Conner 304527 v. Taylor

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided December 23, 2024·No. 2:23-cv-02525·Unknown

Opinion

1 JL 2 WO 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Dayshaun Darion Conner, No. CV-23-02525-PHX-JAT (JZB) 10 Plaintiff, 11 v. ORDER 12 K. Taylor, et al., 13 Defendants.

15 On December 5, 2023, pro se Plaintiff Dayshaun Darion Conner, who is confined 16 in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis (ASPC-Lewis), filed a civil rights Complaint 17 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a 18 January 10, 2024 Order, the Court granted the Application to Proceed and dismissed the 19 Complaint because Plaintiff had failed to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days 20 to file an amended complaint that cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. 21 On January 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint. In a March 26, 22 2024 Order, the Court dismissed the First Amended Complaint because Plaintiff had failed 23 to state a claim. The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended complaint that 24 cured the deficiencies identified in the Order. The Court warned Plaintiff that the Clerk of 25 Court would enter a judgment of dismissal with prejudice if he failed to timely file a second 26 amended complaint. 27 Not having received a second amended complaint or a motion for extension of time, 28 on May 10, 2024, the Clerk of Court entered a Judgment of dismissal with prejudice. The 1 Clerk of Court sent the May 10, 2024 Judgment to Plaintiff at his address of record. On 2 May 13, 2024, the mail was returned as undeliverable because Plaintiff was out to court in 3 Maricopa County. 4 On August 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Excusable Neglect Pursuant to 5 FRCP 60(b)(1) and (6), Prayer to Reopen Case and for Leave to File a Second Amended 6 Complaint” and lodged a proposed Second Amended Complaint. In an October 11, 2024 7 Order, the Court construed the Motion as a Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to 8 Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, granted the Motion, and directed the 9 Clerk of Court to vacate the May 10, 2024 Judgment, and reopen this case. Because 10 Plaintiff stated in his Motion that he never received the March 26, 2024 Order and did not 11 have the benefit of that Order when he filed the lodged proposed Second Amended 12 Complaint, the Court directed the Clerk of Court not to file the lodged proposed Second 13 Amended Complaint and gave Plaintiff 30 days to file a Second Amended Complaint that 14 cured the deficiencies identified in the March 26 Order. 15 On October 29, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 15). The 16 Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint with leave to amend. 17 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 18 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 19 against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 20 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 21 has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 22 relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 23 such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 24 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 25 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does 26 not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the- 27 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 28 1 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 2 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 3 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 4 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 5 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 6 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 7 misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 8 relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 9 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 10 allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there 11 are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681. 12 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts 13 must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 14 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent 15 standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 16 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 17 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 18 facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 19 of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 20 Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, but 21 because it may possibly be amended to state a claim, the Court will dismiss it with leave 22 to amend. 23 II. Second Amended Complaint 24 In his three-count Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues Sergeant Kimo 25 Taylor, Corporal Christopher Carter, and Correctional Officer Doe #1. Plaintiff asserts 26 excessive force claims. He seeks monetary relief. 27 Plaintiff alleges the following: 28 On October 12, 2023, Plaintiff was secured in handcuffs, leg irons, and shackles, 1 and was strapped down and secured in a mobile restraint chair. Plaintiff was incapable of 2 moving and posed no physical threat to anyone. While Plaintiff was restrained, Defendants 3 Taylor, Carter, and Doe #1 all lunged at and slammed into Plaintiff. Defendant Taylor 4 placed Plaintiff in a “choke hold” and “aggressively chok[ed]” Plaintiff for “what seemed 5 like long minutes,” causing him extreme anxiety, apprehension, and panic. Plaintiff 6 “legitimately feared for his life and thought he was going to be killed, choked to death.” 7 “Then later,” Defendant Taylor “aggressively grabbed” Plaintiff’s neck and lower face area 8 and twisted his head and neck at an angle in a manner that again cut off his air supply and 9 made it difficult for him to breathe. 10 Defendant Carter pushed Plaintiff’s head and neck between his legs and Carter 11 “aggressively str[uck]” Plaintiff with a closed fist on the side of his head, causing Plaintiff 12 to lose vision and nearly lose consciousness. Defendant Carter “appl[ied] his full body 13 weight” on Plaintiff’s head and neck, causing unbearable pain.

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