Consol of Pa Coal Company, LLC v. DOWCP

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedOctober 28, 2025
Docket23-2105
StatusUnpublished

This text of Consol of Pa Coal Company, LLC v. DOWCP (Consol of Pa Coal Company, LLC v. DOWCP) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Consol of Pa Coal Company, LLC v. DOWCP, (4th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 23-2105 Doc: 33 Filed: 10/28/2025 Pg: 1 of 7

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-2105

CONSOL OF PA COAL COMPANY, LLC,

Petitioner,

V.

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR; WILLIAM J. SECKMAN,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board. (22-0132 BLA)

Submitted: September 19, 2025 Decided: October 28, 2025

Before HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: William S. Mattingly, JACKSON KELLY PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Leonard Stayton, Inez, Kentucky, for Respondent William J. Seckman.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-2105 Doc: 33 Filed: 10/28/2025 Pg: 2 of 7

PER CURIAM:

Consol of PA Coal Company, LLC ("Employer"), petitions for review of the

Benefits Review Board's ("Board") decision and order affirming the administrative law

judge's (ALJ) award of miner's benefits to William J. Seckman under the Black Lung

Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-944. Employer challenges the ALJ's finding that it failed

to rebut the presumption that Seckman is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. We deny

the petition.

"We review the findings of the ALJ, as affirmed by the Board, to determine if they

are supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with the law." Am. Energy, LLC v.

Dir., Off of Workers' Comp. Programs, 106 F.4th 319,330 (4th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

"To determine whether this standard has been met, we consider whether all of the relevant

evidence has been analyzed and whether the ALJ has sufficiently explained his rationale in

crediting certain evidence." Hobet Mining, LLC v. Epling, 783 F.3d 498, 504 (4th

Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

But "the duty to resolve conflicts in the evidence rests with the ALJ as factfinder.

And when conflicting evidence allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant

is disabled or has pneumoconiosis, the responsibility for that decision falls on the ALJ."

Sea "B" Mining Co. v. Addison, 831 F.3d 244, 252 (4th Cir. 2016). Accordingly, in

conducting our analysis, "we do not undertake to reweigh contradictory medical evidence,

make credibility determinations, or substitute our judgment for that [of the ALJ]." Id.

Indeed, "[s]o long as an ALJ's findings ... are supported by substantial evidence, they must

be sustained." Epling, 783 F.3d at 504. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere

2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-2105 Doc: 33 Filed: 10/28/2025 Pg: 3 of 7

scintilla and is such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Blankenship, 123 F.4th 684, 690 (4th Cir.

2024) (cleaned up).

Nevertheless, "our deference to an ALJ's factual findings is not unlimited," as the

"ALJ must still conduct an appropriate analysis of the evidence to support his conclusion."

Addison, 831 F.3d at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, even if legitimate

reasons exist for rejecting or crediting certain evidence, the ALJ cannot do so for no reason

or for the wrong reason." Id. at 252-53 (cleaned up). "Furthermore, as a condition to

appellate review, an ALJ must adequately explain why he credited certain evidence and

discredited other evidence." Id. at 253 (internal quotation marks omitted). While "this

requirement is not intended to be a mandate for administrative verbosity, a reviewing court

must be able to discern what the ALJ did and why he did it." Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Generally, to establish eligibility for benefits, a miner must demonstrate that:

(1) "he has pneumoconiosis, in either its clinical or legal form"; (2) "the pneumoconiosis

arose out of coal mine employment"; (3) "he is totally disabled by a pulmonary or

respiratory impairment"; and (4) "his pneumoconiosis is a substantially contributing cause

of his total disability." W Va. CWP Fund v. Bender, 782 F.3d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 2015)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(d)(2) (2025). "But for certain

miners, Congress has made it easier to establish eligibility for benefits." W Va. CWP Fund

v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 880 F.3d 691, 695 (4th Cir. 2018) ("Smith"). If

the miner proves that he was employed in underground coal mines or in substantially

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similar conditions for at least 15 years, that he has had a chest x-ray interpreted as negative

for complicated pneumoconiosis, and that he has a totally disabling respiratory or

pulmonary impairment, he is entitled to the rebuttable presumption that he is totally

disabled due to pneumoconiosis. 30 U.S.C. § 92l(c)(4); C.F.R. § 718.305(b) (2025).

"Once the presumption is triggered, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate

that the miner is not in fact eligible for benefits." Smith, 880 F.3d at 695. An Employer can

rebut the 15-year presumption by establishing that the miner does not suffer from

pneumoconiosis arising out of his coal mine employment ("pneumoconiosis rebuttal"),

C.F.R. § 718.305(d)(l)(i) (2025), or "that no part of the miner's respiratory or pulmonary

total disability wa s caused by pneumoconiosis" ("causation rebuttal"), 20 C.F.R.

§ 718.305(d)(l)(ii) (2025). Under the pneumoconiosis rebuttal method, the employer must

prove "that the miner's impairment is not significantly related to, or substantially aggravated

by, the [15] years or more he has spent in coal mines." Smith, 880 F.3d at 695 (emphasis

in original and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the causation rebuttal method, the

employer "must 'rule out' the mining-related disease as a cause of the miner's disability."

Epling, 783 F.3d at 502. The employer cannot satisfy this "rule out" standard by

establishing that pneumoconiosis was only a minor cause or one of multiple causes of the

miner's impairment; rather the employer "affirmatively must establish that the miner's

disability is attributable exclusively to a cause or causes other than pneumoconiosis."

Bender, 782 F.3d at 144.

4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-2105 Doc: 33 Filed: 10/28/2025 Pg: 5 of 7

Here, the parties agree that Seckman is entitled to the rebuttable presumption that

he is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. Employer, however, argues that the ALJ erred

in concluding that it failed to rebut this presumption.

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