislative policies and purposes already declared either by the legislative municipal body or devolved upon it by the law of the state.” Cuprowski v. City of Jersey City, supra, 101 N.J.Super. at 23, 242 A.2d at 877 (citations omitted). “[T]he true distinction is between a delegation of power to make the law which involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and pursuant to the law.” People v. City of Centralia, 1 Ill.App.2d 228, 235, 117 N.E.2d 410, 413 (1953); citing People ex rel. [875]*875Board of Education v. Board of Education, 380 Ill. 311, 318, 43 N.E.2d 1012, 1015-16 (1942). See Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal.2d 125, 222 P.2d 225 (1950) (en banc); State ex rel. Frank v. Salome, 167 Kan. 766, 208 P.2d 198 (1949); Monahan v. Funk, supra; Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wash.2d 820, 505 P.2d 447 (1973) (en banc).
The clear pattern that emerges from the case law is that, where an entity entrusted with executive and/or administrative functions merely seeks to carry out a previously adopted legislative policy, it is improper to submit its purely administrative decisions to the electorate for their approval vis-a-vis the initiative or referendum. This has been particularly the case when the local administrative entity seeks to carry out responsibilities delegated to it by higher, or superi- or, authority, such as the state. People v. City of Centralia, supra; Rauh v. City of Hutchinson, 223 Kan. 514, 575 P.2d 517 (1978); Seaton v. Lackey, supra. See also Mueller v. Brown, 221 Cal.App.2d 319, 34 Cal.Rptr. 474 (1963); People ex rel. Board of Education v. Board of Education, supra; State v. Butler, 145 Neb. 638, 17 N.W.2d 683 (1945); Hughes v. Bryan, 425 P.2d 952 (Okl.1967); Amalgamated Transit Union-Div. 757 v. Yerkovich, 24 Or.App. 221, 545 P.2d 1401 (1976).
The rule that only legislative, as opposed to executive/administrative, decisions are subject to the initiative and referendum has generally been justified both by the requirements of the efficient administration of government, and by the separation of powers doctrine. “A charter giving a small group of electors the right to demand a vote of the people upon every administrative act of the city council would place municipal government in a straight jacket and make it impossible for the city’s officers to carry on the public business.” Housing Authority v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.2d 550, 559, 219 P.2d 457, 461 (1950) (en banc) (proposed referendum on city council’s approval of Housing Authority’s application for federal loan for low rent housing construction, held: actions of local governing bodies under statewide housing laws are only administrative). “To permit a referendum on each of the various steps in carrying out a definite mandate of the voters to secure a site and build a city auditorium would delay executive conduct of the council and defeat the prompt and successful completion of the city auditorium .... ” State ex rel. Ballantyne v. Leeman, 149 Neb. 847, 858, 32 N.W.2d 918, 923 (1948) (after charter amendment, authorizing issuance of municipal bonds to acquire land and construct a municipal auditorium, was adopted, a second ordinance passed pursuant thereto was held to be merely an executive act and therefore not subject to referendum). While a proposed initiative, unlike a referendum, does not immediately suspend an act of the Council until such time as the voters have passed on it, see D.C. Code 1979 Supp., § 1-181, it does effectively leave the execution and administration of a given legislative policy in doubt pending the outcome of the vote. Therefore, the same rationale that serves to bar administrative and executive actions from being subject to the referendum also has been applied to bar them from being subject to the initiative: an initiative on executive action would seriously encumber, if not paralyze, the execution of a previously-approved policy or program, without ever actually addressing the merits of the program itself. See Simpson v. Hite, supra (applying the rationale of Housing Authority v. Superior Court to proposed initiative that sought the repeal of a Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors resolution designating the site for a new courthouse, a declaration that the acquired site would be put to a different use, and a designation of a different site for the courts, held: the Board was merely acting in an administrative capacity in carrying out previously annunciated legislative policy).
More importantly, where, as in the District of Columbia, a system of government vesting the executive/administrative, legislative, and judicial functions in separate entities has been established, non-legislative matters cannot properly be submitted for the initiative without violating the sanctity of that division of responsibility. In Paget [876]*876v. Logan, 78 Wash.2d 349, 474 P.2d 247 (1970) (en banc) the court, in discussing whether a matter was legislative or administrative in nature, confronted the issue of what impact the separation of governmental powers, as established by a home rule charter much like that of the District of Columbia, had on the propriety of the initiative there in question, and said:
Further emphasizing our view in the instant case is the intervention of King County’s home rule charter which, by its terms, precisely divides legislative and administrative functions between the county council and the executive office of the form of county government it adopts.... [T]he charter denominates the county council as the policy determining body of the county and expressly vests it with all of the legislative powers of the county under the charter. [It] describes the elective county executive as the chief executive officer, and vests him with all of the executive powers of the county not expressly vested in the administrative officers under the charter. With the specific and traditional division of legislative and executive functions, it would be anomalous, indeed, to conclude that in accepting, rejecting or deciding between [the proposed domed stadium] site findings and recommendations submitted by the stadium commission pursuant to [the statute], the county council would be performing anything other than a legislative function. [Id. at 358, 474 P.2d at 252 (where proposed initiative would prohibit location of multipurpose domed stadium at a. specific site, held: as site selection is within the legislative power of the council, it was proper subject for the initiative).]
See also People ex rel. Board of Education v. Board of Education, supra, 380 Ill. at 315, 43 N.E.2d at 1014. Similarly, in the seminal case of Dooling v. City Council of Fitchburg, 242 Mass. 599, 136 N.E. 616 (1922), the court reasoned that:
It is manifest that these words [ordinance, resolution, order, vote] ... are necessarily limited to subjects vested by law in the city council. It cannot have been the purpose of the general court to require or to permit the referendum or the initiative .. . [on] subjects wholly outside the field of authorized actions by the city council. [Id. at 601, 136 N.E. at 616.]
Clearly, then, the power of the electorate to propose laws through the initiative is co-extensive with the power of the legislative branch of government to pass legislative acts, ordinances, and resolutions, and to make policy decisions, but does not extend to executive/administrative functions. “[T]he power of the electorate to enact legislation by use of the initiative process is circumscribed by the same limitations as the legislative powers resting in the legislative body concerned.” Mueller v. Brown, supra, 221 Cal.App.2d at 324, 34 Cal.Rptr. at 477 (citations omitted).
In those jurisdictions where the general electorate has retained the right of initiative and referendum, courts have repeatedly faced the need to distinguish between executive/administrative and legislative acts in deciding whether a proposal was a proper matter for the ballot. So, for example, city budgets “[have] been uniformly held to be administrative.” Cuprowski v. City of Jersey City, supra, 101 N.J.Super. at 25, 242 A.2d at 878; State ex rel. Keefe v. St. Petersburg, 106 Fla. 742, 144 So. 313, 144 So. 671, 145 So. 175 (1933) (en banc); Denman v. Quin, supra; Keigley v. Bench, 97 Utah 69, 89 P.2d 480 (1939). In Ruano v. Spellman, supra, a proposed initiative which would have prohibited the spending of any more funds for the completion of a multipurpose stadium, where previously the stadium had been approved by popular vote, a site had been acquired, contracts had been let, and bonds had been issued, was held to address only the remaining administrative functions. “No new law would be involved in expending funds for those [previously] declared purposes.” Id. 81 Wash.2d at 824, 505 P.2d at 450. However, in Paget v. Logan, supra, where a proposed initiative which would have prohibited the location of a multipurpose domed stadium at a specific site was held to be properly concerned with [877]*877a legislative matter, the selected site had not yet been acquired nor had any construction contracts been let.3
Ill
In the District of Columbia, provision for the initiative is contained in D.C. Code 1979 Supp., §§ 1-181 to -187. Section l-181(a) states:
The term “initiative” means the process by which the electors of the District of Columbia may propose laws (except laws appropriating funds) and present such proposed laws directly to the registered qualified electors of the District of Columbia for their approval or disapproval.
As was stated in Part II of this opinion, the general rule is that the power of the electorate to act through the initiative is co-extensive with the power of the Council, the legislative branch of government, to make legislative and policy decisions; this is also the rule in the District of Columbia.4 [878]*878We must therefore consider exactly what are the parameters of the Council’s power and authority to pass “acts”, for this will also tell us what the parameters are of the electorate’s authority to propose “laws” under § l-181(a).
Title IV of the Self-Government Act provides the basis for all governmental authority in the District. It establishes a tripartite system of government with co-equal, coordinate branches. The legislative power is vested in the Council, D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § l-144(a); the executive power is vested in the Mayor, D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-162; and the judicial power is vested in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court, Self-Government Act, § 431.
The legislative history of the Self-Government Act makes it clear that Congress intended to establish a traditional doctrine of separation of powers for the government of the District. The structure of the home rule government was delineated in H.R.Rep.No. 482, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) and in S.Rep.No. 219, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). In the Senate Report, it was stated that:
The District Council would be endowed with local legislative power in addition to that heretofore delegated by Congress .... [Id. at 4.] The mayor and council would take over the functions of the present Commissioner and nonelected Council .... [Id.]
The functions of the Commissioner and the non-elected Council that were to be transferred to the new, elected entities, were described at page three of the same Report:
The basic change embodied in [Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967] was to place the executive responsibility for the City in a single, Presidentially appointed, Commissioner-Mayor, and to set up a Council ... to perform the more than 430 quasi-legislative functions which had been delegated by Congress to the District Government.
The counterpart House Report similarly made explicit the fact that the legislative power was to be vested in the Council, the executive power in the Mayor, and the judicial power in the District of Columbia, Court of Appeals and Superior Court. H.R. Rep.No. 482, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973). This separation of powers concept was reiterated by Senator Mathias, the ranking Republican member of the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, during Senate floor debate on the Act, S. 1435, at 119 Cong.Rec. 22949 (1973): “The task before us today is to enact legislation that will assign to the elected Mayor and Council substantial administrative and legislative authority, respectively.”
It is clear, therefore, that the system of government established by Congress for the District vests the legislative authority exclusively in the Council, while separately vesting exclusive executive authority in the Mayor. Accordingly, the power of the initiative, being essentially co-extensive with the power of the lawmaking body to make legislative and policy decisions, would not extend to matters purely executive or administrative in nature without violating the separation of powers established by Congress.
The sole issue before us, then, is whether the petition here in question presents primarily a legislative matter, or whether it is primarily concerned with the administrative and executive functions of the Mayor. In addressing this question we must remember that each proposed initiative or referendum, by its very terms, presents a unique problem of interpretation. “So variant are the conditions under which the question arises that each case must be settled on the facts of that particular case.” Whitehead v. H and C Development Corp., supra 204 Va. at 150, 129 S.E.2d at 695. Furthermore, in interpreting the nature of a proposed initiative, we must be guided by the knowledge that “[t]he average voter would take the proposed ordinance at face value, indeed, he is entitled to rely on the measure as worded.” Mueller v. Brown, supra 221 Cal.App.2d at 325; 34 Cal.Rptr. at 477.
The proposed initiative circulated to the electorate of the District of Columbia read as follows:
[879]*879The Mayor and the Council of the District of Columbia shall not provide any further tax revenues or any other consideration from public funds, the federal payment, incur any debt or provide public property, after the effective date of this law, to purchase land, construct and/or operate a convention/civic center.
This statement was a summary of the actual proposed bill submitted to the Board of Elections and Ethics, which contained additional details directing the Mayor and City Council to end any commitments for the convention center. As presented, the initiative explicitly addresses the provision and spending of public funds by the Mayor and City Council.5
To begin with, neither the Mayor nor the Council “provide” public funds or other monies in the sense of “appropriating” them. That function was expressly reserved by Congress to itself in §§ 446 and 603 of the Self-Government Act; Congress each year enacts a budget appropriation measure for the District for the next fiscal year, after the Mayor and Council have presented a budget request. See, in particular, D.C. Code 1978 Supp., § 47-224 (“No amount may be obligated or expended by any officer or employee of the District of Columbia government unless such amount has been approved by Act of Congress, and then only according to such Act.” (emphasis added)).
In the Appropriations Act for the District of Columbia for FY 1978, Pub.L.No. 95-288, 92 Stat. 281 (1978), an initial $27 million was explicitly made available for outlay for financing the construction of the convention center; the bulk of the money was to be used to acquire the previously-selected site. See H.R.Rep.No. 596, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R.Rep.No. 1139, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). A second appropriation of $45 million was made available to the District by Congress for the project in the Appropriations Act for the District of Columbia for FY 1980, Pub.L.No. 96-93, 93 Stat. 713 (1979). See H.RRep.No. 294, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); S.Rep.No. 257, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Once a legislative decision has been made by the Council to build a capital project, and, having not been disapproved by the Congress, passes into law, and Congress has appropriated, and thereby made available, public monies for the financing of that capital fund project, all that is left to be accomplished is the management and successful execution of the project. These latter functions have been explicitly, and exclusively, vested in the Mayor:
The executive power of the District shall be vested in the Mayor who shall be the chief executive officer of the District government. He shall be responsible for the proper administration of the affairs of the District coming under his jurisdic[880]*880tion or control. The bill confers on him the usual administrative powers and duties .... The Mayor would have full authority to execute the powers and duties imposed on him by law .... [S.Rep.No. 219, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).]
Section 448 stipulates that the Mayor, as chief executive, shall be responsible for the financial affairs of the District, including ... control of revenues and resources .... [H.R.Rep.No. 482, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973).]
See also 119 Cong.Rec. 42038 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Diggs); id. at 42451 (remarks of Senator Eagleton).
The powers and duties of the Mayor are now codified in D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-162, which provides in part:
The Mayor shall be responsible for the proper execution of all laws relating to the District, and for the proper administration of the affairs of the District .... [Emphasis added.]
The Mayor’s role as chief financial officer of the city is delineated in D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 47-221 to -228. In particular, § 47-226 provides in pertinent part:
[T]he Mayor shall have charge of the administration of the financial affairs of the District and to that end he shall— (1) supervise and be responsible for all financial transactions ...
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(7) have custody of all public funds belonging to or under the control of the District ...
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(9) apportion the total of all appropriations and funds made available during the fiscal year for obligation ....
The legislative history of the Appropriations Act for the District of Columbia for FY 1978 further reflects the fact that Congress understood that, in appropriating funds for the convention center, only administrative tasks were left to be performed in connection with the project and that the Mayor was vested with the responsibility for carrying them out.
The gentleman is correct as to the $27 million [for the convention center]. This bill authorizes the mayor to use $27 million in District of Columbia funds. [123 Cong.Rec. 29603 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Natcher) (emphasis added).]
In the bill we also authorize the Mayor to proceed to use $27 million out of District of Columbia funds [for the convention center] .... [Id. at 29612 (emphasis added).]
The initial plan to build the convention center, to finance it in a certain manner, and to construct it on a specific site, had previously been approved by the Mayor and Council in accordance with the normal procedural process, pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 9-220; a budget request for funds with which to finance that legislative program had been made, pursuant to the normal budgetary process, D.C.Code 1978 Supp., §§ 47-221 to -228; and Congress had duly appropriated funds for the project in the Appropriations Acts for the District of Columbia for FY 1978 and FY 1980.6 Funds [881]*881have already been expended for the purchase and condemnation of property; for title search service, economic feasibility studies, environmental impact statement preparation, property appraisal services, and design and planning services. All that remains is for the Mayor, in his capacity as chief executive and financial officer of the District, to continue to provide monies from the funds appropriated and entrusted to him by Act of Congress, pursuant to the carrying out and successful execution of the original legislative decision to build the convention center.
Just as neither the Council nor the Mayor could require the courts to refrain from expending funds appropriated by the Congress for the operation of the courts, the Council could not take action which would interfere with the Mayor’s exercise of his exclusive executive and administrative authority, for such action would violate the separation of powers mandated by Congress for the District government in the Self-Government Act. As the Council could not interfere with the Mayor’s performance of those ministerial tasks with which he is entrusted, neither could the electorate so interfere through use of the initiative.
Affirmed.