Conroy v. Commissioner
This text of 41 T.C. 685 (Conroy v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
OPINION
It is respondent’s position that the amounts received by petitioners from the special fund are amounts received by them as annuities. As such they would be includable in petitioners’ gross incomes under section 72 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,2 the pertinent parts of which are set out in the margin. Respondent alternatively argues that if tbe amounts received by petitioners may be characterized as amounts received through accident or health insurance they are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includable in the gross incomes of the employees, or are paid by the employer and, as such, they are includable in petitioners’ gross incomes pursuant to sections 104 and 105 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,3 the pertinent parts of which are set out in the margin.
Petitioners contend that the amounts received by them from the special fund, which have been described in our Findings of Fact, are excludable from gross income as “amounts received” through “accident or health insurance for personal injuries,” pursuant to the provisions of sections 104 and 105 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Petitioners specifically referred to section 105(e). They cite as authorities Haynes v. United States, 353 U.S. 81; J. Wesley Sibole, 28 T.C. 40; and William L. Winter, 36 T.C. 14, affd. 303 F. 2d 150.
Of these cases only the Winter case considered the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which in important respects differ from those of the 1939 Code which were considered in the Haynes and Sibole cases.4 As we pointed out in Adam S. H. Tray fey, 34 T.C. 407, amounts received through accident or health insurance are not excludable from gross income under the 1954 Code to the extent that they are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includable in the gross income of the employee or which are paid by the employer. This general rule is stated in section 104(a)(3) and section 105(a); the exceptions are stated in subsections (b), (c), and (d) of section 105.
In the instant cases no attempt was made, as was made in the Trappey case, to show the extent to which the amounts received by petitioners were attributable to contributions by the employer and the extent to which they were attributable to contributions by the employees. Petitioners have failed to prove that the amounts received by them were attributable to contributions by employees. Indeed, there is no showing that the amounts received by petitioners were not paid by the employer. Straight retirement pensions were paid from the special fund as well as amounts claimed by petitioners to be accident or health benefits, and there is no proof that any provision of the plan under which the special fund operated or any law or ordinance which created it prescribed that “the accident or health benefits are provided in whole or in part by employee contributions and the portion of employee contributions to be used for such purpose.” Accordingly, section 1.72-15(c)(2), Income Tax Regs., the pertinent portion of which is set out in the margin,5 is applicable and “it will be presumed that none of the employee contributions is used to provide such benefits.” This presumption is supported by the meager facts in the record having to do with the sources of the moneys paid out by the special fund which indicate that as a practical matter only a negligible or de minimis proportion of the amounts received by petitioners could have been attributable to employee contributions. These moneys were derived from fines, rewards, employees’ contributions, and from appropriations to the fund made by the city (petitioners’ employer). In 1963 there were approximately 650 members entitled to benefits from the fund, who contributed to the fund 2 percent of their salaries. In that year the annual salary of a police sergeant was $6,468. In that year the city appropriated approximately $3,500,000 to the fund in order that it might make the payments of benefits required.6 Ignoring any receipts from fines or rewards and assuming that all members of the fund were sergeants, it would appear that only a little over 2 percent of the payments made by the fund for all purposes in that year could be considered as attributable to employees’ contributions even if the employee contributions, contrary to the presumption of the quoted regulation, had been “used to provide such benefits” — a fact which petitioners have failed to prove.
It follows, therefore, that the amounts received by petitioners from the special fund are not excludable from gross income under either section 104 or section 105 unless they are covered by subsection 105(b), subsection 105(c), or subsection 105(d). Only the last subsection (105(d)), to which petitioners make no reference in their argument, can have any possible application to the facts of the instant cases, and it was on this subsection that we relied in deciding in favor of the taxpayers in the Winter case. In that case we found that “during 1959 [the taxable year there involved] only 10.2 percent of the eligible employees exercised their privilege of retiring at 60 and that over the 10-year period ending in 1959 that figure ranged from 6.6 percent to ‘something over 13 percent’ ” and concluded that it was the normal practice of the employees in that case to retire at 65 rather than at 60 and, therefore, under section 1.105-4(a)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs., the amounts received by a 60-year-old employee under a pension and retirement plan because of illness were excludable from gross income pursuant to the provisions of subsection 105(d) of the 1954 Code. On the record before us in the instant cases we cannot make similar findings and therefore cannot reach the same result. See Corkum v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 471. In this case it has been stipulated and we have found as a fact that the average ages and years in service of those members of the special fund who retired were less than the ages of petitioners during the taxable years and less than their years of service if they had remained in the Department. There is nothing in the record which would indicate that the average age and average years of service at which members of the special fund retired voluntarily were more than 60 and 30, respectively. Petitioners were not “absent from work” during the taxable years since they were not expected to work because they had reached retirement age. See sec. 1.105-4(a)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs. Accordingly, we conclude that subsection 105(d) of the 1954 Code is not applicable to the facts of the instant cases and that the payments received by petitioners are not excludable from their gross incomes under section 104(a)(3) or section 105(a).
Petitioners strongly deny that the amounts they received constituted annuities taxable under section 72 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. In their pleadings they have raised no alternative issue and have made no argument at the trial or on brief that section 1.72-15(f), Example (1), Income Tax Regs., is in any way applicable, nor have they introduced in evidence any facts which would warrant us in making allowances under that section of the regulations on account of their contributions to the fund in amounts greater than those made by respondent in his determinations of deficiencies, even if we decided that the amounts received by petitioners were taxable under section 72 of the 1954 Code.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
41 T.C. 685, 1964 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conroy-v-commissioner-tax-1964.