Computer Care v. Service Systems Enterprises, Inc.

761 F. Supp. 1333, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3617, 1991 WL 60679
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedMarch 20, 1991
Docket90 C 5943
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 761 F. Supp. 1333 (Computer Care v. Service Systems Enterprises, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Computer Care v. Service Systems Enterprises, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1333, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3617, 1991 WL 60679 (N.D. Ill. 1991).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHADUR, District Judge.

This action has been heard on the motion of plaintiff Computer Care for a preliminary injunction against defendants Service Systems Enterprises, Inc. (“Service Systems”) and Larry Aronson (“Aronson”). 1 Both Computer Care and defendants, each *1334 represented by able counsel, appeared at the preliminary injunction hearing (the “Hearing”) and presented evidence — after which counsel have completed their submissions by the filing of post-Hearing memo-randa. For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, which reflects this Court’s findings of fact (“Findings”) and conclusions of law (“Conclusions”) in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. (“Rule”) 52(a), 2 a preliminary injunction is entered in Computer Care’s favor of substantially broader scope than the relief granted by the TRO.

Findings of Fact

Because two lengthy portions of the factual presentation in Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Brief in Support of Its Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“P. Mem.”) are accurate in virtually every respect, this Court adopts that presentation as its own. In order that these Findings may be self-contained and that the description of the acts sought to be restrained may conform to Rule 65(d), P. Mem. 1-13 is attached as Ex. 1 and P. Mem. 27-31 is attached as Ex. 2 to this preliminary injunction order. Only these matters set out in Ex. 1 are excluded from this Court’s Findings:

1. Although it is true that Riordan prepared and furnished to Service Systems a list of Computer Care’s customers (Ex. 1 at 5 and 7 [1340-41]) this Court does not find that to be an actionable violation of Computer Care’s rights. It is considered as relevant evidence only regarding defendants’ intent — their state of mind — when they engaged in the other aspects of copying that do constitute infringements of Computer Care’s copyright and trade dress and trade secrets.
2. Service Systems’ use of false advertising claims, which have ascribed to Service Systems attributes that are true as to Computer Care but are knowingly false as to Service Systems (Ex. 1 at 8, [1341]) do not “deceive customers into believing that their service is Computer Care and not Service Systems” (id.). In fact this action is not a “palming off” case in that sense. Instead such activity is unfair competition that, whether or not actionable under Lanham Act § 43(a) (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), violates Illinois law.

This Court also makes several additional Findings based on the evidence adduced during the Hearing. Those may be set out in relatively brief compass.

For one thing, Computer Care sought unsuccessfully — through many (fully 12) efforts by a professional process server— to subpoena two other persons known to be Services Systems sales representatives (Ex. 1 at 13 [1343]). Both of them were unquestionably ducking service — Aronson himself cynically indicated that to the process server (id.). This Court has accordingly drawn the inference that the testimony of those sales representatives as to Service Systems’ past and current conduct of its business, and particularly as to the continuing infringement of Computer Care’s rights by that conduct, would have been unfavorable to Service Systems and hence favorable to Computer Care.

Second, the changes that are manifested in Service Systems’ currently produced sales scripts — which appear to have deleted the direct misrepresentations that originally misappropriated Computer Care-related facts for Service Systems’ benefit — are not sufficient under the circumstances to dispel the overall pattern of copying and misappropriation involved here. 3 Although Fed.R.Evid. 407 bars the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures “to prove ... cul *1335 pable conduct in connection with the event,” such activity may of course bear on the propriety of injunctive relief against future violations by Service Systems. In this instance the combination of defendants’ past culpable activity and the nature of their response to this litigation calls for a total lack of confidence in the noninfring-ing nature of their future conduct unless Computer Care is given the assurance that can be provided only by an injunction order.

Third, any suggestion by Feldgreber that Service Systems had developed its materials independently, rather than by copying them from Computer Care virtually lock, stock and barrel, is rejected as incredible. If anything, that unbelievable assertion tends to underscore Service Systems’ intention to engage in the deliberate infringements and misappropriations that have been disclosed by the record. Feldgreber’s efforts to explain Service Systems’ copying of the Computer Care format, as presented in its three types of report, on the basis that what was copied was functional is also wholly unworthy of belief in light of Kaufman’s testimony to the contrary. All that Feldgreber rather demonstrated was that the presentation and format could be set up as Computer Care did, and as Service Systems copied, in order to serve customers — but not at all that the presentation and format had to be done that way in order to perform the function. 4 Dramatic evidence of the non-functionality of that information is provided by the facts (1) that Computer Care’s own more recent reports do not include some of its aspects and. (2) that the new Mopar Customer Care program, being presented pursuant to a contract with (but not being provided directly by) Computer Care, will employ a different format.

Fourth, although Computer Care’s trade secrets may not be entirely as broad as it seeks to claim in that respect, Kaufman's testimony established that various matters that he had designed in the Computer Care system and that were kept closely under wraps (not known even to Computer Care’s sales manager) 5 were matters of which Riordan was aware. It is a reasonable inference, and this Court finds, that Service Systems’ incorporation of those same unique factors into its modus operandi— factors highly important to the commercial success of the operation — were derived through the imparting of those confidential trade secrets from Riordan to Aronson.

Conclusions of Law

All the relevant criteria for issuance of a preliminary injunction are the same as the preconditions to issuance of a TRO, as outlined in the TRO in this case. But because the scope of the preliminary injunction called for in this case is broader than that of the TRO, it is necessary to recapitulate those criteria (again drawing on their explication in Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
761 F. Supp. 1333, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3617, 1991 WL 60679, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/computer-care-v-service-systems-enterprises-inc-ilnd-1991.