Filed 8/19/26 Conservatorship of D.A. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
Conservatorship of the Person and B348098 Estate of D.A. Public Guardian of Los Angeles (Los Angeles County County, Super. Ct. No.
25NWMH00226)
Petitioner and Respondent.
v.
D.A.,
Objector and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Scott R. Herin, Judge. Affirmed.
B. Jolene Lewis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Laura Quiñonez, Assistant County Counsel, and William C. Sias, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioner and Respondent.
Appellant D.A. appeals the trial court’s order granting respondent Los Angeles County Office of the Public Guardian’s (Public Guardian’s) petition for appointment as D.A.’s conservator. The order was made following a jury trial that resulted in a finding that D.A. was gravely disabled within the meaning of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS Act). (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 5000 et seq.) We are asked to decide whether substantial evidence supports the jury’s gravely disabled finding and whether the trial court should have granted D.A.’s mid-trial request for a continuance to obtain expert discovery.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Petition and Initial Proceedings In April 2025, the Public Guardian filed a petition for appointment as conservator of the person and estate of D.A. The petition alleged D.A. was a 40-year-old resident of Los Angeles County being held at a criminal detention center. The petition further alleged D.A. had been evaluated and determined to be gravely disabled as a result of a mental disorder, remained hospitalized due to his unstable and deteriorated mental condition, and was unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily. The Public Guardian was issued temporary letters of conservatorship.
The trial court held a hearing on the petition for appointment on May 5, 2025. D.A. declined to consent to a conservatorship and requested a jury trial. The trial court found good cause to continue the matter. The court set a discovery
1 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
3
deadline of June 6, but stated the deadline was set with the understanding that the parties would have to confirm whether the physician or forensic psychologist may receive additional documents on the date of trial readiness. Trial was initially set for June 23, 2025.
At a trial setting hearing in June, counsel for D.A.
acknowledged the jury trial was set for the following Monday but represented there was more investigation she would like to do. Counsel requested the court set a new trial date of July 28, 2025. The court continued the trial as requested.
At a trial setting conference on July 23, 2025, the trial court asked the parties to confirm there were no known discovery issues. Counsel for D.A. asked the Public Guardian if Dr. Elizabeth Morris (Dr. Morris) was their only witness. The Public Guardian confirmed she was, and counsel for D.A. then represented she was ready for trial.2
B. Trial A jury trial commenced on July 28, 2025. On July 30, after the jury was seated but before any testimony was presented, the parties had a discussion with the court. D.A. informed the court the Public Guardian had provided notes from Dr. Morris that morning and D.A. wanted to make sure Dr. Morris’s testimony would not be based on hearsay because she worked in a supervisory capacity and was not D.A’s treating doctor. The Public Guardian represented that although Dr. Morris “is in a
2 Counsel asserted the Public Guardian turned over some discovery the previous day, but she said it should not be a problem for her to be ready for trial as set.
4
supervisory role, she is also part of the treatment team . . . .” The court confirmed there were not going to be any records presented at trial and stated the doctor could explain what she reviewed to help formulate her opinion, but she was not allowed to relate the substance of what she reviewed. The court also indicated it would take a moment with Dr. Morris prior to her testimony to make sure she understood she could only relay her own observations and opinion.
The sole witnesses at trial were Dr. Morris, the Director of Psychology and Social Services and Clinical Training Director at Gateways Hospital (Gateways) and D.A.
1. Dr. Morris’s testimony Dr. Morris became involved in D.A.’s case when he was admitted to Gateways in mid-May 2025, and she was assigned to be part of his clinical treatment team. Dr. Morris discussed D.A.’s case with most of the clinical team, including his psychiatrist, Dr. Jason Lee, and his social worker, Irena. She also reviewed his charts and records, including clinical notes, medical records, and information about his prior history.
Dr. Morris first interviewed D.A. on May 13, 2025, the day he was admitted to Gateways. They discussed his prior mental health history and symptoms. D.A. stated he received treatment before and did not currently believe he needed treatment. Dr. Morris saw D.A. approximately three times per week around the hospital and saw him either every week or every other week for a group or individual session.
Dr. Morris evaluated D.A. on June 3. During the evaluation, D.A. muttered under his breath and Dr. Morris believed he was talking to an unseen person. D.A. also made odd
5
facial expressions, took a long time to answer questions, and could not elaborate upon answers.
Over the ensuing weeks, Dr. Morris observed D.A. sitting in a group setting verbalizing things that were off topic and engaging in odd hand gestures. On a different day, Dr. Morris observed him pacing alone in his room, speaking loudly.
Dr. Morris evaluated D.A. again on July 25, approximately five days before her testimony at trial. D.A. asserted he had no mental health symptoms and his medication was not helpful.
During both the June and the July evaluations, Dr. Morris asked D.A. about his discharge plans. Both times, he said he was going to go to one of his homes in Santa Clarita to live independently. When asked how he would provide for his food or clothing, or access funds, D.A. told Dr. Morris he has millions of dollars in the bank, is the CEO of Spectrum, and has an electronics and 3D printing business with celebrity business partners, including Bill Gates. When asked if he would like mental health treatment outside of the hospital, D.A. said he would only engage a particular psychiatrist, but he would not tell Dr. Morris the psychiatrist’s name. He also stated he did not want to engage in any outpatient treatment. When asked how he would clothe himself, D.A. said he has clothing already, could go shopping with his funds, and had celebrity connections that would assist him.
Dr. Morris opined D.A. was suffering from schizophrenia based on his grandiose delusions, hallucinations, disorganized thoughts, lack of facial expression and emotional expression, poverty of thought and speech, and lack of insight. Dr. Morris also opined D.A.’s mental health and mental illness were impeding his ability to provide for his basic needs. Specifically,
6
his mental illness made it difficult for him to make a viable plan for food, clothing, and shelter because the plans he articulated were delusional.
During his time at Gateways, D.A. was compliant or mostly compliant with taking two different psychotropic medications. When Dr. Morris asked if he intended to continue taking his medication if he was on his own, D.A.’s responses were inconsistent. Sometimes he would say he would continue taking medication if he could speak with his own unidentified psychiatrist. Other times he would say no because the medication was not beneficial. Still other times, D.A. said he would take the medication if he had to or if the doctor said so.
Dr. Morris did not believe D.A. would continue taking medication on his own. She also opined D.A.’s lack of insight would impair his ability to be a voluntary patient at the hospital.
On cross-examination, Dr. Morris stated she writes notes after she meets with D.A. When asked if she turned her notes over to the Public Guardian, Dr. Morris explained that the packet of documents turned over to the Public Guardian was created by the psychiatric social worker and typically includes the psychiatrist’s notes and the nursing notes. Dr. Morris did not play a role in preparing the documentation provided for the trial.
2. D.A.’s counsel requests a continuance At the beginning of the next trial day, D.A.’s counsel asserted that prior to Dr. Morris’s testimony, she did not think Dr. Morris was part of D.A.’s treatment team. Though counsel had received hundreds of pages of records, they were signed by D.A.’s psychiatrist and did not include any notes signed by Dr. Morris. The only documents the Public Guardian had submitted
7
from Dr. Morris were a trial statement dated June 2, which contained general mental health observations, and the notes counsel received the prior morning. Counsel represented Dr. Morris’s curriculum vitae also indicated she works in a supervisory capacity, which counsel perceived as consistent with her understanding that Dr. Morris was a supervisor and not on the treatment team.
Counsel told the court she was not sure she had been able to do an effective cross-examination because she had not been able to review Dr. Morris’s records and was unaware of any exculpatory or impeachment evidence that may exist. D.A.’s counsel wanted to obtain Dr. Morris’s records so she could review them and assess whether or not she would like to recall her and get late discovery. She asked to be given the records and granted “a short continuance” so she could review them and make an informed decision about next steps.
The Public Guardian represented he did not have possession or control over the records sought by D.A. He also stated the proceedings were governed by the Civil Discovery Act, and the Public Guardian had provided notice as early as June 5 that Dr. Morris would be testifying. He argued the issues being raised should have been raised earlier, and that it would be burdensome to continue the case at that point.
The court observed the situation was a recurring problem with the LPS process because criminal attorneys practice under the belief there is an automatic requirement for reciprocal discovery but conservatorship proceedings are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. The court stated that when discovery was turned over and D.A. understood Dr. Morris would be testifying, D.A. should have demanded Dr. Morris’s records. D.A.
8
had not done so and had not otherwise complied with the Code of Civil Procedure. The court accordingly declined to continue the trial, and when counsel for D.A. requested a mistrial, the court denied that request too.
Prior to the resumption of testimony before the jury, D.A.
requested a jury instruction informing the jury that D.A. had not received Dr. Morris’s psychological notes prior to cross- examination. The court denied that request. The court reiterated that the civil discovery rules require a demand, D.A.’s counsel was on notice that Dr. Morris was the testifying doctor, and D.A. should have demanded Dr. Morris’s records upon realizing they were not included in the discovery. The court indicated it did not believe there was any direct intention by either side to keep the information away from the other, but it could not ignore the fact that the Code of Civil Procedure governs the discovery process. The court stated, however, it would be open to giving a more neutral jury instruction stating neither side had been given access to Dr. Morris’s notes.
3. D.A.’s testimony
D.A. had been conserved once before in 2020, for approximately six months. He did not want to go through it again. When asked if he believed he had a mental illness, D.A. testified he believes he has schizoaffective disorder. He also identified the medication he was taking for his condition. When asked if the medication helped him, D.A. said it does, but he does not want to take anything that will hurt him or is not safe. D.A. testified he would be willing to talk to his doctor (who he did not identify), and if the medication was safe and prescribed to him, he would be willing to take it after he leaves Gateways.
9
D.A. testified he was prepared to leave the hospital. He asserted he had a trust account with a balance of approximately $19,000 and a bank account with around $10,000, which could be used to pay his rent and bills. D.A. asserted he would stay at Gateways until he found somewhere else to go. He said he and his social worker, Irena, were in the process of looking for a place for him to live. D.A. had called some potential housing options the day before testifying. He asserted some of the places he called said yes and others said no.
When asked about some of his statements while hospitalized at Gateways, D.A. testified he did not recall saying he did not need treatment. He said he has always been eager to help himself and Gateways was trying to help him. He wanted to work with them as long as it was safe for him. When asked where he would obtain his medication if he were on his own, he identified a Dr. Kay from Santa Clarita Mental Health, who he last contacted about two years prior. He said if Dr. Kay was no longer there, he could go to mental health clinics in San Fernando and Santa Clarita. D.A. asserted he took his medication after his prior conservatorship ended in 2023 until he was admitted to Gateways in 2025.
When asked about his occupation, D.A. asserted he works in 3D animation with others, including Bill Gates. He said people call him the CEO because he invented the 3D spectrum. D.A. stated his inheritance was stolen from him in junior high and a number of people purchased properties, which they put in both their names and his. D.A. testified he needs to go to his realtor and have her check the records to investigate. He did not plan to move to the homes in Santa Clarita until he obtained something in writing from a realtor.
10
D.A. testified he would access food using the $10,000 in his bank account. D.A. explained he buys in bulk when he goes to the grocery store and buys his own clothes because he likes expensive clothes. When asked how he would access the money in his bank account, he said he has a card and knows the woman who works at the credit union. When asked when he last withdrew money using his debit card, he said 2024. He also stated he last went to Santa Clarita Mental Health in 2024. D.A. related he plans to work if he were released from the conservatorship and he wants to work at a Mercedes Benz dealership selling cars (though he has never sold cars before).
4. Jury instructions and verdict As relevant for our purposes, the court ultimately instructed the jury that “[t]he parties were not aware of additional discovery that may have been available. You may consider that when evaluating Dr. Morris’s testimony.” The jury was also instructed that the parties stipulated D.A. was unavailable to access money or to have sought mental health treatment in the community in 2024.
The jury found D.A. was presently gravely disabled due to a mental disorder. The court appointed the Public Guardian as conservator over D.A.’s person and estate.
II. DISCUSSION
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s determination that D.A. is gravely disabled as a result of his schizophrenia because his grandiose delusions render him unable to provide for his basic personal needs for food, clothing, and shelter. Additionally, the LPS Act is a special proceeding of a civil nature to which the
11
rules of civil procedure generally apply. Because D.A. did not serve a demand for production of Dr. Morris’s documents as required by the Code of Civil Procedure, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.A.’s mid-trial request for a continuance.
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Verdict The LPS Act authorizes one-year conservatorships for those who are gravely disabled due to a mental health disorder. (§ 5350.) “When a treatment professional determines a person is gravely disabled and unwilling or unable to accept treatment voluntarily, the county’s public guardian may petition to establish a conservatorship. [Citations.] If the matter proceeds to trial and the person is found gravely disabled, the court appoints a conservator [citation], imposes ‘disabilities’ as needed [citation], and determines an appropriate treatment placement [citation]. [Citation.] A conservatorship terminates after one year but may be extended for additional one-year terms upon petition. [Citation.]” (Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1095-1096.)
“In the trial court, ‘to establish that a person is gravely disabled, the evidence must support an objective finding that the person, due to mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise provide for his or her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter,’ and the public guardian must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the proposed conservatee is gravely disabled. [Citation.] On appeal, we apply the substantial evidence test to determine whether the record supports the court’s finding of grave disability. The testimony of one witness may be sufficient
12
to support such a finding.” (Conservatorship of Jesse G. (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 453, 460-461; see also Conservatorship of S.A. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 48, 54.)
D.A. does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence that he has a mental illness. He challenges only the finding that his schizophrenia renders him gravely disabled. That challenge fails because substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that D.A. is gravely disabled on account of an inability to provide for basic needs of food, clothing, and shelter.
Dr. Morris testified that during her interviews with D.A., including an interview approximately five days before her testimony at trial, D.A. asserted his discharge plan was to go live in one of his homes in Santa Clarita. D.A. was unable to identify any of those homes other than indicating he knew a home was available to return to because squatters or inhabitants put up a “‘welcome home’” sign. D.A. stated he would provide for his food and clothing using the millions of dollars he had in the bank as a result of his role as the CEO of Spectrum and his 3D printing business with Bill Gates. He also said he would rely on his funds and his celebrity friends to obtain clothing. Based on this, Dr. Morris opined D.A.’s grandiose delusions, a symptom of his schizophrenia, impeded his ability to provide for his basic needs because his discharge plan was based on his delusions. That conclusion is well supported by D.A.’s statements.
Portions of D.A.’s testimony at trial further corroborated Dr. Morris’s testimony. For example, he referenced his belief that he works with Bill Gates, is referred to as the CEO of Spectrum, and potentially has multiple houses in Santa Clarita. He asserted he last withdrew money from his bank account using his debit card in 2024 (though the parties stipulated D.A. was
13
unavailable to access money in 2024). Additionally, though D.A. asserted he planned to work at a Mercedes Benz dealership selling cars if he were released from the conservatorship, he also admitted he had never sold cars before.
D.A. nonetheless contends the finding of grave disability was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the evidence that he was willing and able to accept voluntary treatment. He also argues Dr. Morris’s opinion that he lacks insight into his mental disorder is similarly unsupported by substantial evidence and not dispositive. Even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was credible evidence D.A. was willing to accept voluntary treatment and has sufficient insight into his mental illness, neither point negates the evidence, already detailed, that D.A.’s mental illness rendered him incapable of providing for his personal needs for food, shelter, or clothing. The jury was entitled to disregard D.A.’s testimony in light of the other substantial evidence which supported its finding of grave disability. (See Conservatorship of Guerrero (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 442, 445-447.) And our review of the record centers on determining whether substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the jury’s finding. (Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577; Conservatorship of Amanda B. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 342, 350.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying a Continuance
D.A. contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying him a continuance to obtain additional discovery. “Trial continuances are ‘disfavored’ and may be granted ‘only on an affirmative showing of good cause.’ [Citation.]” (Reales
14
Investment, LLC v. Johnson (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 463, 468.) We review a trial court’s order denying a continuance for abuse of discretion. (Forthmann v. Boyer (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 977, 984- 985.)
D.A. requested a mid-trial continuance of unspecified length in order to obtain and review records from Dr. Morris, the Public Guardian’s expert witness. Though the record does not disclose exactly when the Public Guardian provided D.A. notice of the identity of its witness, the Public Guardian orally represented to the court that it provided notice that Dr. Morris would testify “as early as June 5th” and also produced records on July 22nd and 23rd. The Public Guardian also represented it did not have possession or control over any of Dr. Morris’s documents.
An LPS proceeding is a special proceeding of a civil nature.
(Sorenson v. Superior Court (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 409, 432.) As such, the rules of civil procedure generally apply. (Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 438, 444.) Because the relevant LPS statutes are silent with regard to discovery rights, civil discovery rules also apply. (See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 286 [“discovery act applies to statutorily-enacted special proceedings that are silent with respect to discovery”].) Those rules require parties to demand the exchange of documents related to expert witnesses. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2034.220, 2034.230.) The onus was accordingly on D.A. to demand production of Dr. Morris’s notes regardless of whatever informal discovery took place, or usually takes place, in LPS proceedings.
D.A. protests that the due process right to a timely trial would be frustrated by requiring a proposed conservatee to
15
strictly adhere to the Code of Civil Procedure.3 But the question before us is not whether there was error because the trial court strictly enforced normal civil discovery deadlines. Rather, the question is whether it was error for the court to deny the continuance based on D.A.’s contention that the reciprocal rules of criminal discovery should apply to LPS proceedings. Those rules do not apply, and there was accordingly no error.
D.A. also argues the documents he received from County Counsel suggested Dr. Morris worked in a supervisory capacity, rather than in a treatment capacity, and he was blindsided with the information at trial. Since D.A. has not provided an appellate record including any of the documents produced in discovery, we cannot say whether this was a reasonable assumption to make. But in any event, counsel for D.A. could have taken steps to confirm the assumption, either informally by asking the Public Guardian (or, indeed, her own client) or formally by demanding information and documents under the Code of Civil Procedure.
D.A. further complains that though the court set a discovery deadline of June 6, 2025, some documents were not produced until July 22. D.A., however, did not complain about
3 It is hard to understand why. The only formal discovery D.A. would have needed to propound was a demand for exchange of information concerning expert trial witnesses, with a demand for production of discoverable reports and writing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2034.210.) Such a demand must be served “no later than the 10th day after the initial trial date has been set” and the exchange may be set “50 days before the initial trial date, or 20 days after service of the demand, whichever is closer to the trial date, unless the court, on motion and a showing of good cause, orders an earlier or later date of exchange.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2034.220, 2034.230.)
16
the timing of the production below and any such objection is forfeited. (Howitson v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489 [“failure to raise an issue in the trial court typically forfeits on appeal any claim of error based on that issue”].)
Finally, D.A. argues the trial court erred by failing to consider California Rules of Court, rule 3.1332, which enumerates facts and circumstances relevant to ruling on a request for continuance, and he contends that if the court had considered the rule, a continuance would have been warranted. D.A. did not file a noticed motion, ex parte application, or an accompanying declaration in compliance with rule 3.1332(b). Nor did D.A. challenge the trial court’s decision on this ground below. This contention too is forfeited (Howitson, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at 489), and regardless, we presume the trial court was aware of and followed applicable law absent evidence to the contrary—of which there is none (McDermott Will & Emery LLP v. Superior Court (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1083, 1103).4
4 D.A.’s contention in reply that the trial court ignored section 5122 is doubly forfeited; it was not raised in the trial court or the opening brief.
17
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. All parties will bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.