FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 8 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTIAN DAVID No. 24-7609 CONTRERAS-PORCAYO, Agency No. A087-777-352 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted December 3, 2025** Portland, Oregon
Before: MCKEOWN and SUNG, Circuit Judges and FITZWATER,*** District Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Christian David Contreras-Porcayo (“Contreras-Porcayo”) petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) order affirming the immigration
judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition in part and deny it in part.
1. “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ[’s] decision and also adds its
own reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision
upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (9th Cir.
2019). We review legal questions de novo and factual determinations for substantial
evidence. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). “Under
the substantial evidence standard, administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id.
(citation and emphasis omitted).
2. In his briefs before the BIA and this Court, Contreras-Porcayo did not
challenge the IJ’s determination that “Mexicans who are perceived as wealthy based
on their years residing in the United States” is not a cognizable social group.
Therefore, he has forfeited this issue. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072,
1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).
-2- 3. With respect to his second proposed social group—“relatives of well-known
businessmen”—the BIA did not err when it concluded that Contreras-Porcayo failed
to establish a nexus between that group and the harm he faced. Substantial evidence
supports the IJ’s finding that the gang members who harmed Contreras-Porcayo did
so solely for financial gain. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1018-
23 (9th Cir. 2023) (reviewing a motive determination for substantial evidence and
concluding the same). “[P]ersecution solely on account of an economic motive . . .”
does not merit relief. Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1075 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004).
Although Conteras-Porcayo need not prove that his relationship to his uncle or any
other well-known businessman was the gang members’ sole motivation for targeting
him, the record lacks evidence that it motivated the gang members at all. See
Rodriguez-Zuniga, 69 F.4th at 1019 n.2 (concluding that the petitioner failed to meet
the nexus requirement where “substantial evidence support[ed] the agency's finding
that . . . financial motivation was not in addition to a motivation based on family
membership, but was instead the persecutor's exclusive motivation”). Accordingly,
-3- Contreras-Porcayo has failed to establish past persecution on account of a protected
ground.1
4. The BIA also properly determined that Contreras-Porcayo failed to establish
a well-founded fear of persecution because he could reasonably relocate within
Mexico while avoiding harm arising from his relationship to his uncle. See
Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029. Because Contreras-Porcayo failed to establish
past persecution and alleged only private persecution, the BIA correctly concluded
that he had the burden of proving that relocation within Mexico is unreasonable. See
id. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Contreras-Porcayo failed
to meet his burden. Generalized evidence of violence throughout Mexico is
insufficient to demonstrate that relocation is unreasonable. See Hussain v. Rosen, 985
F.3d 634, 648 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Relocation is generally not unreasonable solely
because the country at large is subject to generalized violence.”). Similarly, the
hardships of relocating with a family to an area where Contreras-Porcayo has no job,
home, or connections do not compel a conclusion that relocation is unreasonable. See
1 We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case that could determine the appropriate standard of review for some of the BIA’s persecution decisions. See Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 145 S.Ct. 2842 (2025). The resolution of that issue is immaterial here because our conclusion concerning the BIA’s nexus determination is the same under a de novo analysis.
-4- id. at 649 (rejecting argument that relocation would be unreasonable because it would
require the petitioner to move to an unfamiliar town far from his family).
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the BIA ignored Contreras-Porcayo’s
argument that the IJ improperly weighed factors concerning the difficulty of
relocation. The agency simply agreed with the IJ. Contreras-Porcayo also contends
that the IJ ignored evidence of his children’s ages and country conditions. But
Contreras-Porcayo has failed to meet his burden to specifically identify “something
in the record or the [IJ’s] decision[] that indicates that the [IJ] failed to consider all the
evidence.” Cruz v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 730, 741 (9th Cir. 2025). Nor does he explain
why such evidence is highly probative or potentially dispositive.2 See id. at 740.
5. However, substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s denial of CAT
protection. See Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting
the standard of review). Because the BIA affirmed only the IJ’s determination as to
2 In his reply brief, Contreras-Porcayo also challenges the BIA’s determination that he forfeited the issue of whether he would suffer harm on account of his family ties outside of Cuernavaca. But he did not make this objection in his opening brief, so we need not consider it. See Lopez-Vasquez, 706 F.3d at 1079–80. Even if we did consider this argument, we agree with the BIA that, although Contreras-Porcayo maintained before the BIA that relocation would be difficult based on his personal circumstances, he did not challenge the IJ’s determination that the record lacked evidence that people outside of Cuernavaca would harm him because of his relationship to his uncle.
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FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 8 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CHRISTIAN DAVID No. 24-7609 CONTRERAS-PORCAYO, Agency No. A087-777-352 Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM* PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General,
Respondent.
Appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals Submitted December 3, 2025** Portland, Oregon
Before: MCKEOWN and SUNG, Circuit Judges and FITZWATER,*** District Judge.
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Sidney A. Fitzwater, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Christian David Contreras-Porcayo (“Contreras-Porcayo”) petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA’s”) order affirming the immigration
judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we grant the petition in part and deny it in part.
1. “Where, as here, the BIA agrees with the IJ[’s] decision and also adds its
own reasoning, we review the decision of the BIA and those parts of the IJ’s decision
upon which it relies.” Duran-Rodriguez v. Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1027-28 (9th Cir.
2019). We review legal questions de novo and factual determinations for substantial
evidence. Ruiz-Colmenares v. Garland, 25 F.4th 742, 748 (9th Cir. 2022). “Under
the substantial evidence standard, administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id.
(citation and emphasis omitted).
2. In his briefs before the BIA and this Court, Contreras-Porcayo did not
challenge the IJ’s determination that “Mexicans who are perceived as wealthy based
on their years residing in the United States” is not a cognizable social group.
Therefore, he has forfeited this issue. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072,
1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013).
-2- 3. With respect to his second proposed social group—“relatives of well-known
businessmen”—the BIA did not err when it concluded that Contreras-Porcayo failed
to establish a nexus between that group and the harm he faced. Substantial evidence
supports the IJ’s finding that the gang members who harmed Contreras-Porcayo did
so solely for financial gain. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1018-
23 (9th Cir. 2023) (reviewing a motive determination for substantial evidence and
concluding the same). “[P]ersecution solely on account of an economic motive . . .”
does not merit relief. Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1075 n.7 (9th Cir. 2004).
Although Conteras-Porcayo need not prove that his relationship to his uncle or any
other well-known businessman was the gang members’ sole motivation for targeting
him, the record lacks evidence that it motivated the gang members at all. See
Rodriguez-Zuniga, 69 F.4th at 1019 n.2 (concluding that the petitioner failed to meet
the nexus requirement where “substantial evidence support[ed] the agency's finding
that . . . financial motivation was not in addition to a motivation based on family
membership, but was instead the persecutor's exclusive motivation”). Accordingly,
-3- Contreras-Porcayo has failed to establish past persecution on account of a protected
ground.1
4. The BIA also properly determined that Contreras-Porcayo failed to establish
a well-founded fear of persecution because he could reasonably relocate within
Mexico while avoiding harm arising from his relationship to his uncle. See
Duran-Rodriguez, 918 F.3d at 1029. Because Contreras-Porcayo failed to establish
past persecution and alleged only private persecution, the BIA correctly concluded
that he had the burden of proving that relocation within Mexico is unreasonable. See
id. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that Contreras-Porcayo failed
to meet his burden. Generalized evidence of violence throughout Mexico is
insufficient to demonstrate that relocation is unreasonable. See Hussain v. Rosen, 985
F.3d 634, 648 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Relocation is generally not unreasonable solely
because the country at large is subject to generalized violence.”). Similarly, the
hardships of relocating with a family to an area where Contreras-Porcayo has no job,
home, or connections do not compel a conclusion that relocation is unreasonable. See
1 We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case that could determine the appropriate standard of review for some of the BIA’s persecution decisions. See Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, 145 S.Ct. 2842 (2025). The resolution of that issue is immaterial here because our conclusion concerning the BIA’s nexus determination is the same under a de novo analysis.
-4- id. at 649 (rejecting argument that relocation would be unreasonable because it would
require the petitioner to move to an unfamiliar town far from his family).
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the BIA ignored Contreras-Porcayo’s
argument that the IJ improperly weighed factors concerning the difficulty of
relocation. The agency simply agreed with the IJ. Contreras-Porcayo also contends
that the IJ ignored evidence of his children’s ages and country conditions. But
Contreras-Porcayo has failed to meet his burden to specifically identify “something
in the record or the [IJ’s] decision[] that indicates that the [IJ] failed to consider all the
evidence.” Cruz v. Bondi, 146 F.4th 730, 741 (9th Cir. 2025). Nor does he explain
why such evidence is highly probative or potentially dispositive.2 See id. at 740.
5. However, substantial evidence does not support the BIA’s denial of CAT
protection. See Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 891-92 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting
the standard of review). Because the BIA affirmed only the IJ’s determination as to
2 In his reply brief, Contreras-Porcayo also challenges the BIA’s determination that he forfeited the issue of whether he would suffer harm on account of his family ties outside of Cuernavaca. But he did not make this objection in his opening brief, so we need not consider it. See Lopez-Vasquez, 706 F.3d at 1079–80. Even if we did consider this argument, we agree with the BIA that, although Contreras-Porcayo maintained before the BIA that relocation would be difficult based on his personal circumstances, he did not challenge the IJ’s determination that the record lacked evidence that people outside of Cuernavaca would harm him because of his relationship to his uncle.
-5- government consent or acquiescence, our review is limited to that issue. See Gonzalez
v. I.N.S., 82 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 1996).
“Acquiescence of a public official requires that the public official, prior to the
activity constituting torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his
or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” Madrigal v. Holder,
716 F.3d 499, 509 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(7)). It is sufficient
to show acquiescence of state or local officials. Id. at 510. As the IJ noted, Contreras-
Porcayo has presented evidence of public officials’ corruption, willful blindness, and
cooperation with criminal organizations like the gangs he fears. Such evidence is
sufficient to show government acquiescence under CAT. Id. at 510 (petitioner
satisfied his burden of proof with respect to acquiescence by presenting evidence “that
corruption of public officials in Mexico remains a problem, particularly at the state
and local levels of government, with police officers and prison guards frequently
working directly on behalf of drug cartels”); see also Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828
F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016) (the agency’s failure to consider “significant evidence
establishing government complicity in the criminal activity” is sufficient to warrant
reversal, but evidence of “a general ineffectiveness on the government's part to
investigate and prevent crime will not suffice”).
-6- Accordingly, we deny Contreras-Porcayo’s petition with respect to his
applications for asylum and withholding. But we grant his petition with respect to his
application under CAT, and we remand for the BIA to determine whether Contreras-
Porcayo is likely to experience torture.
PETITION GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;
REMANDED.
-7-