Congini by Congini v. PORTERSVILLE, ETC.

458 A.2d 1384, 312 Pa. Super. 461

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: August 17, 1983
• Docket: 842
• Status: Published

Opinions

PRICE, Judge:

This is an action in trespass for personal injuries sustained by Mark Congini on December 22, 1978 in an automobile accident. His parents instituted a suit on his behalf and on their own behalf in the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County, Pennsylvania against the Portersville Valve Company (“Portersville”). The Honorable William R. Ralph issued an order and opinion sustaining Portersville’s preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer and dismissed the Congini’s complaint on August 18, 1980. The Conginis have appealed from this dismissal.

The following facts were pleaded and must be taken as true for the purposes of this appeal. At the time of the accident, Mark was eighteen years of age and an employee of Portersville. On December 22, 1978, Portersville held a Christmas party for its employees at its plant at which alcoholic beverages were served. Mark attended the party and became intoxicated.

Mark’s car was at the plant and appellee Portersville had possession and custody of its keys. Although appellee was aware of Mark’s intoxicated condition, the keys were given to Mark upon his request so that Mark could drive from the plant to his home.

While Mark was operating the car on the highway, he drove it into the rear of another vehicle which was proceeding in the same direction. As a result of this accident, Mark suffered multiple fractures and brain damage which have left him totally and permanently disabled.

Appellants allege several grounds of liability based upon negligence. The first argument is that appellee was negligent in providing Mark, a minor, with alcoholic beverages to the point that he was intoxicated and that this negligent action caused Mark to suffer injuries. The second allegation is that appellee was negligent in turning over the keys to Mark’s car, in order that Mark could drive home when appellee was aware of Mark’s intoxication.¹ Appellants have not alleged that appellee is a licensee of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board. The lower court held that this case was controlled by Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973) and sustained appellee’s preliminary objections and dismissed the appellants’ complaint.

Since this appeal is from the sustaining of preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, the facts before us are confined to appellant’s complaint since the demurrer admits for present purposes every well pleaded material fact set forth in the complaint as well as the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom.

Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fioravanti, 451 Pa. 108, 111, 299 A.2d 585, 587 (1973). Only in cases which are clear and free from doubt should a complaint be dismissed.² In this case, we hold that even given the benefit of every reasonable inference, appellants have not pleaded a cause of action.

Appellants are asking that we find for the first time in Pennsylvania that a social host can be liable for injuries which occur to an intoxicated guest. Because they have phrased their complaint in terms of negligence instead of relying on the Pa.Liquor Code,³ appellants urge that we make a distinction between the present case and the prior cases which have denied liability.⁴ However, our supreme court has made it clear that under any theory, “only licensed persons engaged in the sale of intoxicants have been held to be civilly liable to injured parties.” Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 239, 310 A.2d 75, 76 (1973). (Emphasis in original). In Klein v. Raysinger, 298 Pa.Superior Ct. 246, 249 n. 2, 444 A.2d 753, 754 n. 2 (1982), we held specifically that Manning rejected unconditionally the principle of imposing civil liability on unlicensed persons. Appellants argue, however, that in the instant case, the unique facts compel that we distinguish the prior cases and find that appellees are liable.

Appellants agree that potential liability should not rest on every social host who serves intoxicating beverages. However, appellants argue that there should not be a blanket exclusion for social hosts but rather that liability should be determined on a case by case basis. The distinguishing factor among the cases would be the duty of care owed to the guest, depending on the circumstances. For instance, in this case, appellants urge that we find there are extenuating circumstances which create a special duty which was violated by appellees. The facts appellant finds compelling include the handing over of the car keys to the intoxicated minor. We are not so persuaded.

The question of whether it is negligent to allow a guest to drive his own vehicle while intoxicated has already been decided by this court. In Klein v. Raysinger, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 248, 252 n. 3, 448 A.2d 620, 623 n. 3 (1982), we declined to create such a duty, recognizing that “indeed, a social host is not privileged to use force against or impose confinement upon another for the purpose of preventing the violation of a statute, i.e., driving while under the influence.

Nor does the fact that Mark was a minor at the time of the accident change the outcome in this particular case. In the case of Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135 (3rd Cir.1979), the court reaffirmed that a non-licensee in Pennsylvania is not civilly liable for damages caused by serving intoxicating liquors to a social guest. The Bradshaw case specifically dealt with the issue of whether the fact that minors were involved created a special duty upon which liability could be based and the court held that under Pennsylvania law no such duty existed.⁵

Thus it is clear that at the present time, there is no precedent for a finding of liability on the part of a social host. Although we recognize the seriousness of the problem of drunk driving and the resulting tragedies, we are bound to follow existing law. We agree with the Manning court which held that even though these types of claims may have some merit, “a decision of this monumental nature is best left to the legislature.” Supra 454 Pa. at 239, 310 A.2d at 76.

Therefore, the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s complaint is affirmed.

MONTEMURO, J., files a dissenting opinion.

1 . A third issue, involves the duty owed by a landowner to an invitee. (In this case Portersville to Mark). We will not discuss this issue, as it was not raised by the pleadings, but only on appeal. Even if an amendment to the pleadings were allowed however, and this issue was added, our decision would not change in this type of case involving a non-licensee of the Liquor Board.

2 . See Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 149-150, 404 A.2d 672, 673-674 (1979). See also Harley Davidson Motor Co., Inc. v. Hartman, 296 Pa.Superior Ct. 37, 442 A.2d 284 (1982); Banyas v. Lower Bucks Hospital, 293 Pa.Superior Ct. 122, 437 A.2d 1236, 1237 (1981); Chapman v. Philadelphia, 290 Pa.Superior Ct. 281, 434 A.2d 753 (1981).

3 . 47 P.S. 4-493(1); 47 P.S. 4-497.

4 . See Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973); Klein v. Raysinger, 298 Pa.Superior Ct. 246, 444 A.2d 753 (1982); Klein v. Raysinger, 302 Pa.Superior Ct. 248, 448 A.2d 620 (1982).

5 . We also acknowledge the decision of Sanders v. Hercules Sheet Metal, Inc., La., 385 So.2d 772 (1980). This case involved a similar employer-employee situation and the Louisiana Supreme Court upheld a ruling of summary judgment, ruling that there was no possibility of negligence on the part of the employer in such a situation.