Consolidated Elevator Co. v. United States

8 Ct. Cust. 267, 1918 WL 18140, 1918 CCPA LEXIS 7
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedFebruary 8, 1918
DocketNo. 1861
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 8 Ct. Cust. 267 (Consolidated Elevator Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Consolidated Elevator Co. v. United States, 8 Ct. Cust. 267, 1918 WL 18140, 1918 CCPA LEXIS 7 (ccpa 1918).

Opinion

MONTGOMERY, Presiding Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of .the court:

The appellants made two separate importations of the commodity entered as flaxseed and screenings.

The testimony shows that flaxseed as it comes from the farms to the elevators contains a percentage of wild buckwheat, a percentage of wild mustard, a percentage of wheat, and small percentages of barley, oats, chaff, and foxtail. There is practically no dirt in the product. These substances, according to the regular commercial practice, are separated from the flaxseed, making a commercial product known as screenings.

These screenings are .bought and sold in the markets in large quantities. The flaxseed so separated from the screenings is likewise handled and sold, and is, in fact, the commercial product known as flaxseed.

The different seeds found in the screenings may be used for various purposes. If it is practically feasible to separate out what small or broken grains of wheat there may be in the screenings, they are, to [269]*269a limited extent, used for milling purposes. Likewise any mustard seed present may be used to some extent for extracting oil from them. As an ordinary, practical matter, however, all of these screenings are used for stock food on farms. That is, the screenings, as such, without any further or secondary separation and without being subjected to any further process, constitute in themselves a merchantable commercial product which is put upon the market and sold for feeding stock.

The percentage of'screenings varies in different importations, but in the present was stated to be in the different cars from 5 to 9 per cent. The collector at the port of importation, Duluth, acting under directions of the Secretary of the Treasury, imposed a dúty of 20 cents per bushel on the entire importation, on the ground that the screenings should be treated as impurities. On appeal to the Board of General Appraiser's this action of the collector was affirmed. The question, therefore, presented for our determination is whether under" the act of Í913 these screenings, which the testimony shows constitute a separate commodity, sold as such, although commingled with flaxseed at the time of importation, are to be assessed as flaxseed or as the commodity which they in fact commercially are known to be. Or, stated in another way, the question is whether permitting a separation of these two commodities into flaxseed and screenings, respectively, in the proportion which each represents in the entire importation amounts to an allowance for dirt or other impurities.

The paragraph in question is 212 of the tariff act of 1913, and reads as follows:

Flaxseed or linseed and other oil seeds not specially provided for in this section, 20 cents per bushel of fifty-six pounds,

with a proviso at the end of the section as follows:

Provided, That no allowance shall be made for dirt or other impurities in seeds provided for in this paragraph.

The definition of “impure” in Murray’s New English Dictionary is:

1. Containing some defiling or offensive matter; dirty, unclean, * * *.
2. Mixed with or containing some extraneous or foreign matter, esp. of an inferior or baser kind; contaminated, adulterated.

And in Webster’s New International Dictionary the definition of “impure” is—

Not pure; specif, a. Containing something which is unclean; dirty; foul; filthy; unwholesome; as, impure water or air. b. Mixed or impregnated with extraneous, esp. inferior, substances; adulterated; as impure drugs, food, etc.

It would appear that the word “impurity” as used in this tariff act is open to two constructions. It may and often does mean any matter not of the character of the principal matter. It may be given a narrower meaning, as signifying some substance inherently impure oi unsalable.

[270]*270, This precise question lias not before engaged our attention. The •question of allowance for wantage or deductions from full weight •on account of impurities has been considered in various cases in this •court, which cases have dealt with, importations as to which allowance was claimed on account of the presence of nondutiable extraneous matter. In such cases, following Seeberger v. Wright (157 U. S., 183), we have held that in the absence of statutory inhibition an allowance was permissible, subject, however, to commercial usage to the extent that where by commercial custom a •certain percentage of extraneous matter was paid for in commercial transactions as a part of the imported substance, the allowance was restricted, as in the case of United States v. Baker Castor Oil Co. (2 Ct. Cust. Appls., 338; T. D. 32076), to the excess of impurities over the usual amount. Undoubtedly such a provision as that we are considering would require denial of any allowance whatever for impurities, which, within the rule of ejusdem generis, were of like kind with those ■specifically enumerated. We are impressed, however, that this rule calls for a limitation of the impurities, allowance for which is proscribed, to such as correspond with the one named, at least in the essential particular of having no separate tariff status for dutiable purposes, and that the proviso should not be so construed as to abrogate the rule that where two or more articles subject to different tariff rates are present in an importation they may be separately ■assessed at the several rates provided for each, as was done in United States v. Waterhouse (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 353; T. D. 31452), citing United States v. Ranlett (172 U. S., 133). See also United States v. Myers (140 Fed., 648), In re Seaboard Rice Milling Co. (T. D. 34843), and a ruling of the Treasury in T. D. 37187.

An attempt is made to distinguish the case of Seaboard Rice Milling Co. from the instant case, as it is said that in the Rice Milling Co. case there were two mixed commodities, each being a recognized commercial commodity at the time of importation. This is true, but we do not think that on the record in this case the Rice Milling Co. case is distinguishable in that particular. In the present case the screenings are a distinct commercial commodity, commingled with other dutiable flaxseed, it is true, as were the cheaper grades of rice with those of better quality in the Rice Milling Co. case. But in that case actual physical separation was not deemed necessary before there could be separate assessment, and if not required in that case, no more should it be required in the present case, both the lower grades of rice in that case and the screenings in the present case being •commercial commodities subject to a different rate of duty.

In the case of T. D. 37187, a ruling by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, it was held that wheat screenings, which were a part of an importation of wheat, wheat being free at the time, were subject to separate assessment and to duty as a nonenumerated unmanufactured [271]*271article under paragraph 385 of the tariff act of 1913. This case is referred to as showing that screenings are a distinct unenumerated unmanufactured article, subject to tariff duty, and that that is true, even though they are found commingled with other articles—in that case an article not subject to duty, in the present case an article subject to duty—but the screenings alike dutiable in either case.

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Bluebook (online)
8 Ct. Cust. 267, 1918 WL 18140, 1918 CCPA LEXIS 7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/consolidated-elevator-co-v-united-states-ccpa-1918.