CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY v. Carlisle

391 S.W.2d 98
Court of Appeals of Texas·Decided April 26, 1965·No. 7460·Published·Cited by 6 cases

Opinion

NORTHCUTT, Justice.

This is a suit brought by Vernon Car-lisle, Jr., for recovery of total disability benefits provided in two insurance policies issued to him by Continental Casualty Company. One policy was denominated RP Accident No. 9869346 and the other was denominated Accident and Health Policy No. 9869347. The main portion of the policies here involved is as follows:

“Total Disability. When, as the result of injury and commencing within thirty days after the date of the accident, the insured is wholly and continuously disabled and prevented from performing each and every duty pertaining to his occupation, the company will pay periodically the monthly indemnity stated in the schedule for the period the insured is so disabled, not to exceed twelve consecutive months. Subject to the ‘Maximum Period Total Disability Indemnity’ stated in the schedule and after the payment of monthly indemnity for twelve months as aforesaid, the Company will continue the periodic payment of monthly indemnity so long as the Insured is wholly and continuously disabled and prevented by reason of said injury from engaging in each and every occupation or employment for wage or profit for which he is reasonably qualified by reason of education, training or experience.”

The case was submitted to a jury upon special issues. In answer to the issues the jury found that Carlisle was injured on October 30, 1962; that the injuries sustained caused total incapacity so that Carlisle could not engage in his regular occupation as a moving van operator and that he was totally incapacitated so that he could not reasonably perform his duties as a moving van operator for a period of seventeen *100 months. The jury found Carlisle’s injury on October 30, 1962, caused total incapacity from October 30, 1963, up until March 31, 1964, being the date of the trial, preventing him from performing any occupation for wage or profit taking into consideration his experience, training, and capabilities and that said capacity was caused solely by the injury received on October 30, 1962. Upon a verdict of the jury, judgment was granted in favor of Carlisle. From that judgment Continental Casualty Company perfected this appeal and will hereafter be referred to as appellant.

Appellant presents this appeal upon six points of error. Point One contends that there was no evidence to support the finding of the jury that Carlisle was totally incapacitated so that he could not reasonably perform his duties as a moving van operator for a period of seventeen months. Point Two is to the same effect only that such findings by the jury were contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Points Three and Four contend there was no evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury and that such finding by the jury was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that Carlisle’s injury had caused total incapacity since October 30, 1963. Points Five and Six contend there was no evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury and that such finding by the jury was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that Carlisle was totally incapacitated from performing any occupation for wage or profit from October 30, 1963, to March 31, 1964.

The undisputed evidence shows that Carlisle worked and drew good wages during the most of 1963 and some during the first of 1964. In determining the questions here involved as to the finding being contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence, we must consider all the evidence supporting the verdict and weighing it along with the other evidence in the case including that which is contrary to the verdict to determine whether the verdict is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust— this regardless of whether the record contained some evidence of probative force in support of the verdict. In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660. As to appellant’s contention of no evidence to support the jury verdict, we must consider only that evidence, if any, which viewed in the most favorable light supports the jury findings and must discard all evidence which would lead to a contrary result. Biggers v. Continental Bus System, 157 Tex. 351, 303 S.W.2d 359.

It is stated in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Wann, 130 Tex. 400, 109 S.W.2d 470, 115 A.L.R. 1301 (opinion adopted by S.Ct.) as follows:

“No general rule can be announced governing the question of when one is totally disabled to pursue a gainful occupation. The term total disability is relative depending, among other things, upon the capabilities of the insured. No distinction is made by the courts between an accident policy and a life insurance policy containing a disability clause. An injury which might render an uneducated laboring man unable to pursue a gainful occupation might not impair at all the ability of a professional or business man to do so. Kemper v. Police & Firemen’s Ins. Ass’n (Tex.Com.App.) 44 S.W.(2d) 978; Winters Mutual Aid Association Circle v. Reddin (Tex.Com.App.) 49 S.W.(2d) 1095; Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson (Tex.Com.App.) 25 S.W.(2d) 1093; Buis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 229 Mo.App. 190, 77 S.W.(2d) 127; Duhaime v. Prudential Ins. Co., 86 N.H. 307, 167 A. 269; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Person, 188 Ark. 864, 67 S.W.(2d) 1007.
“The evidence in this case raised a fact issue for the jury, and the contention that only a question of law is presented cannot be upheld.”

*101 Appellant does not contend Carlisle received no injury nor does it contend that he was not incapacitated for a short time from October 30, 1962, to February 9, 1963. The evidence here relied upon by appellant to defeat the findings of the jury as to Car-lisle’s incapacity is based upon the fact that he worked most all of 1963 and a short time in 1964 and made good wages and from the further fact that he joined a bowling league and bowled twice in September and twice in October of 1963.

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CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY v. Carlisle, 391 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965).

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