Concerned Citizens of Southern Ohio, Inc. v. Pine Creek Conservancy District

429 U.S. 651, 97 S. Ct. 828, 51 L. Ed. 2d 116, 1977 U.S. LEXIS 46

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: February 22, 1977
• Docket: 76-667
• Status: Published

Opinions

Per Curiam.

Chapter 6101 of the Ohio Revised Code establishes procedures for the organization and governance of conservancy districts, political subdivisions of the State invested with the power to carry out flood prevention and control measures. The statute provides for the creation of a conservancy court each time that a petition is duly filed to propose the creation of a new district. It is the conservancy court’s responsibility first to evaluate the desirability of establishing the proposed district and then, if it decides to create the district, to assume the ultimate responsibility for administering the district. A conservancy district may include territory from one or more counties, and the conservancy court is composed of one judge from the court of common pleas in each county having territory within the conservancy district.

In 1966 the Pine Creek Conservancy District was established in accordance with the procedures set forth in chapter 6101. Appellants, who collectively are residents, property owners, and taxpayers in the Pine-Creek District, brought the present action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging, inter alia, that chapter 6101 is unconstitutional.

Appellants leveled three constitutional challenges against the statute in the District Court, and those claims have been renewed in the 'instant appeal. First, they argue that it violates due process for the conservancy courts to make the decision as to whether the conservancy districts that they will administer should be formed. Since the judges of the conservancy courts are entitled to special compensation for their work on those courts, appellants contend that they have a financial incentive to declare the proposed districts organized and that, therefore, persons objecting to the formation of a district are deprived of a hearing before an impartial judicial officer. See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U. S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927). Second, appellants contend that the composition of the conservancy courts violates the one-man, one-vote principle of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), because the judges on those courts are selected without regard to the size of the population that they represent. Third, appellants argue that chapter 6101 permits the disenfranchisement of freeholders affected by the decision to create a conservancy district because the statute creates a presumption that a local political body, such as a township, represents the views of alb persons within its jurisdiction whenever it supports a petition proposing the creation of a conservancy district.

A three-judge court rejected all of these claims on the single ground that they were foreclosed by Orr v. Allen, 248 U. S. 35 (1918), aff’g 245 F. 486 (WD Ohio 1917), a case in which we rejected a due process and equal protection attack on the statute challenged here. No. C-1-75-5 (WD Ohio, July 6, 1976).

None of the issues presented in this case was raised or passed upon in On. The appellant in On presented four issues to this Court, none of which had anything to do with the issues presented here. The appellant argued that the challenged statute denied him judicial review, that it authorized an impairment of existing contracts, that it improperly conferred legislative powers on the judiciary, and that it authorized a taking without compensation. Our three-page memorandum opinion in On did not purport to go beyond the issues raised by the appellant in that ease. By no stretch of the imagination- can our decision in On be thought to have silently dealt with issues which arose and were decided in later cases such as Ward, Tumey, and Reynolds v. Sims.

Because the court below gave no independent consideration to the issues raised by appellants and relied exclusively on On, although that case considered none of the issues now presented, it is apparent that the merits of appellants’ claims have never been fully considered by any federal court. Without offering any view as to the relative merit of appellants’ contentions, it is fair to say that they are not insubstantial. We therefore reverse the decision below and remand for a full consideration of the issues presented by appellants.

So ordered.

The Chief Justice would note probable jurisdiction and give plenary consideration to this appeal.