Consolidated Coppermines Corp. v. United States

296 F.2d 743, 155 Ct. Cl. 731
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 6, 1961
DocketNo. 498-52
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 296 F.2d 743 (Consolidated Coppermines Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Consolidated Coppermines Corp. v. United States, 296 F.2d 743, 155 Ct. Cl. 731 (cc 1961).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff sues for additional interest on a refund made it for an overpayment of taxes for 1941. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue refused to pay the interest claimed because he said that, in order to be entitled to the refund, it was necessary to carry back to the year 1941 a part of the 1943 excess profits credit, and that interest on a refund resulting from a carry-back of an excess profits credit is payable only from the date the claim for refund is filed, and, hence, plaintiff is not entitled to the additional interest claimed.

[733]*733Plaintiff says, if the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had allowed it to carry over the entire unused excess profits credit to which it was entitled for 1940, it would have been unnecessary to carry back any of its unused credit for 1943, and, since there is no limitation on the payment of interest on a refund occasioned by the carrying forward of an unused credit from a prior year, it is entitled to the additional interest claimed.

It is agreed that if plaintiff is entitled to carry forward its entire unused excess profits credit from 1940, it is entitled to the additional interest claimed.

Plaintiff is entitled to an additional carry-over from 1940 and to a carry-back from 1942 larger than that claimed in its claim for refund, if at all, because the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, in the course of his examination of plaintiff’s returns for 1942 and 1943, discovered that plaintiff was entitled to compute its depletion allowance on cost rather than March 1,1913, value.

When plaintiff made its income and excess profits tax returns for 1941 it claimed a carry-over of its unused excess profits credit from 1940. Then, when it developed that it had sustained a loss in 1942, it filed a claim for refund for 1941, asserting as its sole ground the right to carry back its unused excess profits credit for 1942.

In order to pass on this claim, plaintiff says it was necessary for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to determine first, how much excess profits credit plaintiff was entitled to for

1942, and, second, how much of the credit it was necessary to carry back. To determine the first question, plaintiff’s net income for 1942 had to be recomputed. This involved á determination of the proper basis for computing depletion. Also, to determine the second question, the amount of plaintiff’s carry-over from 1940 had to be determined. This also involved a computation of its income for this year, which, in turn, involved the proper basis for computing its depletion.

So that plaintiff’s claim that it was entitled to a carry-back of unused excess profits credit for 1942 set in motion an investigation which naturally would have disclosed plaintiff’s right to a depletion allowance based on cost, instead of on March 1,1913, value.

[734]*734Before the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had acted on plaintiff’s claim for refund based on a carry-back of its unused excess profits credit for 1942, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue entered upon an investigation of plaintiff’s 1942 and 1943 tax liability. This investigation and the investigation necessary for action on the claim for refund were interrelated, because the claim for refund was grounded upon a claim of right to carry back to 1941 plaintiff’s unused excess profits credit for 1942, and the amount of this unused excess profits credit depended upon a proper computation of its income and invested capital for 1942.

In the course of the investigation of the 1942 tax liability, which, as stated, affected plaintiff’s right to the refund claimed, it was discovered that plaintiff was entitled to compute its depletion on cost rather than March 1, 1913, value, and this was allowed.

This, of course, affected plaintiff’s rights under its claim for refund. It meant that plaintiff had a larger unused excess profits credit for 1942, which it might carry back to 1941. Since, in order to determine how much of this credit plaintiff had to carry back to 1941 to extinguish its tax liability for that year, it was necessary to determine the amount plaintiff could carry over from 1940, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had to recompute plaintiff’s tax liability for this year, using the new basis for computing depletion.

When plaintiff’s 1940 tax liability wras recomputed it was discovered that it was entitled to a carry-over to 1941 of an unused excess profits credit of some $220,000, instead of some $86,000, as the revenue agent had originally computed it. This made unnecessary the carry-back to 1941 of the entire unused excess profits credit for 1942, and, hence, it was unnecessary to carry back any credit from 1943.

Plaintiff says that its claim for refund of 1941 excess profits tax, based on a claim of right to deduct from its 1941 excess profits net income an unused excess profits credit from 1942 set in motion the investigations that led to the discovery of its right to compute its depletion on cost. Since this discovery was made within the statutory period, plaintiff says it was entitled to amend its claim of a carry-back [735]*735of its unused excess profits credit for 1942 by asserting the right to have it computed using cost as the basis of the depletion allowance. In order to so determine the credit to be carried back, it says it was necessary to recompute its unused excess profits carry-over from 1940, using cost as the basis of depletion.

We think plaintiff’s position is correct.

It is true plaintiff claimed a carry-back of a specific amount from 1942, but the amount claimed is unimportant. The crucial thing is that there was claimed a carry-back from 1942, which claim caused the audit, in the course of which it was discovered that plaintiff had the right to deduct depletion based on cost. This discovery was within the statutory period. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue being on notice of this right within the statutory period, plaintiff had the right, after the running of the statute, to file a formal claim, amending its former claim to a 1942 carry-back by claiming an amount based on the increased depletion allowance. The new basis for computing depletion would increase the carry-over from 1940 and the carry-back from 1942, both of which would extinguish the tax liability for 1941, and make unnecessary any carry-back from 1943. This being true, it is agreed that plaintiff is entitled to recover the additional interest it seeks.

We think this is in line with the holding of the Supreme Court in United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62; and United States v. Andrews, 302 U.S. 517, 523-524.

In the Memphis Cotton Oil Company case the claim filed by the plaintiff was a general one. Upon audit of it, it was discovered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that plaintiff was entitled to the repayment of an amount in excess of the amount claimed. The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer was entitled to amend its prior claim to set up its right based upon facts discovered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the audit of its books.

The facts in the present case are somewhat more complicated, but, as in the Memphis Cotton Oil Company

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296 F.2d 743, 155 Ct. Cl. 731, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/consolidated-coppermines-corp-v-united-states-cc-1961.