Connor v. Minier

288 P. 23, 109 Cal. App. Supp. 770, 1930 Cal. App. LEXIS 4
CourtAppellate Division of the Superior Court of California
DecidedMay 2, 1930
DocketC. A. No. 105
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 288 P. 23 (Connor v. Minier) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Connor v. Minier, 288 P. 23, 109 Cal. App. Supp. 770, 1930 Cal. App. LEXIS 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930).

Opinion

SHAW, J.

This is an action on a promissory note for

$300, in which The Williams Plan Company, hereinafter called simply the company, is named as payee. The plaintiff is the assignee of the payee for collection merely, and hence stands in its shoes as to all defenses. The defendant Gaste filed an answer alleging as a defense that the loan was usurious, and appeals from a judgment against him for the full amount of the note with interest.

Prom the record the following facts appear without dispute. The defendant H. W. Minier, desiring to borrow $300, went to the office of the company a few days before May 15, 1928, and applied for a loan. He was told that he must procure accommodation co-makers as sureties on a note, and ivas given an application form and a blank note, on which the note in suit was executed. He brought this note back about May 15, 1928, bearing the signatures of himself and wife, of appellant, and of another person, as co-makers. The loan was then made. In connection with the transaction Minier signed several papers. One of them was an application for the loan, in which he stated that he desired a loan of $300, and agreed if it was made to purchase from the company an investment certificate for that amount, and to hypothecate it as additional security for the loan, and instructed the company to apply the proceeds of the certificate to liquidate the note covering the loan when due. On the same paper with this application were statements of their financial condition, signed by appellant and another maker. The note in suit was dated May 4, 1928, and by its makers above mentioned agreed to pay to the company $300, in forty equal installments, on Tuesday of each week after date, with interest from maturity at eight per cent per annum. This note recited that it was given “for the purchase by the maker of an investment certificate of the said company”. On May 15, 1928, the company made and signed a paper labeled “investment certificate”, which showed that its amount was $300, recited that H. W. Minier was the purchaser thereof and had given a note for the purchase price, describing a note which corresponds to that sued on, except that the date was given as May 15, 1928, and H. W. Minier alone was named as the maker, and then provided that “when the contract of purchase has been fulfilled and the payments of the [Supp. 774]*Supp. 774aforesaid note made, as agreed on or before the dates specified, the Williams Plan Company of Los Angeles will pay to the purchaser or assigns the face value hereof, less any indebtedness owing to said company by said purchaser, and, or, by the comakers of said note given as the purchase price hereof”. This document was retained by the company. Minier alone executed another note labeled “loan note”, dated May 15, 1928, by which he agreed to pay to the company, one year after date, $300, with interest at six per cent per annum. This note was physically attached to the investment certificate above mentioned, and stated that said investment certificate was assigned to the company as collateral security therefor. Before making the loan the company paid $1.50 for a financial report upon the appellant, and upon receipt of the various papers above mentioned, completed the transaction by giving Minier its check for $270 on May 15, 1928.

When a claim of usury is made the courts will look through the form in which the transaction is cast to discover its real substance, and if, when that is found, it appears that a borrower has paid, or agreed to pay, more than the lawful rate of interest for a loan, the loan will be held usurious. (Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., 200 Cal. 609-616 [53 A. L. R 725, 254 Pac. 956, 255 Pac. 805]; Wallace v. Zinman, 200 Cal. 585-597 [62 A. L. R. 1341, 254 Pac. 946].)

Our usury law fixes twelve per cent per annum as the maximum rate of interest that may be charged on a loan, and its manifest intent is to forbid absolutely to the lender any profit whatever by way of commission, bonus or other kind of charge, if in so doing that rate is exceeded. The lender may perform services or incur expenses in connection with the loan for which he may reimburse himself from the loan, but these items must be confined to specific service or expense incidental to the loan, incurred in such a way as to absolutely preclude its being a device through which additional interest or profit on the loan may be exacted. (Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., supra.)

In the present case all the various papers which we have described are manifestly parts of one transaction, by which Minier borrowed money from the company, and all must be taken into consideration to determine whether that loan was usurious. On consideration of them all, and of the other [Supp. 775]*Supp. 775facts stated, we have no doubt that it was. Although Minier signed two notes for |300 each, he actually received only $270, in addition to which the company paid $1.50 for a financial report. At the argument before us it was stated that the deduction of $30 was made up of one year’s interest on $300 at six per cent, amounting to $18, and $12 for expenses of the loan; but the record does not show what was the reason for this deduction. The lender showed no services or expenses in connection with the loan except the item of $1.50, above mentioned. If $12 was deducted for expenses, the remainder of it must, therefore, be regarded as a bonus or commission and treated as a part of the interest deducted in advance. When interest or commission is deducted in advance from the amount of a loan, in testing the transaction for usury, the principal sum loaned will be held to be the face amount 'of the loan, less the interest or commission so deducted. (Haines v. Commercial Mortgage Co., supra.) The total amount loaned in this cas.e, therefore, is $271.50. According to the terms of the note sued on, $300 would be repaid to the company in equal weekly installments extending over a period of forty weeks. This amount exceeds the actual loan by $28.50. If we assume that the whole of the loan remains unpaid for forty weeks, the interest on it for that time at twelve per cent, the maximum rate permitted by the Usury Law is only $25.06. The interest charged is, therefore, usurious even on that assumption, but, in fact, by reason of the installment payments, the whole principal would not remain unpaid for forty weeks, and the interest which could be lawfully charged is, therefore, less than the amount just stated. If we consider the other note, which calls for the payment of $300 in one year, with interest at six per cent, we find that it contains no provision for its payment before maturity, and no interest has been credited upon it, whatever the purpose of the deductions from the loan may have been. It, therefore, apparently requires the payment of $18 more as interest, which would increase the amount of usury of the loan.

We do not think the charge of usury is evaded by the device of taking two notes from the borrower, each equal to the amount of the loan applied for, and issuing in his name a certificate of investment which is to be paid for by one note and held as security for the payment of the other. [Supp. 776]*Supp. 776At the trial plaintiff’s counsel admitted that these investment certificates were of doubtful value, and we quite agree with him. The only agreement which the company made by the certificate is that when the so-called purchase note had been paid it would repay Minier the amount so paid, less any indebtedness owing by him or the other makers to the company.

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Bluebook (online)
288 P. 23, 109 Cal. App. Supp. 770, 1930 Cal. App. LEXIS 4, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/connor-v-minier-calappdeptsuper-1930.