Connor v. Andrus

453 F. Supp. 1037, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17356
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedJune 7, 1978
DocketCiv. A. EP-77-CA-187
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 453 F. Supp. 1037 (Connor v. Andrus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Connor v. Andrus, 453 F. Supp. 1037, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17356 (W.D. Tex. 1978).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN H. WOOD, Jr., District Judge.

This is a suit to have particular regulations of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior and the Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife declared invalid and to enjoin the enforcement of those regulations. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, alleging that the regulations would cause them irreparable harm if the individual defendants were not immediately enjoined from enforcement of the regulations. An evidentiary hearing was held, during which the parties submitted affidavits and testimony and the Court heard arguments from all its parties. Additionally, the parties submitted memoranda of law in support of their positions. Based on the evidence and the administrative record, the Court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the Federal defendants from the enforcement of the hunting regulations and ordering them to promulgate new regulations consistent with that order. The order further decreed that the State defendant, HENRY BURKETT, Director of Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife, reconsider the Texas Parks and *1039 Wildlife regulations closing duck hunting in West Texas and report back to the Court with his findings. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment, requesting a final declaration of rights under the Endangered Species Act and final judgment. Their motion was granted and this Court files this Memorandum Opinion with its Declaration and Order in support of that order.

The Federal regulations which are challenged in this litigation were promulgated by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service pursuant to the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, et seq. The regulations were a part of the annual migratory waterfowl hunting season frameworks which the Service issues pursuant to the notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 553. The initial proposed regulations were originally published in the Federal Register on March 10, 1977. See 42 F.R. 13311. On August 15, 1977, the final draft of the proposed regulations was published in the Federal Register, setting forth the proposed framework for season lengths, shooting hours, bag and possession limits and outside dates within which states could select seasons for hunting birds and other matter. See 42 F.R. 41145. On page 41149 under the heading of “Compliance with Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973”, the Fish and Wildlife Service set forth facts to show that the Secretary of the Interior was complying with the requirements of Section 7. Section 7 of the act is found at 16 U.S.C. § 1536. Under the section the Secretary is required to review programs administered by him and utilize those programs in the furtherance of the purposes of the Endangered Species Act and to take such action as is necessary to insure the actions authorized, funded or carried out do not jeopardize the continued existence of endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or in modification of habitat of the species. Among those listed as endangered was the Mexican duck (Anas diazi). It was announced that the proposed late season frameworks, which includes the duck season in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona were being evaluated as to possible impacts upon the Mexican duck and that consultations within the Department of the Office of Endangered Species and the Office of Migratory Bird Management were then underway. It was further stated that findings from the consultation might cause modification of some of the regulatory measures which had been proposed, and that any modifications would be reflected in the final rule making which was to appear on or about August 30th, 1977.

On September 9, 1977, the final regulations setting late season framework appeared in the Federal Register. See 42 F.R. 45310. The effective date was the date of publication. The final regulations were substantially the same as the proposed frameworks which were published before except that it was ordered that “in order to provide greater protection to the endangered Mexican duck, all duck hunting is prohibited in designated portions of New Mexico and Texas.” Also affected was a small area in Western Arizona.

The regulations stated that a biological opinion was issued on August 22, 1977, on species including the Mexican duck and the opinion concluded that the proposed regulations were unlikely to jeopardize the continued existence of the Mexican duck or destroy or adversely modify critical habitats. See 42 F.R. 45313. Nonetheless the Fish and Wildlife Service concluded that in order to insure the programs administered by the Service are used to further the purpose of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, it intended to prohibit the hunting of ducks in the described areas. Pursuant to the requirement that its regulations conform to the frameworks for the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Texas Department of Parks and Wildlife amended its regulations to close the season for duck hunting in the affected areas of Texas. The New Mexico Department of Game and Fish took no action to conform its regulations to the federal regulations.

The plaintiffs attack the regulations on the basis that they are arbitrary and capricious. They argue that the admin *1040 istrative record and other evidence provide no rational factual basis for the regulation closing duck season in the affected areas. The plaintiffs have recognized that the burden is upon them to show the arbitrary and capricious nature of the Fish and Wildlife Services’ regulations. Sterling-Davis Dairy v. Freeman, 253 F.Supp. 80 (D.N.J. — 1965). This Court concurred with the plaintiffs’ assertion on this point and issued the preliminary injunction and with its order filed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 1 In *1041 reaching its decision the Court recognizes that the Secretary of the Interior has an affirmative duty under the Endangered Species Act to bring endangered species to the point at which they may be removed from protected status. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 428 F.Supp. 167 (D.C.D. 1977). But such a duty is not met by promulgating regulations which do not attack the cause or causes of population depletion of a species. This is particularly a problem where other interests, such as those of the plaintiffs in this suit, are adversely affected. The need to show a rational basis for a regulation obviously becomes even more important.

The defendants have cited that portion of the Senate Report on the Endangered Species Act which contained the following finding:

The two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of the natural habitat. S.Rep.No.93-307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973); U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 1973, pp. 2989, 2990.

Clearly the record and the evidence in this case demonstrate that the Mexican duck is threatened by the destruction of its natural habitat. Additionally, it shows that the other danger is hybridization with the mallard.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
453 F. Supp. 1037, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17356, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/connor-v-andrus-txwd-1978.