Conroy v. Penn Electrical & Mfg. Co.

173 F. 299, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5874
CourtU.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 30, 1909
DocketNo. 50
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 173 F. 299 (Conroy v. Penn Electrical & Mfg. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conroy v. Penn Electrical & Mfg. Co., 173 F. 299, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5874 (circtwdpa 1909).

Opinion

ORR, District Judge.

This is a suit for the infringement of a reissued patent, the subject of which is, “Improvements for Ornamenting Glass.” The bill is in .the usual form and prays for the customary relief. The case comes before the court upon demurrer, which (among other matters) attacks the validity of the reissue. The demurrer must be overruled.

Ordinarily no expression of opinion is advisable in explanation or support of such ruling. In this case, however, the counsel in their [300]*300' arguments have intimated a desire that the court should decide whether or not the patent in suit has been reissued properly. The answer to this must be in the affirmative, if all the express and implied conditions have existed, and have been performed, upon which a reissue may be granted.

The express conditions as found in the statute relating to a reissue of patents (Rev. St. 4916 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3393]), necessary to be considered in deciding the present case, are: (1) That the original patent was invalid by reason of the patentee claiming as his own invention more than he had a right to claim as new; (2), that the error in the original patent arose by inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without fraudulent or deceptive intention; and (3) that the reissued patent is for the same invention as the original.

The implied condition necessary to be considered is that the application for the reissue was made within a reasonable time.

The second express condition and the implied condition may be briefly considered in the light of Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U. S. 156, 171, 12 Sup. Ct. 825, 36 L. Ed. 658. That case pronounces the settled rule of the Supreme Court to be that it will not review the decision of the commissioner upon the question of inadvertence, accident, or mistake, unless the matter is-manifest from the record. Such matter is not manifest from the record in this case. It must necessarily follow that there was not fraudulent or deceptive intention on the part of the patentee. That case also holds that the question whether the application for reissue was made within a reasonable time is in most, if not all, such cases a question of law. In the present case the application for reissue was made within 10 days after the Circuit Court of Appeals had finally decided that the original patent was invalid. That litigation, which is hereinafter referred to, was begun within 15 months after the original issue, and indicates that a decision was reasonably necessary to declare that the original patent was invalid. As will be seen, this is a case of diminished, and not enlarged, reissue. The rights of the public were not narrowed. Therefore the two-year rule mentioned in Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 26 L. Ed. 783, and Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 354, 5 Sup. Ct. 174, 6 Sup. Ct. 451, 28 L. Ed. 665, should not apply. In no view of the case should the patentee be deemed guilty of laches.

The first express condition — reason why the original patent was invalid. The original patent, No. 723,139, was the subject of litigation between the same parties in this court, as reported in Conroy v. Penn Company (C. C.) 155 Fed. 421, and Id. 425, and in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, as reported in Penn Company v. Conroy, 159 Fed. 943, 87 C. C. A. 149. The result of this litigation was that said original patent, No. 723,139, was declared to, be invalid, not because there was no invention, but because the inventor’s claim was broader than it should have been. This will be seen by an examination of the opinions of the courts in said litigation, in so far as said opinions are specially apjplicable to said patent No. 723,139 (there being two other patents also, considered in the same case). The following'is from the opinion of the lower court, 155 Fed. 421, at page 422, in which I have italicized the last sentence:

[301]*301“The patents refer to the chipping and scalloping the edges of plate glass for small mirrors. Previous to these patents this was done by hand. A piece of plate glass of the desired size, diamond scored on the upper side about an eighth of an inch from the edge, was firmly held by the operator with one hand to overlap the edge of a table. Iu the other hand the operator held a chipping tool. This consisted of a handle provided with a bifurcated prong somewhat wider than the plate glass. The longer arm of the prong was on the lower side of the plate. A sharp, quick downward stroke of the tool forced the inner end of the lower prong against the lower side of the plate, and the upper prong against the upper edge of the plate. This chipped or cutout scallops hack to the scored line. The tool was then moved along the plate, and the operation rapidly repeated. It resulted in a uniform succession of scallops along the plate. The advance In hand chipping now dispenses with scoring. The invention in this case consisted in supplanting hand chipping by machine chipping.’’

Again the lower court (155 Fed. 423) uses the following language, which I have italicized:

“It is very clear that, in view of the prior existence of chipped glass, and that the advance Oonroy made ivas to devise a machine to make it, it is clear that, ichile such machine is patentable, the function of that machine, namely, making machine chipped glass, is not.”

The lower court, therefore, held said patent void, “as simply being for the function of a machine devised to manufacture an old product.” The Court of Appeals (159 Fed. 944, 949, 87 C. C. A. 155) considered and described the old hand method, and stated:

“The claims of the method patent include the hand operation as well as the machine operation. * * * The complainant did not discover a new method of chipping glass. * * * tVo think the court below was right in holding this patent invalid.”

There seems to be in said opinions a fair recognition that Conroy had made an invention of broad character, and that only because his claim could be construed to include the old hand method was said patent invalid. It is also a reasonable conclusion from the study of those cases that an adjudication of the court upon the original patent was reasonably required to ascertain the need for reissue.

The third express condition is the same invention. The original patent was a broad method patent, covering both the hand method and the machine method; the reissued patent covers the machine method only. The boundaries of the new claim lie within the boundaries of the old, as may be seen by comparison:

Original,
it. 20, 'Line 101.
As an improvement in the art of shaping the edges of glass articles, the method herein described which consists in removing by blows at successive points closely adjacent to the edge the edge and a portion of the opposite side of the article in pieces approximately uniform in quantity, substantially as set forth.
Reissue.
R. 80, Line 108.

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Related

Penn Electrical & Mfg. Co. v. Conroy
185 F. 511 (Third Circuit, 1911)
Conroy v. Penn Electrical & Mfg. Co.
181 F. 697 (U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Western Pennsylvania, 1910)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
173 F. 299, 1909 U.S. App. LEXIS 5874, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conroy-v-penn-electrical-mfg-co-circtwdpa-1909.